THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A quarterly journal of philosophy

Volume XXXII, Number 1 NOVEMBER 1954

BEING AND GOD ACCORDING TO CONTEMPORARY SCHOLASTICS
George P. Klubertanz, S.J.

GABRIEL MARCEL: EXISTENCE AND THE IDEA OF BEING
Robert Ostermann

THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE MYTH
Frederick D. Wilhelmsen

WHITEHEAD'S PROCESS AND BRADLEY'S REALITY
Robert C. Whittemore

Book Reviews, Bibliography

ALMA COLLEGE LIBRARY Alma, California

Saint Louis University

The College of Philosophy and Letters and the Department of Philosophy, SAINT LOUIS

The Modern Schoolman *is a quarterly journal of philosophy, dedicated to furthering the work begun by the great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages.*

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.
Editor

CHARLES W. MULLIGAN, S.J.
Assistant Editor

Associate Editors

James A. McWilliams, S.J., Vernon J. Bourke, James Collins, William L. Wade, S.J., Robert J. Henle, S.J., Linus J. Thro, S.J.

Corresponding Editors

Belgium and France: Joseph de Finance, S.J., Vals, Le Puy en Velay, Haute-Loire; *Latin America:* Dr. Oswaldo Robles, Mexico City; *The British Isles:* The Reverend D. J. B. Hawkins, Godalming; *Germany:* Walter Brugger, S.J., Berchmanskolleg, Pullach bei Munchen; *India:* J. Pasi, S.J., Mangalore.

EUGENE DUTKIEWICZ, S.J.
Business Manager

Assistants: Robert R. Barr, S.J.; James H. Breininger, S.J.; Clifford E. Brown, S.J.; Patrick J. Burns, S.J.; J. Philip Carey, S.J.; Elmer J. Carroll, S.J.; Royden B. Davis, S.J.; William V. Dych, S.J.; Gilbert R. Gadzikowski, S.J.; C. Edward Gilpatric, S.J.; Milton A. Gonsalves, S.J.; Robert P. Hart, S.J.; Edward J. Herson, S.J.; Carroll C. Kearley, S.J.; Aloysius P. Kelley, S.J.; Carl A. Lofy, S.J.; Emile G. McAnany, S.J.; Lee E. McMahon, S.J.; William E. McMahon, S.J.; Patrick H. McNamara, S.J.; Francis J. Mininni, S.J.; William B. Neenan, S.J.; Louis W. Roberts, S.J.; David D. Schmidt, S.J.; Eugene F. Shaw, S.J.; Marvin D. Skillingstad, S.J.; Edward C. Spethman, S.J.; William J. Sullivan, S.J.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is published in November, January, March, and May. Subscription price, $4.00 a year; foreign subscriptions, $4.20 a year; single copies, $1.25 each. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is indexed in the *Catholic Periodical Index*. Copyright, 1954, by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Saint Louis, Missouri. Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article.

Address all communications to The Editor *or* The Business Manager, THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 3700 West Pine Blvd., Saint Louis 8, Missouri. *Foreign subscription agencies:* ENGLAND: Duckett, 140 Strand, London, W.C.2; NETHERLANDS: Swets & Zeitlinger, Keizersgracht 471, Amsterdam; SPAIN: Anaquel Ediciones, Rios Rosas, 11–San Mateo, 21, Madrid.

Entered as second-class matter December 1, 1923, at the post office at Saint Louis, Missouri, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on January 15, 1929.

Printed in the U.S.A. by E. W. Stephens Co., Columbia, Missouri

THE MODERN

SCHOOLMAN

NOVEMBER 1954

Being and God According to Contemporary Scholastics 1
George P. Klubertanz, S.J.

Gabriel Marcel: Existence and the Idea of Being 19
Robert Ostermann

The Philosopher and the Myth 39
Frederick D. Wilhelmsen

Whitehead's Process and Bradley's Reality 56
Robert C. Whittemore

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Chronicle 75

BOOK REVIEWS

NORMAN KEMP SMITH. *New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes* 77
Henry G. Wolz

BIBLIOGRAPHY 81

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A quarterly journal of philosophy

November 1954 to May 1955 VOLUME XXXII



Saint Louis University

The College of Philosophy and Letters and the Department of Philosophy, SAINT LOUIS

42795

v. 32
1954-
55

George P. Klubertanz, S.J.

BEING AND GOD ACCORDING TO CONTEMPORARY SCHOLASTICS

The Reverend George P. Klubertanz, s.j., *is an associate professor of philosophy at Saint Louis University and editor of* The Modern Schoolman. *He received his M.A. from Saint Louis University and his Ph. D. from the University of Toronto. He has written for* Gregorianum, Mediaeval Studies, *and the* New Scholasticism; *he is the author of* The Discursive Power *and the* Philosophy of Human Nature.

The disappearance of metaphysics, announced so confidently in the nineteenth century, and celebrated so eloquently by the relativists of past generations, has turned out to be only another eclipse. At that time, though metaphysics continued to be taught in some nominal form in most Catholic schools, it was absent from the real interests even of many of its students. Today, metaphysics is again considered important, and many writers, even popular ones, touch on metaphysical subjects. Of course, having a metaphysics is more than just talking about it; not everyone who wants to be a metaphysician succeeds in becoming one. Nor is everyone who claims to follow a great metaphysical thinker a philosopher in virtue of that claim alone.

By metaphysics we can understand any serious and rationally disciplined investigation of reality in its entirety. Metaphysics, thus understood, is different from the literary, humanistic approach and also from any partial approach to some restricted area of the real. As instances of the revived interest in metaphysics, we may point to the development of new metaphysical types such as existentialism and phenomenology, the revival of Thomism outside and even inside the schools, the transformation of Marxism into a philosophy of culture, the neo-Cartesianism of the philosophy of spirit, the widespread interest in, and flood of publications about, the ultimate foundations of morals.

The revival of Catholic philosophy toward the end of the nineteenth century began as a kind of movement to recover *the* heritage of the Middle Ages. Historical scholarship soon brought out the inner complexity and diversity in medieval thought, and it became clear that

"Scholasticism" was not a single doctrine but a group of philosophies. Contemporary "Scholastic philosophy" can therefore only be defined loosely as any philosophy which has its roots in the thought of the Middle Ages. Similarly, contemporary "Thomism" is any philosophy for which the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas is a stimulus and a guide. To be sure, there have been and still are Thomists for whom Thomism is the Athena-like and immobile progeny of the mind of St. Thomas—a system of complete answers to all possible questions. Those Thomists, however, who themselves try to think philosophically engage in a serious and penetrating re-examination of St. Thomas's thought; they confront new problems and discover new aspects of old ones. Some differences are therefore to be expected among Thomists. But even among those who claim to be close followers of St. Thomas there are differences, and sometimes these differences are greatly emphasized.[1]

Are these differences merely verbal—merely disagreements about what to *call* certain realities and principles? Or are they "disputed points"—insignificant trifles magnified out of all proportion in order to arouse a synthetic interest and to hold loyalties along party lines? Or are they basic, real, and fundamental disagreements? One way of telling is to check their consequences.

[1]A sympathetic account of the present situation is given by Robert F. Harvanek, S.J., in "Philosophical Pluralism and Catholic Orthodoxy," *Thought,* XXV (1950), 21-52, and "The Unity of Metaphysics," *ibid.,* XXVIII (1953), 375-412. Father Harvanek leans to a real pluralism with an analogical unity. He characterizes the contrary position as "monolithic," which finds all truth in one system and only error in the other. He considers his position to be intermediate between relativism on the one hand and an excessively narrow view of truth on the other. But even the trilemma he offers leaves out of consideration a fourth position; see James Collins, "The Problem of a Philosophia Perennis," *ibid.,* XXVIII (1953-54), 571-97. See also the notes 31, 32, and 33 at the end of this paper.

[2]There has been some direct writing and discussion of this point; it appears in the attempts of many modern Thomists to begin philosophy with the experience of the Ego; it is implied in the differing epistemologies put forth by Thomists. Another indication was the annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America at Harvard University, March 19 and 20, and that of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in Milwaukee, April 20 and 21. Reference will be made in this article to papers given at both of these meetings. On the interpretation of the texts of St. Thomas dealing with this point, see, among other studies, G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., "The Teaching of Thomistic Metaphysics," *Gregorianum,* XXXV (1954), 9-13, 192-201.

[3]Nor is an interest in the proof of the existence of God merely apologetical, a sign that we are in a state of seige, as is said by John Hyde, S.J., in a review of *La preuve réelle de Dieu* (Joseph Defever, S.J.), *Studies,* XLIII (spring, 1954), 105.

[4]See the typical work done in recent years by such men as Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), and Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (2nd ed. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953).

At present there is a lively discussion about the starting-point of philosophy—the *initium philosophandi*.[2] Where can metaphysics begin? This—let it be noted at once—is not a pedagogical problem of the techniques of arousing a sleeping or sluggish intellect to study a subject that one finds personally uninteresting.[3] Such discussions of mere methodology are almost useless; for teaching is an *art*, and, though the artist can be helped a little by hearing, he becomes an artist chiefly by observing and by doing. The question of the *initium philosophandi* is emphatically a speculative problem, and its importance lies precisely in that it functions as a foundation for a whole elaborated structure of thought.

The historical studies undertaken in the past two centuries have brought out two points about philosophers. It has been made very clear that philosophers differ widely in their conclusions. It has, secondly, been made clear that differing conclusions are not really whimsical, arbitrary pronouncements but are logically necessary consequences of divergent preliminary positions and methods.[4]

In general, this interpretation of philosophical diversity has been admitted for the "major types" of philosophy—idealism, materialism, and so on. What is not often realized is that the divergent conclusions of Scholastic and even Thomistic thinkers are similarly due to initial positions and basic methods.

There are reasons why the necessary differences among Thomists have been minimized and overlooked. Most Scholastic philosophers begin with similar statements of principles; often, they use identically the same formulations. And, being Christian philosophers, they end with a God whom they describe in somewhat similar terms. But if one looks beneath the verbal surface and the agreement of positions, one can find as great differences among Scholastic philosophies as among non-Scholastic ones. A Scholastic philosopher will not be a complete positivist or a pantheist. But there have been Scholastics whose philosophies showed affinities to idealism, Cartesianism, Hegelianism, Kantianism, rationalism; and there are Thomists who differ among themselves in similar ways. We will consider Scholasticism and particularly Thomism inasmuch as they manifest three different starting-points: from concepts, from the conclusions of the philosophy of nature, and

from sense experience directly. Each group considers itself authentically Thomistic, and this study will make no attempt to determine the issue (though it will be clear where the author's sympathies lie).

The Conceptual Approach to Metaphysics

Thomism became a system with Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, though the way had been prepared by Capreolus. It is characterized most sharply perhaps by the doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction and the method of the analysis of concepts.[5] The three degrees of abstraction are not only a method of classification of the various sciences; they also establish the objects of the sciences so classified. By the first degree of abstraction, the direct concepts of the various species and genera are obtained. When these concepts are analyzed at their own level of perfection, we have the traditional Thomistic philosophy of nature: in the concept of man, for example, we find life, sensibility, rationality, freedom, immortality. In turn, each of these concepts has implications: the concept of life, for instance, implies self-movement. As far as the second degree of abstraction is concerned, it will not be discussed here, for it is supposed to explain our knowledge of quantity, not of being or nature. But if—on the plane of the third degree of abstraction—the common substantial features of objects are abstracted, one is in metaphysics. This, be it noted, is a formal abstraction, not merely a greater generalization. Nevertheless, universality and necessity are the traits by which such concepts are recognized. Now, it is true that experience does provide a point of departure for these concepts. Traditional Thomism teaches that we experience change. But we then take up the *concept* of change: we look at the very nature of change in itself, and we see that change implies a distinction between potency and act. This distinction is a real one, because the notions of potency and act are opposed. Note the method. Though we derive the concepts from experience, the very process of abstraction itself eliminates the contingent and particular features of experience to give us its

[5]For an example of traditional Thomistic metaphysics, we can take as a classic exposition Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *Reality*, trans. by Patrick Cummins, O.S.B. (Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950), or any Thomistic textbook written before 1920; for example, those of Fathers Remer or Arnou.

[6]For example, the classic work of P. Descoqs, S.J., *Institutiones Theologiae Naturalis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1935), or the very popular *Scholastic Metaphysics* of John F. McCormick, S.J. (Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1928).

intelligible core. Once abstracted, the concepts of substance, potency, act, and the like, still bear a relation to existing things—they are *able to* exist; existence is suitable to them (*cui competit esse*). Similarly, the object of metaphysics is abstract—namely, whatever is or can be, provided that it has a relation to existence. Being is not entirely neutral to existence, it does have a positive relation to it. But precisely because it is in the third and highest degree of abstraction, being is a formal intelligible character. Beings exist, it is true; but metaphysics deals with being as being, with its intelligible constitution and relationships.

The method of conceptual analysis is followed in proving the existence of God. One first establishes that the concept of cause is a valid one. One has the concept of a contingent thing from experience. So we examine the concepts of contingent thing and of cause and see that the former implies the latter. We see moreover, that the concept of cause and of a per se ordered series of causes requires the existence of a First Cause. Finally, from the concept of First Cause, Pure Act, and so on, the various attributes of God are deduced. In this approach we are dealing with the concepts of act and potency, the concepts of essence and existence, the concepts of contingence and necessity, of creature and of God. The Thomist using this method sees no incongruity in speaking of the metaphysical essence of God and establishing the formal definition thereof. For him, intellectual knowledge and concept are coextensive—whatever we understand, we understand in a concept. Judgment and reasoning are combinations of concepts—based on external grounds, it is true, but essentially operations of concepts. Therefore, this metaphysics is of a piece: one begins with a concept of being as being; one discovers the necessary relations of being, contingency, and causality; one ends with a concept of God—not in Himself, it is true, but only in relation to material things.

Suarezianism, usually considered to be an opponent of Thomism, differs from such traditional Thomism neither in starting-point nor in methods,[6] but in adding some modifications to the concept and in substituting at certain points an appeal to experience for the rational analysis. Historically speaking, these modifications are eclectically added to traditional Thomism, mainly under the pressure of nominalism. Such a modification in method is the Suarezian argument from

separability—an experienced fact—instead of from conceptual distinction—the Thomists's rational approach. For the Suarezians, matter and form are really distinct because forms are separated from the matters they inform and vice versa. This is clearly a nominalist mode of argumentation. But similar separability of essence and existence is impossible; hence, they contend that essence and existence are identical; hence, being cannot be analogous by the analogy of proper proportionality.[7] Yet Suarezians also begin with a concept of being which is most abstract; they reason by the implications of contingence; they arrive at a concept of God as a necessary being.

Like Suarezianism, traditional Scotism is not very far removed from traditional Thomism.[8] A few theses, such as the univocity of being, the formal distinction, and some theses about God, have given rise to rather violent controversy. But like the Thomists, the Scotists argue from concepts, and the differences are those of degree. The difference, for instance, between "possible being" and "the possibility of being" is not an extreme one—both are concepts, and the greater formalization of the latter may be an advantage in some cases. The formal distinction of the Scotists is more in keeping with the conceptual-essential mode of approach, but its difference from traditional Thomism is

[7]In God, according to traditional Thomistic doctrine, there is no distinction, not even a distinction of reason, between God's existence and His essence, but only a distinction of terms. Suarezians often maintain that an analogy of proper proportionality between creature and God is meaningless. If they do admit its possibility, they insist that it is secondary, that it can be used only after the proved existence of God, and therefore cannot be used within that proof. (Not everyone who objects to this particular analogy, however, is a Suarezian.)

[8]For example, Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., *Joannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Philosophica et Theologica* (Quaracchi, 1930). The position of Scotus himself is not being discussed here.

[9]Whereas Avicenna does this openly by calling God the "First" and the "Necessarily Existing," modern Thomists and Suarezians show their similar leanings by wishing to reduce all the proofs of St. Thomas to the proof based on contingency (both contingency and necessity being understood in a formal sense). On Avicenna, see Djemil Saliba, *Etude sur la métaphysique d'Avicenne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1926), pp. 112-24.

[10]Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, *In Summam Theologicam*, I, q. 2, art. 3, comm. iii (ed. Leonine [Rome, 1888], IV, 32b). For similar criticisms by other Thomists, see the references given by Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., "The Conclusion of the *Prima Via*," The Modern Schoolman, XXX (1952), 34-35.

[11]Is not Kant's criticism of the ontological and cosmological proofs a weighty consideration here? Kant's treatment of these proofs, as is well known, envisaged only a conceptual proof.

[12]See Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., "The Reality of the Aristotelian Separate Movers," *Review of Metaphysics*, III (1950), 319-37.

merely one of formalization. The mode of argumentation by analysis of concepts is in both cases logically rigorous; the greater formalization of the Scotist view of the concept permits a simpler reasoning and a more obvious logical severity.

From objective concepts of the Thomistic, Suarezian, or Scotistic type, proceeding by way of analysis, syllogistic deduction, and verification by application to an existing world, one must arrive at a concept of pure form, which is first in the order of formal implications of causality. Its proper qualification, then, is that of "Necessary Being."[9] True, God *is* a Necessary Being. But when His existence is reached by way of formal deduction from the concept of contingency, He must be regarded first as a pure form. And because there is no reason at all why a pure and therefore necessary form could not be many in number, Aristotle ended with many necessary forms. For this reason, also, Thomists, Suarezians, and Scotists find it of supreme importance to attempt to prove the unicity and infinity of God. Some Thomists, seeing that St. Thomas did not consider this transition difficult or important, persist in affirming that this is no problem. Cajetan was much more perspicacious and honest when he asserted that St. Thomas's argumentation was insufficient.[10] Of course, it is not enough to prove a necessary form or essence, and in this Cajetan is right. But, conversely, is it possible on a purely philosophical basis to prove the unicity and infinity of the Necessary Being (as form)?[11] The very extent to which the Scholastic philosophers mentioned above have been exercised in the attempt to prove the unicity of God, His infinity, and His transcendence, are by themselves sufficient to point to the presence of a grave difficulty.

Connected with this problem, and in a way merely a different facet of it, is the question of identifying with a real existent the object to which the proof concludes. When the proof from the formal implications of contingency is used, we discover the *nature* of a cause. To use an analogy, we prove that there is a cause, that somebody is responsible; but *who* the cause is is not clear from the proof. The evidence that one definite individual is responsible is only circumstantial and therefore unsatisfactory. Aristotle proved the existence of the class of unmoved movers,[12] but there is no indication that it occurred to him

to think that one or all of these was the God of his religious worship.[13] Again, take the complaint of Pascal, that the First Cause of the philosophers is not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Scholastic philosophers, of course, point out, in their defense, that the philosophical proof cannot be as rich in its content as revelation, but they *are* concerned to show that their Necessary Being is to be identified with God. The identification that they try to establish is as it were accidental and material. If it can be shown that the Necessary Being is truly God, it remains true that the formal content of these notions is not evidently the same.

The Physical Approach to Metaphysics

The conceptualism of the rationalistic mode of philosophizing has led some philosophers to seek another way of grounding metaphysics in reality. Convinced that metaphysics must be abstract and conceptual, these Thomists think that they can re-establish its claim to be a knowledge of reality only by finding an intermediate realistic basis.

One—obviously non-Thomistic—way of doing this is to employ a syllogism such as this: Aristotelian metaphysics is realistic because it is based on Aristotelian "physics." But Aristotelian "physics" is obsolete, and has been replaced by modern scientific physics. Hence, modern metaphysics must be based on the conclusions of modern science.[14] Or the minor of this syllogism may be changed by a Thomist so that it reads: But Aristotelian "physics" has a core that is still valid, and this core is the Thomistic philosophy of nature. As a consequence, the Thomistic metaphysics, to be realistic, must be based on the conclu-

[13]On the difference between the First Principle and God, see Etienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1941).

[14]This kind of argument is advanced by Filmer S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), and Philipp Frank, *Modern Science and Its Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949).

[15]This is the position of Professor Vincent E. Smith (see n. 18 below), and of members of the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (see William H. Kane, O.P., Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., John D. Corcoran, O.P., and Raymond J. Nogar, O.P., *Science in Synthesis* [River Forest: Dominican College, 1952], pp. 9; 200; 210, n. 5).

[16]The terms "mental construction" and "mental construct" have been given wide currency by philosophers of science; Thomists may find terms like "beings of reason," "surrogate-sign," "perinoetic, empiriological knowledge" (popularized by M. Maritain) more familiar.

[17]This conclusion was stated by F. S. C. Northrop, in the meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America (cf. n. 2 above), in a paper called "The Metaphysics of Mathematical Physics."

sions of the Thomistic philosophy of nature.[15]

The metaphysics of modern physics is evidently an abstract science and at best is only mediately realistic. But, since modern science is constructural in character,[16] any further science based upon it must of course also necessarily be constructural. Suppose one begins with the conclusions of physical theory. One can look for what is established scientifically as the absolute and necessary. Relativity theory, it is contended, shows us a constant whose value is absolute and necessary—the speed of light.[17] The metaphysical term of such a process of reasoning is both abstract and constructural—a pure intelligibility and not a being. But both the starting-point and the method have entirely predetermined the character of the conclusion; nothing else could possibly have been reached without inconsistency.

On the other hand, the Aristotelian philosophy of nature is not constructural, but it is an abstract science. If one wishes to base a metaphysics on the conclusions of the philosophy of nature, one's starting-point can only contain what the philosophy of nature is able to give. Hence, we must consider these conclusions and the arguments from which they have been derived. We will grant, without argument, that the object of the philosophy of nature is changeable-being (*ens-mobile*) as a single intelligibility or concept. In the philosophy of nature, we conduct a formal analysis of change according to physical principles, and we discover the universal, quidditative principles of substance and accident, matter and form. We discover also an extrinsic physical principle, the movent, or the physical-cause-by-way-of-motion. The analysis of motion leads to an investigation of place and time, and leads to the conclusion that every cause which produces motion by physical activity is extended and in place. A further analysis shows that every movent is itself moved and cannot be infinite in either space or time and consequently also not in power. This conclusion raises a final question: What is the ultimate source of motion? According to the doctrine of the physical approach, we are still formally within the philosophy of nature. Within this division of philosophy, let us recall, changeable-being is a single intelligibility; in other words, the predicate "is" or "exists" means "is something changeable," "is in motion"—the mobility inherent in the being of material things

necessarily and intrinsically affects all predication in that science. It is within this science that we are to raise the question of the possibility of a series of moved movers. The Aristotelian analysis purports to end by showing that a series of moved movers cannot be infinite and must therefore terminate in a first or unmoved mover.[18] What does it mean to say, "A series terminates in a first"? Are we saying that the "first" exists? It is a sheer contradiction to assert that an *unmoved* mover exists *changeably*. Yet the only meaning of "exists" in the philosophy of nature is "exists changeably." One may think to escape the contradiction by asserting that he denies all physical attributes of this mover. Change is a physical predicate, and so he denies the change. This is a very interesting maneuver. It was admitted, as we saw above, that changeable-being was an indivisible intelligibility, that "is" in the philosophy of nature means "is-changeable."[19] So, in denying change, one necessarily denies existence. The "unmoved mover" therefore does not exist, but it moves the things which do exist; it is a nonbeing which is the cause of being in the things that are (-changeably).

Aristotle, to be sure, avoided this impasse—by deliberate equivocation (*equivocum a consilio,* St. Thomas calls it) and a surreptitious univocation. He began with form (essence) and he was content to end with form. And his many finite prime movers are no more like God for being reached by a physical argument than they would be if

[18]This paragraph is a summary of the argument of Vincent E. Smith, in "The Prime Mover in Philosophy of Nature and in Metaphysics," a paper given at the Milwaukee meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, which will be published in the *Proceedings* of that Association.

[19]Logically, the intellectual (human) soul cannot be treated by an Aristotelian. In his philosophy, he can consider only the sensitive soul; in his metaphysics, only the separated soul. The serious philosophical dangers of this position deserve an explicit and full treatment. For the problematic of the Aristotelian soul *vs.* the Aristotelian intellect, see François Nuyens, *L'Evolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1948).

[20]See Owens, "The Conclusion of the *Prima Via,*" pp. 38-51.

[21]According to Professor V. E. Smith, in the philosophy of nature existence is merely a predicate. Logically, the position should end up with Plotinus or Scotus Erigena. Having identified being with finitude, such a philosophy must assert that the infinite is nonbeing, and therefore place above being and reality a nonbeing which is unknowable.

[22]Logically, this position should conclude to a finite God, as did Averroes, who is the most explicit of the earlier physicalists. Averroes also identified being with finitude, but decided that God is a finite form.

[23]On the difference between Aristotle and St. Thomas, see Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers,* pp. 44-73, 160, 166, 168-70, 174, 185-86; and Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian* Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,

they were reached by a dialectical analysis. St. Thomas, in his *Commentaries on the Physics,* quietly introduced a metaphysical meaning and important to the discussions and so is not within the restricted categories of the philosophy of nature.[20]

If a Thomist seriously intends to remain within the philosophy of nature and rigorously to exclude metaphysical considerations from it, he has no right to the conclusion that an unmoved and therefore immaterial mover exists. For he must either deny all predicates of his First, including the predicate of existence,[21] or he will affirm some physical predicate of his First Cause to get it existing.[22]

However, even if we were to grant that the philosophy of nature could prove the existence of an unmoved mover, the metaphysics based on this physical proof would still be only the metaphysics of an abstraction, not a metaphysics of real being. For the being which is the object of metaphysics according to the theory of the physical approach is reached by abstraction and, consequently, is itself abstract. Now, an abstract metaphysics is willy-nilly a metaphysics of essence, and so a metaphysics which depends on the necessarily abstract conclusions of the philosophy of nature has all the problems of any other metaphysics of essence. An abstract Deity is all that can be concluded to if one begins with an abstract principle.

The Metaphysical Approach to Metaphysics

The physical approach to metaphysics assumes that we come to know being as being by proving the existence of God in the philosophy of nature. This approach is an interpretation of St. Thomas which is determined by a group of Aristotelian texts. The conceptual approach to metaphysics grants that we derive our concepts from experience and sensible being but assumes that, once these concepts have been acquired, metaphysics is developed directly from the content of these concepts and not from existent sensible things. The conceptual approach is an interpretation of St. Thomas through the commentaries of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. Are these the only ways of reading St. Thomas? There are strong indications that St. Thomas is not simply an Aristotelian[23] and some grounds for believing that

Cajetan interprets rather than expounds the text on which he comments.[24] Perhaps it will be helpful to consider St. Thomas's doctrine in itself,[25] without the guidance of either Aristotle or Cajetan.

What, then, is the characteristic of St. Thomas's starting-point? He is the first and the only metaphysician to base his metaphysics immediately on the senses and material being.[26] Not that St. Thomas is the only empiricist—by no means. There have been a great number of empiricists and sensists from Heraclitus to Hume and the neo-positivists, but none of them has been able to develop a complete and scientifically organized metaphysics. St. Thomas's experiential starting-point was not taken without reflection and deliberate choice, for it entailed serious disadvantages: he scandalized most of his contemporaries and was criticized by the heterodox Aristotelians; he failed to convince his most famous pupil, Giles of Rome. At the hands of his own followers, his thought was subjected to a rigid systematization, and it was precisely in metaphysics that the most significant changes occurred. Aided by a copyist's error, St. Thomas's doctrine of the origin of metaphysics was transformed into an abstractionism.[27]

1951), pp. 184, 296-97, 376 note 18, 421 note 41.

[24]The differences between St. Thomas and Cajetan have not been thoroughly investigated. Most historians admit that the two have quite different theories of personality. For some other indications, see Herbert Thomas Schwartz, "Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan," *New Scholasticism*, XXVIII (1954), 127-44; Etienne Gilson, "Note sur le *revelabile* selon Cajétan," *Mediaeval Studies*, XV (1953), 199-206; *idem*, "Cajétan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* (June, 1953), 267-86; Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1952), especially the third chapter.

[25]See the forthcoming article of Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., "A Note on the Approach to Metaphysics," in the *New Scholasticism*.

[26]For some illustrative texts, see *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 154, a. 5 ad 3; q. 173, a. 3; I, q. 84, aa. 6-8; q. 78, a. 4; q. 91, a. 3 ad 3; I-II, q. 11, a. 1; q. 111, a. 5 ad 3; q. 112, a. 5; *Truth*, q. 12, a. 3 ad 2 and 3; a. 7; a. 12; q. 28, a. 3 and ad 6; *In Lib. I Post. Analyticorum*, cap. 4, lect. 16; *Scriptum super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 9, q. 4, a. 1. Cf. Louis-Marie Régis, O.P., "Analyse et synthèse dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas," *Studia Mediaevalia in Honorem Ad. Rev. R. J. Martin, O.P.* (Bruges), pp. 313-30.

[27]On the "third degree" of abstraction, versus St. Thomas's "separation," see Louis-Marie Régis, O.P., "La philosophie de la nature," *Etudes et recherches*, Philosophie I (Ottawa: Collège Dominicain, 1936), 129-56. The discussion is summarized, with references to other articles and studies, by Marie-Vincent Leroy, O.P., "*Abstractio* et *separatio* d'après un texte controversé de saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste*, XLVIII (1948), 328-39. Fr. Leroy's conclusion is that there is no difference, and that textual criticism cannot decide doctrinal points.

[28]On the relation between concept and intellectual knowledge, see Quentin Quesnell, S.J., "Participated Understanding: The Three Acts of the Mind," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXI (1954), 281-88.

If we read St. Thomas directly in his own words in their own context we find three remarkable features: its starting-point in the experience of material being, its refusal to limit intellectual knowledge to the concept, and its development of many levels of philosophical discourse.[28]

Most scandalous of these positions to the rationalist is the one that sees intellectual knowledge as something more than a simple or complex concept. Intelligence, typically, is understanding what something is. The *human* concept is abstractive, and yet we do know concrete existents. Hence, St. Thomas holds that truth, which is the perfect possession of knowledge, is in the judgment alone. And we attain truth in its primary sense when we know *that* something *is*. Notice that this is not a knowledge of "what existence is"; we do have such a concept (which is a construct), but it is derivative, secondary, and relatively unimportant philosophically. Prior to the concept of existence is the assertion of "is." "Is" is meaningful as the actuality of all acts, including forms. Similarly, reasoning for St. Thomas often involves causal influence. But the actual causing by an agent is not an essence; it is the making-something-to-*be*, and so there is, properly speaking, no direct abstractive concept of causality, though there certainly is a knowledge of causality. However, this methodological position of St. Thomas is unintelligible apart from his metaphysics of being.

The aspect of St. Thomas's thought that has most impressed historians is its synthetic power. Whereas other philosophies are philosophies of essence or substance or form or matter or spirit or idea or change, St. Thomas managed to find a level of his own thought on which he could communicate with almost any known philosopher and assimilate all his insights. This second feature makes it possible for Thomists to be faithful to the thought of their master in very many things (even when they miss some basic insights)—except of course when they try to eliminate one of the levels of that thought (a rare happening), and to the extent that they neither see the primacy of the level of existence nor know how to use St. Thomas's own intercommunicating stairways.

St. Thomas's starting-point differs widely from those of the conceptualizing and of the physicalizing Thomists. *His* starting-point is

sensible or material being. Consistently he maintains that the only beings we know by immediate experience are sensible, material beings, and that includes our own selves (for, as beings, we human beings are also sensible, material things). The act of intellectual knowing, it is true, is not material, but it is not *a* being in the strict sense, it is not some *thing* which is. Nevertheless, the immateriality of the act of knowing is enough to force on us a reflection as to the very nature of the being which we experience. Reflection—and precisely reflection on the fact that our concepts attain the nature of the thing which is without including its actual existence, while only in the judgment do we attain and directly know the act of existing itself—shows us that what we know and express by "is" is not what we know and express by "that which (is)."[29] Moreover, the beings of sensible experience are many; that is, one is not the other, and yet each one of them is. So, again, what each one of them is cannot be simply identical with its act of existing. The examination of the beings of our experience, then, shows us that they are beings, not by virtue of *what* they are, and specifically not by virtue of their materiality, but by virtue of the act of existing. The denial of the identity of material essence with the act of existing St. Thomas has called "separation." By means of the

[29]*Ibid.* For some texts, see St. Thomas, *In Lib. I Perihermeneias*, cap. 3, lect. 5; lects. 8, 1, 2, 5, 7; *In Lib. III De Anima*, lect. 11; *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 58; *Truth*, q. 1, a. 3; *In Lib. VII Metaphysicorum*, lect. 17 (Cathala No. 1658); *Expositio super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3; *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 16, a. 2.

[30]On the importance of the right understanding of being in philosophy, see Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1937), especially the last chapter.

[31]It is not really proper to speak of the truth of a philosophy, since a philosophy is a complexus of principles, methods and reasonings, and conclusions. Single judgments and propositions are true or false. Two propositions about the same thing may be different and yet both true, on the condition that neither of them is a complete knowledge of the thing. Is any philosophy—taken as a whole working from principles by means of methods and reasonings to conclusions—so complete that it cannot be further developed? (We need not delay to refute the seeming opinion of some Thomists that St. Thomas has answered every possible question in full detail.) Since in fact no wholly complete philosophy exists and since every great philosopher has discovered at least some truths, it is impossible to say that any one philosophy as a whole is *the* true philosophy and that therefore all the others are completely false. (On the impossibility of constructing *the* philosophy by a selection of philosophical statements from different philosophies, or of assuming that "the truth" lies in the "analogical" or "polar unity" of diverse philosophies, see the article by Dr. Collins, cited in n. 1.) Hence, there is a sense in which one can speak of better and less good philosophies —and this involves an element of choice. (There is also a sense in which we can speak of true or false principles, correct or incorrect methods, true or false conclusions.) Now, that philosophy is the best which comes closest to being an un-

judgment of separation St. Thomas has escaped with one single move from the handicaps of essentialism, formalism, and conceptualism. In virtue of his clear-cut discovery of the act of existing even within material beings, he has set for himself the ground on which to transcend sensism and materialism (without the danger of idealism).[30]

On this datum, St. Thomas can now begin to reason. An act of existing possessed by an essence which is distinct from it and possessed by other similar beings as well, raises the question: How is it that these multiple, limited, and different things are? Their analogical unity in being, the sheer possibility of their natures, the fact that their existence is in them without being of them, necessarily implies subsistent existence. The cause of coming-to-*be*, as we find it, involves an ordered series of causes of being, which must terminate in that which is being by its very nature—again, subsistent existence. The movement of this latter argumentation, it must be admitted, is similar to that of Aristotle, but through the direct start in sensible existents, the judgment of separation, and the causal analysis of caused *being* (not caused or changing *form* or *essence*), St. Thomas's conclusion is as distinctive as his starting-point. The term of his argument is subsistent, pure, unqualified being. Of this term, we must say simply, "It *is*." Note, we do not say or imply that it is *something* (and then prove that this something exists); our simple assertion of its existence without any corresponding and distinct essential limitation is the properly determinate conclusion of the demonstration. This term is, in virtue of the proof itself, infinite and unique. For St. Thomas, it is a simple corollary to conclude to the unicity, infinity, spirituality, absolute perfection, and goodness of God.

Conclusion

What are we to make of these significant differences in Scholastic metaphysics? Are we to say that there are false and true metaphysics? There are, of course, some false metaphysics—a complete subjective idealism is a false metaphysics, for it is not what it claims to be, a philosophy of the real as such. This is not to say that it may not contain some truths. But for the rest, they are true—only, they are not *equally* true.[31] If we narrow down the question to those of the starting-

point and of the proof of the existence and nature of God, the answer is similar. A proof that purports to prove that God is the world (pantheism) or that God is finite and like the beings of the world is a false or invalid proof. All other proofs are valid.[32] But not every proof, and, similarly, not every point of departure, is equally *valuable.*[33]

---

derstanding of reality in its entirety (the basic criterion) and which is capable, by reason of its present truth and the suitability of its method, of assimilating every philosophical truth (the secondary criterion). The philosophy of St. Thomas himself—not what I have called "traditional Thomism"—is such a philosophy. Hence, in principle, Thomism is now the best philosophy, and, on the condition that its adherents personally engage in philosophical thinking according to the methods of St. Thomas, will approach—asymptotically perhaps—the position of being the one true philosophy.

[32]The validity of a proof can be considered from two points of view: a narrow and an inclusive one. From the narrow point of view, a proof is valid or true when it proceeds from true principles by correct reasoning. "Invalid proofs" for the existence of God are then of two kinds: (*a*) either they do not prove anything at all, like the attempted proof for the existence of God from the nature of a historical series; (*b*) or they contain an error—in premise or form—such as the attempted proof that the world is God. All other proofs are valid, at least if one knows how to use them. And this condition points up the necessity of considering the conclusion of a proof in a more inclusive way; namely, not simply as an isolated philosophical position *established* by reasoning, but as deriving its *exact meaning* from the premises and procedures by which it is established. For example, the Platonic procedure—the *via Platonica* as St. Thomas calls it—is by no means illogical, nor are its premises, taken narrowly, false; and yet the assimilation of the order of reality to the order of the mind is a misplacement of principle. The result is that the Platonic notion of God, inasmuch as that notion is methodologically Platonic, represents God only indirectly and in a very inadequate way.

[33]In modern terms, we could say that some proofs for the existence of God are theoretically unfruitful; they are inadequate and indirect. For example, the proof that some necessary thing exists is a good proof, but it proves very little, and that indirectly. True, some necessary being does exist, but the person who uses such a proof does not yet know whether that being is one or many and still has a lot of proving to do before he knows that this being is God. Hence, necessity is not, properly speaking, the nature of God. What this means is that some proofs for the existence of God attain God obscurely in terms of an alien nature; i. e., one that is not God (and indeed usually is a construct; for example, "a super-human watchmaker"). But, when we attribute to a being a nature that is alien to that being, we are using metaphor. It is not only legitimate but extremely useful and even humanly necessary to use metaphors in speaking about God. Only, we can base *no argument at all* on a metaphor; to attempt to do so would be to fall into the fallacy of equivocation. Metaphors are rich and highly suggestive, but they are essentially obscure. No metaphor can be *turned into* a philosophical statement (for it is neither univocation nor intrinsic analogy), and the attempt to do so necessarily leads into error. The Deistic errors, for example, are necessary consequences of treating the metaphor of the "great Watchmaker" as if it were an intrinsic analogy.

This highlights the great *value* of the Thomistic proofs. First, because they reach God according to His own proper nature as being—in a merely human way, of course, inasmuch as we conclude *that* God is, they are the starting-point of a critically justifiable philosophy of God as the First Cause. A person who really understands St. Thomas's arguments for God's existence will not attempt to say

The starting-points of most metaphysics are secondary, derivative. Though one can get some kind of "explanation of reality" from them, they are partial, awkward, often involved; they discard the obvious in favor of the esoteric. St. Thomas alone had the courage and the insight to see what was in front of him; namely, sensible being.

Somewhat the same is to be said about the various proofs for the existence of God. There are many valid proofs for God's existence, but most of them conclude to God, as it were, accidentally.[34] It happens that the Being whom we know as the First, as the completely Necessary, the Infinite, the Provider for the whole universe, is really God. But God is He who is,[35] and only St. Thomas's proofs conclude that God is a subsistent act of existing.

What then is the value of considering and comparing different metaphysics and different proofs for the existence and nature of God, if we do not intend to refute all but one of them?[36] Surely not the contrary conclusion that it makes no difference, for, as we have seen, it makes a great deal of difference. But philosophy is an act of understanding, and, being human, our progress in understanding is not unilinear and straightforward; it occurs through a dialectic and a dialogue in which many voices take part.

---

what God is in Himself and so will be freed from many anthropomorphic problems and avoid many errors. Secondly and consequently, he is in a position to locate properly all the indirect proofs. When, as he must, he himself makes use of metaphor in personal prayer, in the study of other philosophers, or in discourse with non-philosophers, he will not commit the fallacy of equivocation.

[34]Compare this statement of Cajetan's, "... in concluding that these things are to be found in the real order, one concludes directly, as it were accidentally, that God is; i. e., God, not as God, but as having a certain condition, exists" (*In Summam Theologicam* I, q. 2, a. 3, comm. [ed. Leonine (Rome, 1888), IV, 32b]). Ironically, this is Cajetan on St. Thomas's *prima via*.

[35]See Etienne Gilson, *Le thomisme* (5th ed. Paris: Vrin, 1947), chap. IV, "Haec sublimis veritas," pp. 123-39.

[36]"... understanding is a prerequisite to more than verbal disagreeing, and once they [Spinoza and Hegel, as examples of divergent philosophies] are understood, they stand in no need of being refuted" (Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, p. ix).

Robert Ostermann

GABRIEL MARCEL: EXISTENCE AND THE IDEA OF BEING

This is the third in a series of three articles on Marcel.
The two previous articles appeared in The Modern Schoolman, *XXXI (1954), 99-116; 289-305.*
Mr. Ostermann is now teaching at Iona College, New Rochelle.

I

Man obeys many laws whose existence he does not even suspect; and not all of us are reflective enough to detect the principle unifying the majority of our actions. The intellect is no less bound than other created natures. Subordinated to an object, it is measured by that object and is therefore meaningless when considered in isolation from it. Now, the object of the intellect is being, unlimited and perfect; and philosophies, in the last analysis, stand or fall by their idea of being. Gabriel Marcel has disclaimed the title "existentialist,"[1] preferring to dissociate himself from other related contemporary thinkers. He would perhaps suggest as an alternative "philosopher of the concrete";[2] and when we recall the measure of opprobrium heaped on existentialism, with the papal denunciation, his repudiation is not difficult to understand. But it remains to be seen whether, deeper than names, there is not a fundamental philosophical position behind certain superficial divergences. To demonstrate fully that thesis would take us far afield; but it is at least not contradictory to suppose the intervention of personal history as a factor directing varying developments from what is an original similarity. Indeed historical parallels would lead us to believe that such has often been the case.[3] This is certainly not intended to suggest that Marcel is an atheist like Sartre, though in disguise, but only that he may have been safeguarded from many of Sartre's conclusions by influences like an active realist instinct and the Catholic faith. Following a mysterious rule of proportion man always seems to seek only what he is likely to find; and the different terminations of philosophical quests are not always as foreign to each other as

they appear. Multiplicity is not the final law of things.

Hence it is imperative to ascertain what the idea of being is for Gabriel Marcel. And there should be no hesitation in declaring that what is real for him is existence: not, that which exists is real; but, existence is reality. The distinction is far from unimportant; and, whatever the intention to restore to the concrete its rightful position, the emphasis is so exclusively upon existence that no account is taken of the being that exists and acts. To pose the problem of being in an intelligible fashion, he says, we must remember that "c'est *d'être* qu'il s'agit, non de *l'être*."[4] "En faisant de l'être un substantif," we learn, "nous semblons en effet nous demander implicitement quels sont les prédicats qui lui conviennent. Or ceci est inintelligible."[5] Existence is real, nothing else. The main lines of Marcel's philosophy could not be what we have seen them to be if being were not existence. Even the language, in a broad view of the matter, is a convincing clue. As for Kierkegaard, it is always either/or,[6] and the famous distinctions are improperly so-called. They separate and divide; they do not distinguish. It is never objectivity *plus* existence, or problem *plus* mystery. The conjunction used is *and,* which splits the world into the objective and the existing, into problematic and mysterious. Neither could the alternatives be the "full" or the "empty"[7] instead of the many and the one. Being is entirely existence.

"Le plein ou le vide." We are back once again, after two and one half millenia, clasping hands with Parmenides over an intuition as

[1]F. C. Copleston, *Existentialism and Modern Man* ("Aquinas Papers," No. 9. Oxford: Blackfriars, 1948), p. 3.

[2]Cf. *Du refus à l'invocation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), pp. 81-110.

[3]Whatever the doctrinal disputes, for example, between Fichte and Kant, and between Hegel and Fichte, it cannot be denied that all three worked from the same principle of immanence, inherited from Descartes. But they could never have been persuaded to defend their mutual agreement.

[4]*Journal métaphysique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), p. 202.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 181.

[6]Cf. *Reflection and Mystery*, trans. by G. S. Fraser, Vol. I of *The Mystery of Being* ("The Gifford Lectures." 2 vols. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951), p. 183. On the phenomenological stand either/or are the alternatives. Oppositions can be reconciled only at the level of being.

[7]*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 179, 202; *The Philosophy of Existence*, trans. by Manya Harari (London: Harvill Press, 1948), p. 3.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 4.

[9]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 281.

[10]*Etre et avoir* (Paris: Aubier, 1935), p. 48.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 50. On p. 46, in a reference to Kant, being is substituted quite arbitrarily for existence.

[12]Cf. *The Philosophy of Existence*, pp. 8, 18; *Etre et avoir*, p. 149.

[13]*Etre et avoir*, p. 50.

[14]*Ibid.*, p. 49.

[15]*Ibid.*, pp. 243-47.

basic as it is erroneous, celebrating a universe of univocity where there is either existence or there is nothing. "Being is—or should be—necessary."[8] "Le métaphysicien est en quete de ce qui est, non pas à la poursuite de ce qui sera,"[9] which could never have been said if there were a past and a future, an order of possibles or becoming. Being is; nonbeing is not. It is true, and the exigencies of reason have been announced; but it is an idealist fallacy to suppose that there is only reason. What of the requirements of experience, sensible and intellectual, which have contributed to the enunciations of reason? True enough, everything that exists is being. But does it necessarily follow that everything that is being must exist? It does follow, if one is in a univocal world where being is identical with existing and where it is necessary to become "more Eleatic than Plato,"[10] so that, when there is an explicit hesitation about the relation between being and existing,[11] the thought progresses as though no hesitation had ever appeared. When we consider being, then and only then are we in the metaproblematic,[12] because being is existence which constitutes the metaproblematic as such. Existence is not a quality;[13] it is nothing else that might be added to a thing from without; and in itself it is supremely unqualified;[14] for we know that to qualify, or to characterize,[15] is to make being unreal. Hence existence is *the* reality of anything; and reality is being.

Now, it is one thing to say that the presence or absence of existence makes all the difference in the world to a thing; it is quite another to say that existence is all there is in a thing. In fact, it is exactly the difference between reason and unreason. The consequences of this position for the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel are extremely instructive, since it is almost at once evident that no genuine advance is possible in such an existential world. The movement of the mind is arrested by the opposition called contradiction, and there is surely no deeper opposition than existence and nonexistence. If the alternatives are these, the philosophy pursuing them will be repetitive, traversing laterally its field of inquiry and discovering over and over again, under an indefinite number of costumes, the one truth it allows itself to assert. To restrict reality is the most effective means of creating a prison for oneself, whether this be a speculative deprivation producing an intel-

lectual prison, or a practical deprivation like sin and therefore a moral prison. In either case the person is locked up, confined to an inadequate and unworthy area of experience. Take, for example, the results of one of the rare direct and extended speculations on the problem of being that occupy the pages of the *Journal* from June 26 to August 9, 1929.[16]

In the first place[17]—and in spite of his mistrust of the mechanism of logic—Marcel makes a logician's approach to a metaphysical situation when he argues that, since it is impossible to deny the principle of identity save *in verbis*, being cannot be denied, or ignored, by suspending judgment.[18] He reaffirms this a few pages later,[19] misunderstanding St. Thomas in passing, by wondering if the principle of identity forces him to assert being, whereas, of course, being imposes itself on the intellect which then expresses this necessity in the principle of identity. As an indication of the drift carrying us, this is a capital beginning; and he next says that being cannot be placed into the category of mere possibles. Understood univocally (that is, being is existence) from the very start, no distinction can be made between the idea of being and the individual existing things; the fine edge of particularity begins to blur if it is a question only of existence.[20] All protestations to the contrary aside, when existence is reality, existence alone, there is no room for the concrete existing thing. A metaphysical necessity insists that, if being is and nonbeing is not, nevertheless existing things are not identically being, which in Marcel's inflexible frame entirely rules out things. If existence is all, what is there left to diversify it? This is not to say that one could not *speak* about the concrete, and even speak

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 35-52.

[17] This should not be taken as a trivial quibble over details. It would be unfair to examine a philosopher word by word and judge each proposition in isolation in the light of one's own system, besides being unprofitable for advance in truth. Philosophies are not composed of a handful of loose parts summarily stuck together to form a coherent view; they are the progressive development of a view initially one and perhaps only obscurely grasped. But a conviction about being will be a conviction—doubtless realized in diverse ways—about everything that is.

[18] *Etre et avoir*, p. 36. We observe how even the English translator is uncertain of what way to understand this "being," capitalizing the noun as though it referred to the being of God. Or is this more than uncertainty? Being is act and necessary if it is only existence; and once the contingent has been eliminated the only necessary being is God. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 76.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 44. This is a remnant of idealism.

[20] St. Thomas would have said that if existence was not the individuating principle of essence, still an essence must be individuated in order to exist by itself.

[21] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 40, a. 3; q. 85, a. 1 ad 1 and 2.

[22] *Etre et avoir*, pp. 43-49.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

truly. But the truth would be without rational justification. An opponent would not be convinced by its evidence, for it presents no credentials; arguments based on it could be granted no more than metaphorical value.

On the level of knowledge that we call metaphysical, the highest and deepest accessible to the unaided mind, it is finally a case of seeing or not-seeing. No other alternatives are offered. The metaphysician must see for himself, or reality evades him. He may recite formulas by their hundreds, but the formulas will be empty. One remembers St. Augustine in his early years so sunk in matter and sensory life that he could not conceive of a world of immaterial forms. Now what must be seen is this: that the foundational act of the intellect is an act of vision, an intuition; that there is an idea of being which is the light of all our seeing; that this idea originates in the primitive and humble sense experience whence arise all our ideas; that this idea, in virtue of the peculiarities of its structure, is—yes—an abstraction, but the result of a judgment:[21] that the intellect therefore (and knowledge, too) is related necessarily to being, which is an order that cannot be left unexplained. Reflecting on these, it is easier to understand why discussions like those entered in the *Journal* for July 30 and 31[22] are admirable but not helpful and can certainly be dangerous for a student making his first acquaintance with philosophy. They begin all wrong; and where the end is prefigured in the beginning, as it is in metaphysics, a false step then is of immense importance.

In these few pages Marcel is close enough to St. Thomas to make us feel that when he sketches the central philosophical question, the nature of being, the slightest turn could bring him round into the traditional line. That turn is not, cannot be, made. Being does not meekly suffer distortion. We end up manacled by our own errors.

Several options are suggested by Marcel: the fragmentation of the real[23] and the identification of being with the *apeiron.*[24] We escape these traps only by seeing in being its proportional content of *ens* to *esse,* of essence to the act of being. The *apeiron,* an indeterminate vagueness to which things return and from which they issue, bears a suspicious resemblance to Hegel's idea of being which is, in its turn, a faithful but vulgarized copy of the Scholastic *materia prima.* The

possibility of arriving at an *apeiron* is inadmissible. Knowledge is consciousness of being whose perfection is the act of existence. The laws of thought are the laws of being. Hence if the *apeiron* is unthinkable,[25] that must be because it cannot be; more than a logical impossibility meets the mind. Thought does not, cannot, work where there is no being; and so we are preserved from the hypothesis of a level of reality where unintelligibility and contradiction would reign. Being is universally intelligible. If being is not known, nothing is known. And while it is certainly true that the metaphysician (one prefers this word to Marcel's, which is "ontologist") must not treat existence as a quality[26] like color or hardness, it is for another reason than that given. Existence is not "l'inqualifié par excellence"; it cannot be dealt with as a quality because it is not a thing. Existence is *energeia*—but of something. This helps to account for a puzzle, recorded on a subsequent page,[27] of how to relate being and existing. Understandably enough—for if existence is being, then the two are identical—the problem is dismissed with no solution stated. The door is, nevertheless, left open on possibility and the past through the proportion between *ens* and *esse,* on what has been and what can be, while the entrance to these is achieved through *esse.*

We have written "an indeterminate vagueness." It should have a familiar ring, for an old friend in fact is back again with us: the principle of Spinoza, *omnis determinatio est negatio.* Philosophers of essence and philosophers of existence will agree upon the truth of the principle, responding to it, however, in characteristic manners, whereas St. Thomas, more subtle than either, would see the truth of the principle *and* the necessity for determination in reality, incorporating it as a moment in a dialectic of being that mounts to God, *esse subsistens.* For a philosopher like Spinoza, already situated in a stable intelligible world of essences, these negating determinations are to be stripped aside one by one so that (he thought) the most supremely real essence of all, escaping limitation, would finally be discovered; and this was God. Gabriel Marcel is so convinced that determination negates knowledge by fixing the mind that he equates reality with existence. On the one hand, the movement terminates in the changeless imperturbability of a unique, infinite, intelligible substance; on the other, the

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 44.
[26] *Ibid.,* p. 49.
[27] *Ibid.,* p. 50.
[28] *Journal métaphysique,* p. 281.

mind finds itself confronted by complete undetermined meaningless existence.

What neither essentialist nor existentialist sees is that *determinatio* has two meanings: the first, treacherous in its incompletion, given by Spinoza in his principle; the second, that of St. Thomas, wherein determination is that which restricts the act of existence, in itself unlimited, and renders it accessible to the finite mind. Limit, or determination, is the very condition that must be fulfilled by the finite, the contingent, in order for it to be; and without the finite the mind is in contact with nothing. St. Thomas does not despise determination (of course he does not despise anything); but he is prepared to surpass it. At this point is revealed the inadequacy of substituting "the full and the empty" for the traditional problem of "the one and the many." St. Thomas would point out that being as such is full, although being in the concrete existing things is indigent, unaccounted for in them. Considering the one and the many insists that one further question be asked: Why is there anything at all? Gabriel Marcel cannot ask this question, beginning from his principles; and it is quite certain that it can be answered nowhere but in a metaphysic of being that does justice to all the diverse, scattered realities of heaven and earth and accomplishes their final unification by seeing their absolute and radical dependence upon that Being who is supremely existent, who alone can account for them because He has created them.

Not irrelevant to this, in a footnote[28] to a discussion of the metaphysical need, there is a provocative reference to man's interior indigence:

> Il me semble que l'indigence intérieure implique tojours l'exercice à vide d'une refléxion: je ne suis pas cet état-ci—et par conséquent cet état en son fond n'est rien; mais je ne suis pas non plus autre chose; donc il n'y a que cet état, qui lui-même n'est rien. Formule du désespoir théorique, du pessimisme; pressentiment qu'il n'y a pas de ressource.

Before proceeding to examine a few implications of this text, it may be helpful to consider the illustration it offers us of another form of the metaphysical dialectic, what might be called the dialectic of presence and absence.

Far from being a cue for despair, the apparent absence of all re-

source, the mind's consciousness of its indigence is strong evidence that present to it and sustaining it is the reinforcement it requires. We could not be led to affirm a fatal poverty in things (and in ourselves) if poverty was all there is. Awareness of an absolute indigence is a contradiction. We are; and so long as we are, we cannot not be. We are not *all* poverty. The appetite for being is natural to everything that is, proportioned to its mode of existence, and no tendency can be awakened without an object to satisfy it; nor can anything seek being without first having it. Hence absence implies presence.

On an incomparably higher level the very same truth is witnessed to by the saints when they experience the terrible denials of the "dark nights." The point here is that God is never nearer to them than when He seems utterly withdrawn. The soul is agonized by His absence; but He is truly more purely present to the soul by love, and He summons from the soul a more powerful desire for Him. The result is a more perfect, sacrificial union based on the acceptance of separation, a deeper presence accompanied by the soul's acute awareness of her poor insignificance and nothingness. "I am she who is not," St. Catherine of Siena said many times; but she swung instantly out to Him who is, completing the movement. The indigence of the thing that is nothing by itself reveals upon reflection that it is something by Another. It is a dwarfed sentimentalized experience that stops itself at the nothingness and refuses to consider the promise hidden in every absence. We could not apprehend our failures and our worthlessness if these were absolute; and if we were superior in an absolute way to failure or impoverishment, these would also be outside our experience. We, as all things, occupy a much more risky position. We are without resources, and yet—nevertheless we are, and the guarantee of presence is the absence we so intimately know.

Now, pessimism may be described, as Marcel suggests in the above passage, as the doctrine which declares that there is no final *raison* of things, no ultimate explanation, no haven anywhere outside this visible order which itself offers no hold. The first significance of the text quoted is that nowhere does this philosophy envisage the possible radical failure of the resources of reality; the key note is rather inexhausti-

[29]Cf. *Etre et avoir*, p. 148.

[30]Cf. *The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 5; *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 178-80.

[31]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 177.

[32]*Ibid.*, p. 309.

[33]*Existence et Objectivité*, p. 313; cf. *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 258, 279.

bility.[29] Marcel admits that the pessimist assertion[30] can be made but that it cannot be made in the context of a philosophy focused on mystery. No argument in defense of this is given, and none is possible. The logical term of Marcel's teaching is pessimism, intellectual despair, as we shall now try to show, in spite of the protection of appearances.

An unintelligible universe is a universe that demands despair from the human mind; in truth, the mind has indeed no hold on it. With nothing in the mind or outside it to give rest and security, the mind cannot but be struck with a deadly vertigo by the dreadful message of things, that there is no message; and there is no message, no meaning or sense in anything, when there is not anything but existence. Existence is limited by essence, proportioned by it to the dimensions of the human intellect. If essence is jettisoned, the intellect is deprived of its grip on the real. ". . . l'être, c'est la plénitude, à condition de ne pas entendre par ce mot une synthèse de déterminations intellectuelles"[31]; and in *Existence et objectivité*[32] we have seen how intelligibility is conferred by the characters constituting a thing (its essence). The mistrust of determinations has carried him too far: the division is indisputable and cannot be bridged—essence and intelligibility on one side, the order of the "object"; existence on the other, the order of the "real." Hence being, within the confines of this philosophy, is unintelligible; we can find no ultimate reason for things, because in things there is no reason. However absurd it may be to claim the necessary fulfillment of certain conditions in order to determine *if* a thing exists,[33] is it so absurd to try to discern the conditions governing the *actual* existence, here and now, of a thing? It is a curious ending for a philosophy of the concrete, that in it there is no accounting for the concrete.

This situation goes deeper than what a philosopher says or intends; intelligibility is subject to rigid necessities as wide and deep as being. Because of the analogical amplitude of being, a philosopher has at his disposal a variety of expressions which, though they may serve temporarily to obscure, cannot evade the sovereignty of the principles of being. Language, through thought, is related to being; and so it is possible to pierce the tissue of words to the authentic meaning behind

them. Everything that is participates in the *sense* of being, even the errors of philosophers which could not be at all were not some truth in them.

The second valuable point to emerge from our text quoted is this: Since on principle this philosophy should conclude in an attitude of pessimism, what has protected it? Why has it continued through the years to increase its positive apostleship of courage and enthusiasm, insisting upon man's dignity, his unique destiny, and the rare treasure he bears in his person, urging communion against solitude and emphasizing the ethical values of fidelity, love, and sacrifice? One answer satisfies. Through some crevice a force and a knowledge of an alien order has infiltrated the philosophical texture to sustain it against its own internal infirmities. If an organized body of thought, or even disorganized, has not that within it to endure and resist error, aid must come to it from without; and by "without" is meant without those armories naturally accessible to it.

As a hypothesis, but no more than that, it may be suggested that the period from 1924 to 1929, during which Gabriel Marcel abandoned philosophical research,[34] is the crucible whence emerges a finished, tempered philosophical stand, one incorporating and defining the prolific speculation of earlier years. What else comes out of those years to shore up the walls and stop the gaps? That is of course a personal mystery; but something else is certainly present. Again hypothetically, let us consider the most important event of those years. On March 23, 1929,[35] Gabriel Marcel was received into the Catholic Church. A transformation like that, we may believe, is the fruit of invisible and unknown operations in the soul, of dark weights and weariness, of the

[34]Etienne Gilson, *Existentialisme chrétien* (Paris: Plon, 1948), p. 207. This also coincides with the interrupted period indicated in the two published journals.

[35]*Etre et avoir*, p. 30.

[36]I wish to dispel in advance any suspicion that I accuse Gabriel Marcel in any way of consciously imposing the wisdom of theology on his philosophical labors. I can find no reason to doubt Marcel's complete fidelity to this vision. But man is not so simply designed a creature, so emancipated from his perilous location between heaven and hell, that the content of his intellectual productions will derive solely from his intellect, or that he has a mastery and a knowledge of self so extensive as to leave no corner or cupboard of his being in shadow.

[37]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 64.

[38]*Etre et avoir*, p. 308.

[39]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 228.

[40]Cf. *Etre et avoir*, p. 108.

[41]*Ibid.*, p. 115.

[42]*Ibid.*, p. 115. Cf. *Homo Viator* (Paris, Aubier), p. 71. Hope does not *see* what will be; it affirms *as if* it saw.

[43]*Homo Viator*, p. 47. Hope appears to itself as suprarational, suprarelational.

[44]*Ibid.*, p. 69.

[45]*Etre et avoir*, p. 112.

immeasurable aspirations of good faith and the awful purgings that accompany all our human agonies. It is not at all impossible that this, too, came from that time of philosophical silence.

Some evidence, so slender, does exist for confirmation: the peculiar nature, and similarity, of the means taken to ensure a universe fortified against unintelligibility. There can be no disputing the traces of origin still lingering round the three most important restorative instruments; love, faith, and hope carry with them the unmistakable markings of Christianity. It is true that they were articulated in the pre-Catholic writings. But so were many another, and these alone have survived and been developed in the new era. If it is only a coincidence, it is at least an extremely instructive one.[36]

Now, at this point the hypothesis—the source of the philosophically alien material—is concluded. About the use of these instruments we can be more certain.

Love, in the instance of knowledge by man of his fellows: "L'amour porte sur ce qui est au delà de l'essence . . . l'amour est la négation même de l'essence."[37] Faith, when the knowledge of God is in question: "L'objet de foi ne se présente absolument pas avec les caractères qui distinguent une personne empirique quelconque";[38] and, in another place, "La foi comme puissance d'adhésion à l'être."[39] Hope, in the universal restoration of reality's integrity[40] or confidence that it has the resources to triumph over all dissolving attacks: "L'espérance est un élan, elle est un bond. Elle implique une sorte de refus radical de supputer les possibilités."[41] These three—love, faith, and hope—are the secret springs whence reviving energies flow into reality. But the greatest of these is hope; it is the foundation.

Hope, Marcel says, is not concerned with what should be or even with what must be. Its message is that "this will be."[42] Clearly this is an affirmation that has nothing to do with seeing; the intellect is not compelled to an assent by evidence, for evidence is cast aside in favor of a nonrational assertion.[43] When I hope, I make an appeal to the existence of a certain creativity in the world or of real means placed at the disposal of this creativity;[44] and I am hence beyond causality and law.[45] It should not be perplexing that hope, a virtue of the will, has been nominated for the star role. To save the intellect from the

consequences of an impossibility, man must advance the will as salvation, give it superiority over the intellect; and this is in itself an admission of mistrust in the intelligence and a belief that the unintelligible may be real. Hope is a kind of knowledge (*sic*) that goes beyond what cannot be known, "une grâce, mais non point en aucune façon une conquête."[46] Faced with these texts it is difficult to disclaim the "imported" character of hope as an epistemological means of rectifying an undisclosed philosophical failure. Indeed we are expressly told[47] that hope is transcendent, with roots in the supernatural, in virtue of which it claims to touch "un principe caché au fond des choses"; presumably this principle is hidden from the mind.[48] But then, how does the will—if the term means anything corresponding to appetite—become aware of the existence of what has not been shown it? If "les embouchures de l'espérance se situent dans le monde invisible,"[49] how do we come to know of their existence? Just as there is no accounting for my act of moral *engagement*,[50] so that it remains in fact a quite capricious personal decision, so there is no rational foundation for hope in its present function. And this there cannot be without an intellectual analysis of the human intellect and will caught in act. All is description, pure and simple, which offers little foothold for the mind.

The following syllogism might be used to sum up the situation: If the intelligibility (rational determinations) of reality is due only to the essence; if reality is warped when we consider it essentially; then existence is unintelligible and reality has in it something more than intelligibility. For Gabriel Marcel, this is mystery.

[46]*Homo Viator*, p. 10.

[47]*Etre et avoir*, pp. 115-16.

[48]The clinching text seems to be *Homo Viator*, pp. 90-91: "L'espérance est essentiallement, pourrait-on dire, la disponibilité d'une âme assez intimement engagée dans une expérience de communion pour accomplir l'acte transcendant à l'opposition du vouloir et du connaître par lequel elle affirme la perennité vivante dont cette expérience offre à la fois le gage et les premises." Small wonder, then, that metaphysics is described as the exorcization of despair.

[49]*Etre et avoir*, p. 114.

[50]*Ibid.*, pp. 56-80. Cf. *The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 70. It is a muddled philosophy, which has elsewhere claimed close kinship with Christianity, that posits an ethic without any commitment; that does not pose, in the very nature of man and shared universally through the universality of that nature, a co-ordinated and reciprocal exchange of rights and duties independent of all accidental relationships existing between man and man.

[51]Cf. *The Downside Review*, autumn, 1953, pp. 387-91, my article "Gabriel Marcel and the Mystery of Being."

[52]*Ibid.*, p. 389.

[53]Cf. *Etre et avoir*, pp. 203-4.

[54]Cf. *A Preface to Metaphysics* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939), pp. 3-9.

In this philosophy the order of the metaproblematic is existence.[51] Essence seals off existence. The mysterious is the uncontained. The explanation we have of the distinction problem-and-mystery is not fully satisfying; its analysis is incomplete. We are told, descriptively,[52] why it is necessary for us to distinguish, while no account is offered for the presence of mystery in reality—it is there, and we must deal with it—except through the references to existence in the earlier distinction of existence and objectivity. But what if we pursue this further? Why is there something mysterious about existence? What is there about its impact on the mind to produce its unusual consequences? Gabriel Marcel has found existence mysterious. Perhaps there is something in this point of view to teach a Thomist. A philosopher courts failure when he indulges reluctance to reflect on the convictions of his opponents or of his companions.

It must be admitted first that for Marcel our first query would be a pseudo-question. A problem can be questioned, a discourse started about it, but not about mystery. The most we can say of mystery is that it is.[53] We can describe because we are within, but we can never question. Questioning entails being outside the object of one's enquiry. But the human intellect will not be satisfied to be told that reality is mysterious and you cannot explain mystery and that is all there is to it. Unless the mind is to remain forever frustrated in its natural desire to know, an explanation must at least be sought. Jacques Maritain says that "an intelligible mystery is not a contradiction in terms."[54] We should like to try to add a little more to his discussion here of the relationship between problem and mystery.

According to the customary statement, reality may be mysterious for man in two different ways: (*a*) because it is of an order entirely different from the intellect and therefore incapable of being known without the intervention of a higher power, which in the case of the present laws of men is faith illuminating the mysteries of the divine life, the birth and death of God, human redemption, the mystical body of Christ, and the prodigies of human sanctity; (*b*) in the natural mystery of being which is its limitless intelligibility whereby its un-

ceasing excess daunts, so to speak, the human mind, whose light being is. Supernatural mystery will engage us presently; it, too, intrudes into the texture of this "concrete philosophy." But whence arrives this mystery of being that seems to challenge so formidably the authority of the intellect? From existence, Marcel answers; and, though ultimately true, it is an answer that requires correction and interpretation before a firm assent may be given it.

A familiar Scholastic distinction gives us a start—reality as it is in itself and reality as it is for us (*quoad nos*) in our act of understanding it. And if that seems to suggest that the mind can legislate for reality, we must keep in mind that reality is known as it is; that is, as being, which gives the intellect, though subordinate to its object, authority to speak for that object. For us it is the essence of anything that makes the act of existence accessible to the mind, and the act of existence situates the thing outside its causes in order to present it to us as an object potentially intelligible to the mind. In itself, as it is if it could know itself, the reality of existing things flows from their acts of existence, "for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality . . . [and] nothing has actuality except so far as it exists."[55] An essence without existence is not a possible; it is nothing. United to its act of existence, it is not an existing essence but an existing thing: "existence is that which makes every form or nature actual."[56] So that the act of existence is the immediate source of all the reality in anything; hence, of its intelligibility, which is captured for us through the essence limiting it, giving it a focus and a name. "Hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum."[57] Note that the act of existing is the *immediate* source, not the final. Nevertheless we must not duplicate the existentialist error and, emphasizing the energy activating things, become mortally fearful of essences. Even in God it would be improper to speak of essence vanishing. It is His essence to exist. The proportion of essence to existence is identified in Him, but essence has not departed to make room for perfect act. And neither should we slip into the easy error of declaring that it is existence that is intelligible, when it is being (essence/existence) that is intelligible.

It may be useful to refer in passing to the Fourth Way of St. Thomas,

[55]St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 4, a. 1 and ad 3.

[56]*Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 4.

[57]*De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 2 ad 9.

which is, I suggest, the most central and inclusive of the five proofs of God's existence. Plato had risen, we recall, by means of similar ascent, to the notion of a most perfect good, an absolute beauty. But that was an *ideal* term of an ascent ideally conceived; the existence of the absolute good and beauty remains undisclosed. The same kind of movement seems to occur in St. Thomas—degrees of perfection, good, truth, nobility, the like, requiring the absolutely perfect—except that the Angelic Doctor visualized a dual movement: (*a*) in which the mind mounts to the ideal in whose light it judges the varied perfections apprehended; and this is dialectic; (*b*) in which, by reflecting upon the sources of its knowledge—namely, the concrete existing things in which the diversity of perfections appear—the mind sees that the ideal is actually the cause of the limited perfections. The movement is circular in appearance only, since the double passage is in fact simultaneous and the Supremely Perfect is seen to be the First and Supreme Cause. The ideal justifies the thing (a logical movement); the thing, because actual, tells us that the ideal exists (ontological movement). Hence it is possible to understand why existence is, as Marcel claims, at the source of mystery. Existence is one of those perfections, indeed the first, realized in finite beings according to hierarchical degrees: "perfectio omnium perfectionum." It is through the act of existence that the order of concrete realities *expresses the infinite creative act of God:* existence is the gift most perfect. The ultimate mystery is, Why is there anything at all, when nothing has any right to be? A consideration of the creature leads us to ask the reason of creation. But this is to seek entrance into the divine will, wherein is laid up the secret of every action, every cause, of happiness and pain, of the sins of the good and the sufferings of the wicked; where to penetrate would be, as St. Paul says, "to recognize God as He has recognized me." The mystery of being is the mystery of love. And love is ultimate.

Of course the act of existence is unlimited. It could be nothing else, for it reflects the positive infinity of Him who is *ipsum esse subsistens.* And of course being has a universal and inexhaustible intelligibility, since *esse,* act of acts, confers intelligibility upon it. Everything shares in mystery to the degree that it enjoys existence. In itself being is

mysterious and thus is analogous to the suprarational mystery of divinity, which in no way prejudices its work as the illuminating energy of the intellect.

By accounting in this way for the mysterious aspects of being, though, have we not deprived ourselves of an explanation of its problematical feature? If being is necessarily mysterious, how can it be a problem? The proportional structure of being contains the answer. Existence is not the only element in being.

Man is a limited being, and human knowledge is acquired progressively. Intellect as such is intuitive; intellect as human is a thing of movement and advances; knowledge results from labor. But it is not always clearly seen that the foundation of the human intellect's movement is precisely its intuitive character and capacity. If it did not first see, there could be no movement. Nor, on the other hand, is it sufficiently realized that because its intuitive capacity is so limited the mind must move in order to acquire knowledge. The deficiencies of seeing are implemented by all the complicated machinery of rational discourse, and that is why St. Thomas says the human intellect is more properly called "reason";[58] but vision remains the goal of the mind, an extension of its sight through the limitless universe of being. In the first place, then, reality has the aspect of problem in virtue of its assimilation according to the human mode of knowing; that is, by means of successive and interrelated actions in which progress in truth is accomplished. Insofar as my assault on reality is not immediately exhaustive, so far reality is presented to me as a continuing series of problems to be overcome by the mind. We must here take into account that matter is not constitutive of being as problem, but only at the human level.

A most important corollary truth emerges: Every mystery is therefore a problem for man. Every ontological problem, in consequence, must ultimately lead man to mystery, which, although he knows it to elude him, he knows does not entirely escape mind. Being is intelligible; hence it must be known *somewhere*, by some intelligence, in all its unlimited lightsomeness. This, I think, is closer to the data of experience than the account given by Jacques Maritain,[59] who seems to depreciate more the problem aspect than is justified. No doubt at

[58] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 3.
[59] *Preface to Metaphysics*, pp. 7, 9.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

the metaphysical level the mind penetrates deeper by a more intense adhesion to its object, being; its intuitional grasp is still abstractive, and the progressive development from within this idea of being as such is not free from the mind's characteristically problematic attitude. Being as problem is not governed by the direction of the mind's movement, laterally or vertically as one enters the positive sciences or philosophy, but by the necessity for it to move at any level, in any direction. The structure of being is analogical. Therefore the problem in being will be there wherever being is, not of course without respecting the differences.

It is perhaps oversimplified to speak of scientific questions as mysterious "in regard to the thing, the object as it exists outside the mind," and problematic "in regard to our formulae."[60] Mystery and problem are not so neatly separable; there is interpenetration. Problem and mystery are two faces of the same coin; my acts of knowing are themselves mysterious. It cannot be said that mystery arises in the object, and problem from the side of the knowing human subject. That proportional poise and equilibrium of essence/existence relates problem and mystery within being in such a way that mystery is problematically explored, problem mysteriously revealed; and this explains why the mind seems to be making a problem out of reality. In virtue of the intellect's participation in being it realizes according to its proper analogical mode the interpenetration of problem and mystery in itself which is the characteristic structural law of being as such. The mysterious splendor that is the act of existence is, as it were, interrupted by the essential form of things; and the intellect reproduces that interruption in its broken advance towards truth. Things participate in being but are not identically being, and so too they are not identically mystery. Being is necessarily mysterious; but we encounter its mystery through the problematic, which is merely another name for limitation.

III

A number of conclusions now, with preliminary considerations behind us, appear concerning Gabriel Marcel's treatment of "problem and mystery." If his "mystery" is not a supernatural mystery (he says it is

not),[61] it must derive from what we have called "the natural mystery of being." Now, this natural mystery—and its companion problem—are, within being, necessary and inescapable, so that to opt for one or the other is in the last analysis to disapprove of reality, to wish it other than it is. This seems to be exactly what Marcel has done. We are encouraged to place at the springs of his philosophy an attitude, an *in*disposition, if the word be allowed, given formal statement in the dramas[62] and philosophical writings. This attitude may be described as one of fundamental *refusal,* a refusal to accept the human condition. Marcel's sustained criticism of the abstract has all the familiar tones of Bergson's celebrated attack on the analytic intellect, and it rings not a few changes on favorite themes of Dilthey and Scheler, who both regretted the laborious equipment of human knowledge. Behind the disapproval of the abstract lies the same unassuaged irritation, a dissatisfaction with the intellect's inability to see face-to-face in one instantaneous glance the spiritual (but natural) universe of forms. With the necessity it has to limp ahead by stages—through concepts, judgments, reasonings—instead of making in one huge bound the transition from ignorance to knowledge fully realized. How uneasy lies the Cartesian ghost. But Marcel is himself witness to the intellect's unlimited capacity, though he has never understood it in its human mode because he has never examined it in act in its living relation to its object.

Now, it may be objected that this hypothesis would make angelic knowledge one without problems. That this is false may be shown in two ways: (*a*) because there is movement in the angels,[63] even if it be only successive and not consecutively generative, and movement means problem; (*b*) because, although being also lights the angelic mind, the species through which the angels fully understand what they know are

[61]*The Philosophy of Existence,* pp. 1, 30.

[62]A critical analysis of the plays should confirm this. The dramatic conflict arises from people who knot up their personal universes by rejecting the roles and destinies allotted them, cherishing dreams of perfection and peace beyond the resources of their world to provide.

[63]St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 55, a. 3.

[64]*Ibid.,* q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 1.

[65]*Ibid.,* q. 12, a. 4.

[66]The result of this horror is the blasphemy of a completely evil God, the final triumph of Satan, to rule the kingdom of heaven as he does the kingdom of this world.

[67]*The Philosophy of Existence,* pp. 10, 12, 15, 22, 23.

[68]*Ibid.,* p. 17. Cf. *Etre et avoir,* p. 163, where Marcel writes of a "possibilité pour notre 'condition' de se transcender elle-même . . ." Do we transcend our condition or do we co-operate in the use of *all* its potentialities?

separated intelligible forms.[64] There is even a problem in God, only that is a mystery due to the supreme intelligibility of the divine existential act which is beyond the power of any finite intellect to utter.[65] The divine existential act contains the incomprehensible mysteries of the life of the godhead.

A distinction must be made. To know a thing incompletely and progressively—that is, in man's way—is a different matter from distorting it; just as it is neither a fatality nor an evil to be a finite, incomplete creature, unless one believes with Nietzsche that it is an evil not to be God, or with Heidegger that there is a "sin of nature" and a guilt with its roots in the limitations of creatures.[66]

That Marcel does identify rational knowledge with the act of abstraction is clearly evident from references in the essay *Position et approches concrètes*.[67] That he fails to see the need for abstraction is also evident in the same essay and, for example, in his conviction[68] that abstraction is subject to man's pleasure, where he opines that an abstract attitude is impossible when one makes an enquiry into "the value of life." He insists that "it would be a paralogism to suppose that I can pursue such an inquiry as though my own life were not at stake." Abstraction then becomes a method one may or may not employ, according to situation and our own caprice.

It is unnecessary to dwell in detail upon the historical examples disproving this rather remarkable assertion. One could scarcely dispute that there have been and are, to take a sample, Christians who "think" their Christianity and live it not at all, with intellects stocked with virtues and with atrophied wills. Kierkegaard fought them; sanctity has always accused them; the Pharisees are their ancestral types. Christianity is not the only illustration. We know each day in our personal experience the painful awareness of betraying in action the content of our dearest convictions. "For each man kills the thing he loves."

Two errors, not unrelated, are possible when it is question of a doctrine whose term is right action: (*a*) in which the person believes that perfection lies in an intellectual understanding of the doctrine; (*b*) in which the person believes that a certain understanding will guarantee effective and true action. We can, without stretching names beyond recognition, classify this error of Marcel as Socratic, or the

inability to see things whole. We can stop at the essence of things because we must begin with the essence. That is man's law. Socrates thought that all truth was rolled neatly up in the knowledge of natures and, had he been God, his knowledge of the nature of a thing would have taken him right down to the most accidental aspects of the individual. Marcel believes that no truth is in the nature of things.

The first error supports the second. Look at our two men. Both are preoccupied with essence, the one so deeply that he never sees the startling originality of the existing thing embodying the essence, the other with such rebellion that he quite repudiates it. Get beyond the essence we must; leave it out we cannot. If a Christian can fail the demands of his faith while knowing them, it is because he has originally seized its essence in that first moment of the perfecting of human knowledge and then has stopped. Only when he returns that essential form into the existential situation where the terrible privilege of loving God begins to exert pressure on his whole person will the full dimensions of human knowledge appear and with them a recognition of the significance of the will in human action. This of course is not the same thing as acting, but now the conditions are known and the first step towards action has been taken.

Oh, Marcel is right: the person is committed. But his metaphysic failing to begin with an integral view of being has left the being of man hung disastrously up with his roots in neither heaven nor hell, with no destiny outside contemplating the existential void surrounding him. In the human condition error is just as likely as truth; failure accompanies success; the life of man is a warfare and a mixed thing. To wish to alter this condition is the most effective means of achieving human misery, since it proposes a destiny for men incompatible with their nature. Socrates had believed that knowledge was sufficient; it was an incomplete knowledge. Marcel finishes by using hope to round out the rough edges of a universe without meaning. In either case the nature of man displayed is incomplete, and in the end an inevitability prevails that makes it exceedingly difficult to explain that kind of choice we call human free will. Free will is impossible when there is no reason. We must ask ourselves how much reason is left when one of the two vital constituents of being has been left aside. That is an act of unconscious abstraction to end all abstractions.

Frederick D. Wilhelmsen

THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE MYTH

Mr. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen *is a member of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santa Clara. He has previously taught at Loyola University of Los Angeles. He received his A.B. from the University of San Francisco and his M.A. from Notre Dame. He has previously written for* The Modern Schoolman.

In a recent study Father Robert F. Harvanek, S.J., raised the question of the unity of metaphysics and concluded that, although metaphysics is necessarily a unity, it is nonetheless a unity that is analogical.[1] Therefore "it is possible to have a general analogical unity of philosophy and personal, particular differences," which "appear especially on the level of ultimate explanation and depend in great part on historical, psychological, and social circumstances."[2] Father Harvanek linked this latter conclusion with the new emphasis Thomists have placed on the judgment as an act involving the whole man, body and soul, sensation and intellection.

In commenting on Father Harvanek's discussion, it would seem necessary for one to distinguish between a valid pluralist incarnation of one philosophical system and a valid plurality of systems. Metaphysical pluralism in the latter sense would reduce philosophy to a mere conceptual ordering of experience; one ordering of experience could be just as valid as another. It is difficult to see how such a position escapes historicism and relativism. However, a philosophical pluralism in the first sense—a plural incarnation of the one true philosophical system—involves no inner contradiction, nor does it relinquish the Thomist claim that metaphysics is a science of being as it is. It is the contention of this essay that the inner principles governing the act of judgment render such a pluralism a personal and cultural necessity.

It is only judgment that attains being in its existence; and, since Thomist metaphysics is the philosophy of being as the exercise of the act of existing, it is by now clear to all Thomists that the metaphysical act is the disengagement of what is actually given in all judgments—being. What is not so evident as yet is the truth that this position en-

tails the philosopher's penetration into the whole body-soul, intellect-sensation relationship that constitutes judgment. This last, when seen, points up what must be an intolerable paradox to anyone still under the influence of that rationalist and univocist tradition inherited by Scholastics through Descartes, Leibnitz, and Wolff, a tradition Thomism is only now fighting free of. Existence is attained immediately in judgment; but judgments necessarily entail the use of phantasms, and, except in direct judgments of existing material things, the phantasms employed are symbolic.[3] The philosopher must go through the phantasm to reach being. To say this is to say, in effect, that being is usually approached indirectly. We do not, as a matter of fact, directly plunge into an intuition of metaphysical truth simply by being confronted with an existing reality. We sidle up to being, as it were, and approach the terrain of metaphysics by way of a long ride through back country trails. Every teacher of metaphysics knows this is true; and every student of St. Thomas's metaphysics is aware that, although the actual disengagement of being from any necessary link with material being[4] may have come to him like a revelation, this revelation was reached after a long journey through the darkness.

The approach to being is made by way of phantasm-symbol constructs that necessarily depend on "historical, psychological, and social circumstances." This is true, but it is not enough. Even after the metaphysical *habitus* is born in a man, that *habitus* can be nourished and deepened only by a continuing and never-ending engagement in the whole order of phantasms and all this implies. Metaphysics proceeds, not by expanding progressively through the proliferation of concepts, but by an ever-deepening insight into the intelligibility of being.[5] From

[1]"The Unity of Metaphysics," *Thought*, XXVIII (Autumn, 1953), pp. 375-412.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 405.

[3]For a discussion of this issue cf. George P. Klubertanz, S.J., *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Co., 1953), pp. 191-95. It might be well to note in passing that this essay prescinds from the whole question of *natural* symbols and *natural* myths as they are understood in the Jungean psychology. Symbol is used in this study as defined in the text; that is, as a phantasm intending or representing intelligibility.

[4]I refer here to the relative *separatio* of being from matter and motion (*In Boetium de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 2). For a brief discussion of the literature concerning the negative judgment specifying metaphysics, cf. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, "The Aesthetic Act and the Act of Being," The Modern Schoolman, XXIX (May, 1952), pp. 286-87.

[5]Robert J. Henle, S.J., *Method in Metaphysics* (The "Aquinas Lecture," 1950. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1951), pp. 51-56.

[6]E.g., A. C. Southern, "Form and Style in Prose," *Month*, X (August, 1953), pp. 93-102.

this it follows, both logically and as a matter of experience, that the philosopher successively penetrates into the *ratio entis* by fashioning new and more elaborate phantasm constructs through which he can read the meaning of being. St. Thomas often insists that anyone who seeks to know any nature whatever must erect a symbol through which he will come to know the essence of the thing in question. This necessity becomes more complicated when it is a question of understanding being. Since being is intrinsically being through an act—*esse*—which is not a nature or form, not only is there no concept of the act of being, but there is no direct phantasm of that act as well. From this follows the need to deny that the act of existing is what I imagine or conceive it to be. I can conceive what things are, and I can imagine what material things are; but "what" they are is precisely not the act through which they are. Nonetheless, the approach to being must be through phantasms because man understands nothing in this life without their use. This fundamental Thomist position is revealed in its full significance when the philosopher analyzes the inner structure of judgment. Such a scrutiny reveals that the subject in all judgments—the thing understood—is grasped by way of phantasms, so that the intellect can "see" the thing itself under this or that intelligible determination; that is, the predicate which represents the formal content of the intelligible species to which the intellect is in act in any given judgment. Thus to talk metaphysics is to utilize phantasms which only instrumentally signify the act under which being—the subject of all metaphysical discourse—is seen. Our initial paradox is deepened, then, in that metaphysics means what it says, but never says what it means.

These phantasm symbols utilized to grasp things in their being vary from person to person. The imagery needed to make me see being is never quite the imagery needed to make someone else see being. And when I do see being, I will see being in my own way, and this way will not be anyone else's way. This is not a relativism, because all of us will be seeing the same intelligibility, but we will be seeing it according to modes differing intrinsically in each of us.

This is not a simple matter of rhetoric, as rhetoric has been generally understood since the seventeenth century.[6] If metaphysics were a science of the concept, a science whose achievement was reached in

the conceptual expression of formal intelligibilities, then we could say perhaps that each of us "clothed the naked truth" in an imagery peculiarly his own. But to talk this way is not only to miss the point about Thomist metaphysics; it is also to misread the Thomist psychology of intellection.[7] Intelligibilities are not abstracted *out of* sensorial data by an agent intellect that acts like a buzz saw, receiving raw phantasms at one end of the line and slicing off neat concepts at the far end of the belt, concepts that are in turn assembled in judgments by an abstracted (one might almost say *separated*) intellect. Intelligibilities are abstracted *in* phantasms, and the phantasms are never left behind, because they are the cocauses with the agent intellect for the determination of the intellect. The phantasm, being directly or indirectly caused by extramental existence, carries the *esse* of the thing to be known and is thus integrally linked to the process that terminates in the assent to the truth; and assent is always assent to an act of existing, either extramental or intramental, actual or possible.

To insist that metaphysics is engaged in the symbolic order is not to talk poetry; it is to talk both metaphysics and psychology. To speak of a pluralist incarnation of Thomist metaphysics is, among other things, to call attention to a side of metaphysical discourse that is both personal and symbolic—personal because phantasms are personal, and symbolic because the phantasms used in metaphysics do not formally, directly, represent the act of existing and the perfections intrinsic to that act. This personal, symbolic character is, as indicated, intrinsic to metaphysical discourse as such. It is not restricted simply to the images used to convey the truth to a student or to meet an alien mind on its own terms. And, finally, this personal, symbolic character is conditioned culturally and thus involves the very existence of metaphysics within history.

Understood in this sense, the possibility of a philosophical pluralism is not something granted reluctantly by the defenders of the philosophy of St. Thomas. Such a pluralism is entailed by the inner structure of

[7]Bernard Lonergan, S.J., "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies,* VII (1946), pp. 372-80.

[8]Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1946), p. 5.

[9]Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian* Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951), pp. 49-65.

[10]Walter Ong, S.J., "Myth and the Cabalas," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXVII (March, 1950), pp. 169-83. The following two paragraphs are heavily indebted to Father Ong's article.

that very philosophy itself. That many Thomists have been reluctant to grant this seems to be due to their overemphasis on the concept and on its representative character, and to a failure to grasp the truth that metaphysics is a science of the judgment. Thomists must make a closer study of the symbolical character of the phantasms employed in metaphysics, since it is these very phantasms that are the instruments carrying being to the intellect. Being cannot be denied to be as it is in the phantasm, unless what is denied—the character of the phantasm —is understood on its own terms. Such a program plunges the metaphysician into the twilight zone of symbol and its relation to the whole area of myth.

What follows is an exploration of the psychology of myth and symbolism as they function within judgment and a discussion of certain implications that this interplay of myth and symbol have for the philosopher in his concrete approach to the truth, an approach that is profoundly influenced by history and all the cultural contingencies implied by the historical order. Such a discussion should throw light both on the problem of philosophical pluralism and on the question of the incarnation of Thomist wisdom in the modern world.

That the symbol is related to the area of myth is rather generally recognized. The ritual theory of myth has been advanced by Cassirer and others.[8] Myth is described as a narrative linked with a rite. The rite *stands for,* symbolizes, the myth. The perpetual re-enactment of the rite keeps the myth present to the collective consciousness. Granting that this historical report on myth and symbol is substantially true, the philosophical issues involved still remain open questions. Following Aristotle's method of "looking to the thing,"[9] let us ask initially what all men mean by myth. In the classical European mind a myth was primarily a story taken by the populace to be the truth.[10] It was essential that the story be historically false, and what rendered any given tale a myth was the fact that it was taken to be the truth. As Father Walter Ong pointed out a number of years ago, what was peculiarly mythological about a myth was what was *not* known about it; namely, its historical falseness. By an extension, myth gradually comes to be considered anything explicitly unknown accompanying something explicitly known. Thus the myth was conquered rationally

when it was penetrated, disengaged, and understood as such. The very act of uncovering this "implicit" content in human knowledge was the act of exorcising the myth. Yet, amusingly enough, myths are slippery characters and not easily shaken. Classical literature is full of stories about sophisticated young atheists who smiled at "old wives' tales" but who, faced by the swords of the enemy in battle, broke down in prayer and fervently called on the whole assembly of Mount Olympus for aid. The rationalist who walks around a ladder or who throws salt over his shoulder is a familiar comic figure to all of us. He periodically pays his compliments to the unknown. He is the victim of myth.

Yet we oversimplify the issue if we restrict myth to the realm of a supposed nonexistent preternatural. "Each explicit statement carries with it something it is not, an implicit, which is a kind of potency."[11] Since all human knowledge is finite, every act of understanding is restricted to some well-defined field of reality; and whatever implicitly accompanies that understanding is a kind of myth—the unspoken, the unconceptualized, the backdrop from whence emerges all human discourse. When two Thomists, for example, sit down to talk philosophy, they must share a vast body of here-and-now unconceptualized and unexplicated knowledge which is the very foundation of their conversation. Let a stranger to their interests intrude himself and the spell is broken. The philosophers become aware that what was unarticulated was not nonexistent, nor was it unimportant. It was, in fact, the very ground of possibility for their communicating at all. In this sense of the term, myth is the historical undertrussing of rationality, the latent bond of society, lying beneath all rational communication, uniting men in some common tradition, conquering personal and corporate alienation.

The issue is still more complicated in that it seems arbitrary to designate strictly as myth that body of unarticulated knowledge that men can articulate at will, given the proper circumstances. The term "myth" in common usage carries with it the connotation of something *suffered;* the person is possessed by some demonic force. The intelligence of the ancient Athenian who accepted the tales about Zeus as the literal truth "suffered" from error. His judgment was simply false. The three million and more Americans who consult astrologers in our day are duped. Germany, frustrated into Nazism, erupting into the barbarism

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

of race murder, was possessed by the myth of *Blut und Boden*. The French proletariat, regarding Marxism as an "exact science," is fooled by a myth. The neurotic, seeking help from an analyst, hopes that the subconscious forces that wound him and that he cannot disengage by his own powers might be brought to the level of consciousness by the physician. Such a man knows he is wounded by some myth. The Western mind has shown a marked tendency to restrict the term "myth" to that portion of unarticulated knowledge and volition that cannot be explicated rationally and that is, therefore, capable of harming a man spiritually and physically. This prime analogue of the term "myth" refers, then, to subconscious powers that are malevolent, that block rational understanding and action.

Therefore myth can be more than one thing. It can be "malevolent," and this seems to be the more common usage of the term; or it can be "benevolent" in the sense spoken of earlier in this analysis. If the word is to be retained, these two meanings—related as they are—must be distinguished carefully. The traditional and cultural ocean from whence man draws his conscious rationality is not some hostile sea, menacing a humanity isolated on an island ribbed round with a wall of reason. This kind of "myth" is, on the contrary, the spiritual reserve both of society and of the individual. It is a treasure slowly laid up through the years in the human psyche, or (to alter the figure) it is a public and private highway down which a man travels to conquer his past and become one again with his origins.

Because the myth lies below rationality and consciously possessed intelligibility, it cannot be located psychologically within the actuated intelligible species which is the principle for any given act of intellection and the formal content of the predicate in every judgment. The myth, bound up as it is with the past, connoting as it does the forgotten, involved in volition and charged with emotion, must be located within the principle of judgment touching the order of memory, passion, imagination, and volition. That principle is the subject of the judgment, and this confronts us again with the paradox mentioned earlier in this essay. Man grasps the subject of judgment in and through phantasms that are usually symbolic. Since phantasms are the stuff of symbolization and belong to the order of the body, the link

between conscious intelligibility and myth must be the phantasm itself.

Phantasm constructs in any one judgment both present the subject and symbolically re-present the predicate, which is the way in which the subject is seen in this act of knowing. The judgment is a unity, and what is *meant*—intended—of the subject is always the predicate. (They stand to one another as matter to form.) Thus the phantasm constructs, in this act of knowing, mean precisely what I intend (the term is used formally) them to mean. Nonetheless, although *this* meaning is given *this* phantasm in *this* judgment, the phantasm itself is the end product of a long history of construction. In previous acts of knowing the phantasm could, and probably did, mean something else. This prior meaning is latent within the phantasm; it pervades the phantasm, lying low, hovering beneath conscious intelligibility, mixing with all the subrational life of man. To speak technically, this prior, unarticulated meaning is the intelligible species existing *in habitu* —neither in act nor simply in potency. Thus a phantasm has been disengaged from the memory, a phantasm containing potentially a whole cluster of intelligible species. One of these species is illuminated by the agent intellect and thus actuates the intellect. The others are *there*, but they are not adverted to consciously. Hence in the judgment the explicit rationality of the predicate plays over and works through a large body of unarticulated knowledge.

Each of these unarticulated phantasm "symbols" is related to other areas of unspoken meaning, which in turn fan out and unite themselves with still more areas of darkened rationality. In a very profound sense, we can say that a man carries his whole life before him every time he utters the simplest and most innocuous of judgments involving the most elementary symbolic phantasms.

If the above analysis is fundamentally true, we can go on to relate symbol and myth in the following way: Symbol is materiality that man causes to mean something; myth is materiality meaning something, though what is meant is not known at this time and under these circumstances. This has, I believe, serious implications for the question of the concrete incarnation of philosophical wisdom within the historical order. Before turning to these implications, however, it might be wise to set forth, in logical sequence, the theory of judgment presupposed in this discussion. This theory, thought to be integrally Thomist, can be summarized in five points.

1. The judgment is not the juxtaposition of two full-blown concepts, the products of two distinct acts of simple understanding. Briefly, the reasons are twofold. (*a*) If the judgment were composed of two "concepts"—two "ideas"—then it would never attain actual existence, since concepts are the intellectual expression of the understanding of abstracted intelligibilities, *precisely as abstracted* from existing singulars. The only complexity that can emerge from two abstracted essences is a conceptual complexity, itself abstract. Existence has never yet been coaxed forth from the ideal order. (*b*) If the judgment were composed of two concepts, then the intellect would be in act to two intelligible species, since the principle of every act of understanding—simple or judicative—is the intelligible species. But this cannot be, since a potency cannot be actuated by two acts within the same genus as itself, any more than a table can have its potency for color actuated simultaneously and under the same aspect by both red and green.

2. The judgment is, in every instance, an attainment of an act of existing. This is evident upon an inspection of the contents of all judgments. Such an inspection reveals, in a judgment itself (the first of all metaphysical judgments), that being is the exercise of existence.

3. The attainment of things in their existence is achieved through a return to the singular order by way of the phantasm-sensation relationship. Here man concretely grasps existing things through the causality they exercise upon his senses. (This last implies, of course, no illationism. Man directly knows the thing that is, but he can know the thing directly because the thing acts on his senses.)

4. Man, through his intellect, knows things as they are by bringing previously abstracted intelligibilities back to the things held in the sensation-phantasm process, from whence these intelligibilities had been abstracted originally by the agent intellect. The intellect is caused to "revert" to the senses because the thing to be known acts—through sensation initially—upon the intellect, causing the intellect to see its own relatedness to the object. Expressed otherwise, the *esse* of the thing causes within the intellect the *esse* of the species (by way of the agent intellect—cause in the order of exercise—and by way of the phantasm—cause in the order of specification). This "return to the phantasm," and through the phantasm to the thing, is the imposition

of predicate on subject, the latter being nothing more than the thing to be known presented to the intellect by phantasms reacting down to the primitive order of external sensation. The "composition of predicate with subject" causes the intellect to see itself as *related to a thing*. This "being related to a thing" is the act of being true, *esse verum*.[12] Intellect's "seeing" the "being true" of the composition is the uttering of the *verbum*, the commitment to the truth—to the relational act of intelligible existing that the thing exercises within the judgment. Not only does man know the truth; not only has he assimilated the object to himself; but he knows his own relatedness to the object; he knows how he stands with regard to the thing before him. "It is true to say that it is."

5. Because, as seen above, the thing known is presented to the intellect through phantasms which are the source of intelligible species, the thing known—the subject of judgment—is known only through this instrumentality. In direct judgments of existing things, judgments about singular material things here and now sensed and perceived, the phantasms employed are usually direct, not symbolic. They formally carry the thing to the intellect. In judgments bearing on realities not present in sensation to man, the phantasms employed are indirect; they symbolize the thing—stand for it—and instrumentally represent it to the intellect. Almost all scientific, philosophical, religious, historical, and artistic judgments are of this latter type; in short, the better part of the cultural life of a man. All of these judgments involve the use of symbolic imagery, and imagery highly refined and "abstracted" in the mathematical sciences, but an imagery highly historical and personal in the philosophical sciences, since these latter terminate—not in the imagination—but in being as it is.

These symbolic phantasms do not just happen within the psychological life of a man. They are built up slowly out of the very substance of psychic existence. They are the product of a memory stretching back to the first days of life. They represent the intuitions and traditions, the prejudices and strengths of the family, and, beyond the family, of

[12]B. J. Muller-Thym, "The 'To Be' Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XVI, 230-54. The most comprehensive study of St. Thomas's theory of judgment known to me is that of George V. Kennard, S.J., "The Intellect Composing and Dividing According to St. Thomas Aquinas" (Unpublished thesis, Graduate School of St. Louis University, 1948).

the whole cultural milieu from whence has emerged this human thing. More intimately, they reflect the passions and weaknesses, the hidden reserves of decency, the personality of this man faced with, and annealed by or crushed before, the whole order of existence.

It is this twilight zone of meaning, a zone charged with emotion and bathed in history, that renders possible, as indicated, a pluralist incarnation of metaphysical unity. Let it be insisted upon once again: Metaphysical truth is one. Nevertheless, this one true metaphysics—the wisdom of Thomism—will be made flesh in men philosophizing within history. Understood in this sense, metaphysical wisdom partakes of the mystery of the one and the many. Many men in many civilizations can see the same truth, but they will see it in their own way.

The philosopher becomes fully conscious of his own relation to the truth he professes only when he understands the cultural presuppositions lying beneath his conscious rationality. As shown above, these subrational "myths" condition all his thinking. They can hinder his philosophizing if he does not understand them. They can further the common task facing philosophy if they are known for what they are.

The late R. G. Collingwood held that only the philosopher was capable of illuminating the implicit judgments and values of any given cultural order. If Collingwood went on to identify philosophy with this task, it was due to his historicist principles. The task he suggests is, however, by no means linked essentially to historicism. Nor should the task be surrendered to the empiricist and positivist mentality. The nature and meaning of cultural existence and the relation they bear to philosophy can be understood and disengaged only by principles themselves fully philosophical. In the light of the preceding analysis, the metaphysician should be able to forward this enterprise and thus reveal to himself the historical conditions within which he must philosophize.

That every culture lives by and in its myths is a truism, but the psychological link between myth and symbol supplies a key to this life. If a symbol is materiality consciously used to mean something, we can say that a culture possesses its own meaning and is aware of itself when it can disengage its mythological structure and look it in the face.

When a society knows its own myths, such a society is fully articulate and itself. The mythological substructure of the community is known with greater or lesser penetration on analogical levels within the society. The Roman empire was such a civilization, and it has been suggested that Rome finally fell under Theodosius because Rome, possessing its meaning inherited from Augustus and the old Republic, realized that this "closed world order" was no longer adequate to the task of facing existence.[13] Medieval Christendom represented the most fully articulated and self-possessed civilization Western man has yet known. In modern times, classical seventeenth-century France was also such a consciously possessed civilization, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, eighteenth-century England. Such a community holds its own meaning never too far below the surface. In a crisis it can express itself corporately. The kind of community described is, of course, the "organic society";[14] and in the historic economy of Christianity these societies have been sacramental.

The organic society is indigenous; it is economically and socially rooted in a well-restricted locale that both conditions, and is conditioned by, a centuries-old penetration by the community.[15] It is a society in self-conscious communion with its own past and committed —corporately and, to a large extent, personally—to perpetuate a way of life bound up with the rhythm of a nature domesticated and humanized by the forefathers. This is not an a priori definition, but is rather a commonly accepted description of what is meant by an "organic society." In such a community the linguistic, artistic, historical, and even economic myths are the results of a long, slow growth from within the society itself. The imagery this society creates reflects its own communion with the existing cosmos. There are few problems of self-interpretation within the organic community. The collective myths are carried close to the surface of the collective consciousness. The myth-symbol tension—the inability to disengage latent intelligibility—is relatively rare and, when present, not too important. Myth is not "malevolent," but "benevolent." If these societies are Christian, the

[13]Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1937).

[14]On the "organic society," cf. Gustave Thibon, *Retour au réel* (Lyons: Lardanchet, 1943), and F. R. Leavis and Denys Thompson, *Culture and Environment*, pp. 78-98.

[15]Pierre Deffontaines, "The Religious Factor in Human Geography: Its Force and Its Limits," *Diogenes*, spring, 1953, pp. 24-37.

symbolism in question frequently bears on obvious religious meaning. Creation is seen sacramentally. The incarnation of metaphysical wisdom is rendered less difficult by the cultural presuppositions the philosopher brings to the search for truth. The very language, the psychic structure, the implicit way men look at things, favor a metaphysics of being. Progress in metaphysics is largely the rendering explicit of the signification of what is already affirmed implicitly and lived in exercised act. That things exist in and for themselves, that they are created and are thus finite and contingent, that they fall under the providence of God, that God is being—these truths not only surround a man as a body of doctrine external to himself but are part of his very life and express themselves on all levels of cognition and volition. Even though few men will ever become genuine philosophers in this or any other society, we can affirm that those who philosophize within a Christian cultural framework will find metaphysics an activity that goes with the grain. The climate is already Thomist.

An entirely different situation exists in a culture in process of disintegration. In such communities the implicit cultural background is in opposition to the consciously articulated *Zeitgeist.* T. S. Eliot has expressed this truth in a now famous phrase, "the disassociation of sensibility." On the implicit level of thought and action, men continue to judge and be motivated by the old cultural pattern that they repudiate in their *conscious* philosophizing. A rather striking example, at the dawn of the modern era, was John Milton. In his sonnets he is often an orthodox Catholic; in his prose writing he is an Arian. He reacts like a Trinitarian; he thinks like a Unitarian. The most significant fact about the disassociation of sensibility is that it is generally not known for what it is. The lost heritage continues to linger on in the gestures and imagination of a people who have lost the old meaning. Myth here is "malevolent" in the sense defined earlier in this essay. The most striking mass example of this in our day is to be found in Russia. The Christian tradition has been, in all probability, lost to a large part of the second- and third-generation Communist youth. Yet we are certain that this religious tradition hangs on as a kind of myth, expressing itself in a host of signs and symbols. Something invested with a non-Marxist meaning is burnt into the soul of

Russia, but what this might be, or what it might portend, escapes the conscious rationality of the Communist youth.

The society that has lost its meaning is not the only kind of society in which men find it difficult to articulate their cultural presuppositions. This is also true of the society in process of formation. Such is the case with the new industrialized society of the Western world. A host of myths cluster around the community, but they do not stand as articulated symbols for any conscious vision of reality. Some recent and illuminating studies have pointed out, for example, that Americans are motivated largely by a mass communication system that fans out and covers the entire nation, penetrating every home and touching the most removed of men.[16] These instruments of communication play on subconscious drives and hidden hopes; they create mythological patterns informing millions of people who are only vaguely aware they are being affected at all. Behind this mythology of popular culture reposes a deeper mythology, and this deeper mythology can be said almost to define modernity itself. This deeper mythology is fundamentally antirealist. It is hostile to the spirit of Thomism; and unless this spirit is understood by the Thomist, there is grave danger that he might fall victim to it. I would define this spirit, this cultural background to the conscious mind of modern man, as an "implicit idealism"; and I suggest that it is the result of the two dominant drives in modern secularized civilization, the spirit of Gnosticism in politics and the spirit of technics in cultural life at large.

Eric Voegelin has spoken of the "Gnostic revolution" as defining the essence of modernity.[17] Viewed politically, this spirit is described as the "inner logic of the Western political development from medieval immanentism through humanism, enlightenment, progressivism, liberalism, positivism, into Marxism."[18] Looked at theologically, Gnosticism represents a failure in nerve. Man ceases to place his beatitude in an end transcending the cosmos; he "immanentizes" salvation, investing

[16]Herbert Marshall McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1951); H. A. Innis, *Changing Concepts of Time* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1953); Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, *The Heart of the City* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1953); Bernard Iddings Bell, *An Examination of the American Way of Life* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952); David Riesman, in collaboration with Denney Reuel and Glazer Nathan, *The Lonely Crowd, a Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950).

[17]Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952).

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 125.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 170.

the world with the attributes of divinity. This involves the first split with the spirit of realism. Since present existence is full of imperfection, sin, evil, and the rest, the Gnostic goal is always projected into the future. Time, as mere time, is invested with an intrinsic teleology, and present existence is viewed exclusively as an instrument for the future fulfillment of this end that works itself out dynamically through history. Man, inasmuch as he falls under this Gnostic influence, tends to live more and more in the future; and the refusal to face existence as it is becomes a matter of principle. The resultant intellectual and moral corruption "pervades society with the weird, ghostly atmosphere of a lunatic asylum, as we experience it in our times in the Western world."[10] When this spirit becomes widespread and thus corrupts the popular soul, the implicit realism natural to man begins to give way to an implicit idealism. Being is not thought to be existence, but becomes ideal possibility. The things that are assume gradually the character of pure means; their being is a being-used; they are tools for the future order wherein man will be divinized. Should this spirit completely corrupt a man, insanity results. He loses all insight into reality as it is. Obviously a "pure" Gnosticism is a contradiction for a sane man; the spirit mixes in with older cultural patterns, and wherever it is present in some degree within a man the chances for an incarnation of metaphysical wisdom become weakened. If such a man does struggle through to a Thomistic vision of reality, it will be by way of denying these unrealistic "myths"; metaphysics will grow there in an alien soil, a soil hostile to philosophical growth.

Linked with this "Gnostic" drive in the modern world is the dominance of the technological mind, a mind that would pattern the world after the spirit of mathematics. Broadly viewed, we can say that the mathematical mind would create its own universe and impose a univocal rationality on that universe. The modern world is due, in large part, to a gigantic mass effort to remake creation in the image of man. There is no question here of the abstract legitimacy of the method at hand. The question rather concerns the nature of the method and the influences it has produced on the "myths" of modern man. Mathematicized science, dependent as it is on the extensive use of the *entia rationis,* does not see things in terms of their own proper natures.

Things are understood exclusively inasmuch as they are quantified. From this follows the Procrustean method of imposing rationality on the world, rather than disengaging intelligibility from the world.[20] Gilson has noted the marked hostility of many modern scientists to the very intelligibility of existence itself.[21] In fact the goal of modern science is not an understanding of things as they are, but rather power over the things that are. Culturally, this drive in science has resulted in throwing around man a world of technics, instruments. To use a distinction of Heidegger's, modern man is surrounded less and less by things that are *vorhanden*—things of nature present *before* one's hand —and more and more by things that are *zuhanden*—things that are made, that are instruments, that are *at* one's hand.[22] No matter how useful a thing of nature might be, it nevertheless belongs first to nature and only secondly to use. Initially it is viewed as being; only afterwards as being-useful. The instrument produced by technology is viewed first as an instrument and only afterward (if at all) as being in itself. To be conditioned psychologically by an ever-increasing array of mass-produced instruments, to be removed—by the same process—from anything but the most obvious contacts with natural creation is to work increasingly toward an implicit or mythological idealism. Things are thought of spontaneously as functions, as related to me prior to being in themselves. Couple this fact not only with the inability of modern science to deal with existing natures on their own terms, but also with the hostility this science displays toward existence itself, and the result can only be a still further weakening of that nonconceptualized realism that naturally should aid the growth of true metaphysics.

Gnostic refusal to see things as they are, linked with the cultural dominance of a mathematically created technology, has created the most typical myths of modern man—myths, once again, inimical to realism. Popular culture, with its flight from "the sorry scheme of things as they are" and with its desire to remold them "nearer to the

[20]Gavin Ardley, *Aquinas and Kant* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1951), *passim*.

[21]Etienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1939), p. 128.

[22]Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, with introd. by Werner Brock (London: Vision, 1949), pp. 28, 43-45.

[23]McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride*, p. 155.

heart's desire,"[23] both reflects and is caused by these deeper currents of modernity.

All of this, of course, brings us back to our initial question of the possibility of a pluralist incarnation of the one true metaphysics. The form Thomism eventually assumes in our day cannot be the form it took in the medieval world. Still more, Thomism in our day faces a cultural substructure, a "mythology," unfriendly to the *existence,* if not to the *essence,* of metaphysical realism. The signs of this are everywhere: the inability of men of good will to see the probative value of the demonstrations for the existence of God; the implicit judgment that things are less rich and diversified than they seem; the postulate of an impoverished universe; the refusal to affirm that man knows things are simply because he senses them; the passing away of that reverence for reality that Heidegger calls "the sense of the Holy." Still further, there is the evidence of the new American language, a language neither organic nor concrete, as is its older English counterpart, but rather dynamic and abstract. This reflects the new mind. The language is "dynamic" because present existence must be overcome as rapidly as possible and "abstract" because the mind is accustomed to moving in a world of technological abstractions. Obviously, the modern American is almost completely unaware of this implicit idealist background to his conscious rationality. The lack of irony in our day reflects this simplicity.

These myths of modern culture are malevolent largely because they are not known for what they are. They are merely used unthinkingly; they are the stuff from whence the latter-day man abstracts, reasons, and judges. Yet it is out of this riot of unarticulated meaning—impregnated with centuries of Gnostic dreaming and technological rationalism —that a philosopher will disengage being as the possession of existence. In order for Thomism to incarnate itself in our day, this hidden cultural substructure must be understood for what it is. Once understood, it can be faced and counteracted. This is a work that cannot be shirked because each philosopher brings to the contemplation of wisdom not only his intellect, but himself—a man, standing in a certain cultural order, stamped by all the forces of history.

The Philosopher and the Myth
Frederick D. Wilhelmsen

Robert C. Whittemore

WHITEHEAD'S PROCESS AND BRADLEY'S REALITY

MR. ROBERT C. WHITTEMORE *is an instructor in philosophy at Tulane University. He had previously taught at Yale University, where he received his M.A. and Ph.D. He has written for* Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Ethics, *and the* Personalist.

I

> If you get a general notion of what is meant by perishing, you will have accomplished an apprehension of what you mean by memory and causality, what you mean when you feel that what we are is of infinite importance, because as we perish we are immortal. That is the one key thought around which the whole development of *Process and Reality* is woven, and in many ways I find that I am in complete agreement with Bradley.

So speaks Whitehead in his essay on process and reality.[1] "I admit," he remarks elsewhere in the same paper, "a very close affiliation with Bradley."[2] And in the preface to *Process and Reality* itself,[3] comparing his own view with that of Bradley, he finds that "the final outcome is after all not so greatly different." All of which would appear to lend credence to the speculation that in the Bradleian view of reality a not inconsiderable contribution to the development of process philosophy is to be discerned.

Hitherto, the existence of such a contribution, if suspected, has at least been thoroughly ignored. Bradleians have in general been so preoccupied with the negative implications of the doctrine of Appearance as to have no time for consideration of the positive import of the theory of Reality. And for the interpreters of Whitehead, Bradley apparently does not exist. Yet consider the Bradleian teaching on Feeling, Appearance, Process, and Reality in juxtaposition with similar

[1] A. N. Whitehead, *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948), p. 89.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[3] *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), p. vii.

[4] F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951), p. 432.

[5] *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950), chap. 15.

themes in Whitehead, and the result is not only affinity, but, in many instances, improvement. The consensus of philosophical opinion has inclined to view these two philosophers as holding views alien to one another. That the consensus is wrong, that, on the contrary, it is to the Bradleian viewpoint as correcting, and corrected by, that of Whitehead that we must turn for the solution of many of the difficulties besetting process philosophy it is the aim of this essay to show.

It will be objected at the outset that no justification exists for such an interpretation. Bradley, we shall be told, is an absolute idealist, Whitehead a realistic relativist; between such idealism and realism the dichotomy is complete. There are, of course, reasons for such an attitude. Prime among these is the belief common to many that realism and idealism represent two distinct cosmological types. Few items in the mythology of metaphysics have wider circulation. It is the presupposition of virtually every historical classification. And yet it is a presupposition which requires only to be taken literally in order to dissolve. For what metaphysics can claim, or would care to claim, to be either *purely* realistic or idealistic? A metaphysic without a doctrine of mind or interpreted experience is hardly thinkable. Reality encompasses elements realism dreams not of. On the other hand, Appearance is not illusion. Whatever its character, it nonetheless remains a fact for explanation. On these theses both Bradley and Whitehead would agree. In short, the *metaphysical* dichotomy between realism and idealism lies more in their respective approaches than in their conclusions. Differing methodologies can yield coalescent conclusions.

Yet even granting this, the relationship of Bradley to process philosophy is by no means established. Bradley to all intent concludes to a Reality couched in terms of an immutably perfect Absolute, Whitehead to a Reality which is Creativity conceived as the locus of the operations of a panentheistic God. The compatibility of these conclusions cannot be simply presupposed. So much might we admit. On the face of it, Bradley's conception of unity does seem rather inconsonant with that envisaged by Whitehead. But in fact the incompatibility is more apparent than real.

Call to mind that for Bradley the connotation of "Absolute" is not "the sum of things,"[4] is not "God-independent-of-the-world,"[5] is not

"unity excluding diversity";[6] but it is that Whole which is "God-and-the-world," "unity-including-diversity." The alleged incompatibility disappears. "There really is within the Absolute," Bradley remarks,

> a diversity of finite centres. There really is within finite centres a world of objects. . . . These things are realities, and yet, because imperfect, they are but appearances which differ in degree. That they are supplemented and *without loss* are all made good absolutely in the Whole we are led to conclude. But how in detail this is accomplished, and exactly what the diversity of finite centres means in the end, is beyond our knowledge.[7]

Reality, he writes elsewhere, "must be One, not as excluding diversity, but as somehow including it in such a way as to transform its character."[8] The parallels with Whitehead are plain to see. Substitute "actual entities" for "finite centres"; for "Absolute" read "consequent nature of God";[9] and there is little in either of the statements of the one that would not be admitted by the other.

Compare Bradley's

> For me the Absolute is there to see that nothing in the world is lost. That effort which for our vision is wasted, passes over beyond our vision into reality and is crowned with success.[10]

with Whitehead's

> He [God] saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.[11]

A further affinity appears. Presupposed by both statements is a doctrine of transmutation (passage over), which is by Whitehead explic-

[6] *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 180, 364, 430-32.

[7] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 412. My italics.

[8] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 213.

[9] Such an identification is of course subject to limitation and qualification. On the surface it seems unwarranted. But on this topic, more below.

[10] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 348. For expressions of a similar nature see *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 214, 380, 404, 438, 453.

[11] *Process and Reality*, p. 525.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 384 f.

[13] *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 162, 214, 403, 404, 411, 438, 453, 469, 470.

[14] Note that we say "consonant" and not "identical." Bradley, of course, would resist any effort to identify the Absolute with God, at least insofar as this latter term is taken in any traditionally religious sense.

[15] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 160, 230 f.; *Appearance and Reality*, p. 508.

[16] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 420.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 190. See also *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 127, 223.

[18] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 315 f.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 190 n.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 157 n.

[21] "This immediate union of the one and many is an 'ultimate fact' from which we start. . . . But feeling, if an ultimate fact, is not true ultimately or real. Even of itself it is self-transcendent and transitory" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 508). See also *Essays* pp. 160 f., 175, 316, 178, 203.

itly categorized[12] and by Bradley implicitly acknowledged throughout his work.[13] It is this common employment of "transmutation," together with its cosmological presupposition of "the universal immanence of feeling," which serves to link the two philosophies in one tradition and make consonant the "Absolute" of the one with the "God"[14] of the other. How this linkage may in detail be justified and what significance for the future of process philosophy it holds remain for explication.

II

The explication falls naturally into three parts, corresponding to the three levels of experience delineated by Bradley: (*a*) infrarelational experience (feeling); (*b*) relational experience (Appearance); (*c*) suprarelational experience (The Absolute–Reality). At each level we shall encounter elements common to both Bradley and Whitehead. Of perhaps more importance is the fact that at each level we will also meet much in the philosophy of the one seemingly alien to the viewpoint of the other. Should such basic differences as may appear prove irreconcilable, our whole aim would be invalidated. The comparison and analysis which follows is undertaken in the conviction that there is nothing in the viewpoint of the one intrinsically alien to the position of the other, but that, on the contrary, such differences of expression and theory as will be encountered admit of fusion into a synthesis at once more coherent and consistent than either view taken in isolation.

For Bradley, as for Whitehead, feeling is the final given fact in which Reality finds temporal expression.[15] "Feeling," he insists, "is the beginning, and it is the source of all material, and it forms the enfolding element and abiding ground of our world."[16] "Nothing," he continues, "in the end is real but what is felt, and for me nothing in the end is real but that which I feel."[17] Only in feeling, he concludes, do we directly encounter Reality.[18] "The real, to be real, must be felt."[19]

Yet we are not to take this to mean that Reality is to be reduced to, or equated with, feeling.[20] For feeling is, in a sense, always transcended.[21] Our experience constitutes a perennial process of mere awareness giving way to reflective consciousness. And because this is so, we must never, Bradley warns, lapse into the fundamental error of

identifying feeling with Reality.[22] Feeling is the ground, but it is not the criterion of Reality.[23] "In one sense," he remarks,

> I agree that we can never break out and pass beyond feeling.[24] Everything that is real must be felt. But, on the other side, I urge that our felt content is developed in such a way that it goes beyond and conflicts with the form of feeling as mere immediacy.[25]

Given such a view, it is easy for one to see why Whitehead should be moved to remark that "his [Bradley's] insistence of 'feeling' is very consonant with my own conclusions."[26] For the Bradleian view here constitutes an almost direct traversal of the Whiteheadian analysis of perception into modes of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy. The notion of feeling as transcended yet immanent in relational experience (Whitehead's mode of presentational immediacy) is virtually the same in both philosophies. Common to both also is the conviction that consciousness is not coextensive with experience.[27] "Consciousness, to my mind," states Bradley, "is not original. What comes first in each of us is rather feeling, a state as yet without either an object or subject."[28] The parallel to Whitehead's notion of causal efficacy is obvious. At this stage, whatever differences may be discerned between the two viewpoints seem almost wholly terminological.

One exception to this unanimity does, however, require mention. The exhaustive analysis of feeling, which is the central topic of Part III of Whitehead's *Process and Reality,* finds no parallel in Bradley; to

[22] *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1935), II, 696; see also *Appearance and Reality,* p. 407.

[23] *Essays on Truth and Reality,* pp. 179, 420; *Appearance and Reality,* pp. 330-31.

[24] *Essays on Truth and Reality,* p. 157 n., 173, 175, 178.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 157.

[26] *Process and Reality,* p. viii.

[27] *Essays on Truth and Reality,* p. 192; *Process and Reality,* p. 245.

[28] *Essays on Truth and Reality,* p. 194. Note that in this passage, as throughout his work, "feeling" is in nowise taken as *merely* subjective (see *Appearance and Reality,* pp. 70 f., 90, 103). "Feeling," for Bradley, is never simply "my feeling," but is rather a state in which the feeler is ever at one with the felt. (See *Appearance and Reality,* pp. 236, 239). ". . . what I repudiate," says Bradley, "is the separation of feeling from the felt, or of the desired from desire, or of what is thought from thinking, or the division—I might add —of anything from anything else. . . . You cannot find fact unless in unity with sentience, and one cannot in the end be divided from the other, either actually or in idea" (*Appearance and Reality,* p. 129). This doctrine, allowing for differences due to terminology, is virtually identical with that taught by Whitehead (see *Process and Reality,* pp. 357, 359, 390).

[29] *Collected Essays,* II, 662.

[30] When Whitehead speaks, for example, of such hybrids as propositional feelings (*Process and Reality,* pp. 391 ff.) and judgment feelings (*ibid.,* p. 396), he is clearly employing "feeling" in a sense which, for Bradley, would belong to the relational rather than the infrarelational level of experience.

[31] *Process and Reality,* pp. 350, 351.

analyze the felt, for him, is to destroy it as such.[29] On the surface this difference would seem to pose somewhat of a problem for process philosophies. For if Bradley is correct in his assertion that analysis is the death of feeling, we may well ask if "feeling" retains any univocal meaning when applied, as by Whitehead, to the description of stages of experience both lower and higher.[30] It seems possible to reconcile the two views only if we take the Whiteheadian use of "feeling" to signify no more than the continuing immanence of the feeling state in higher levels of experience. Fortunately for their compatibility, no good reason appears to exist which would rule out such an interpretation; and it might even be argued that the difference between the two positions is merely one of ambiguity. In any case, it would seem that the Bradleian distinction of levels of experience runs less risk of degenerating into equivocation than does Whitehead's division of feelings into classes. If we must follow Whitehead on this score, then the analysis of perception as given in his *Symbolism* would appear, in the light of the Bradleian view, to have rather more to recommend it.

However, with the introduction of the notion of the analysis of perception, we have, following Bradley, in a sense already left feeling behind and entered into the realm of the relational. And here we are met with a curious inversion. For whereas at the infrarelational level Whitehead's analysis of feelings found no counterpart in Bradley, here at the relational level Bradley's critique of Appearance finds no equivalent in Whitehead! There seem to be two reasons for such an inversion. One, already noted in part, stems from the fact that in Whitehead's analysis of feeling Bradley's two levels (relational and infrarelational) are telescoped into one. If, as Whitehead maintains,[31] relations can be given in feeling below the level of consciousness, then obviously any distinction between levels is somewhat artificial. However, as against Whitehead, a strong doubt may, as we have already noted, be expressed as to whether or not relations as such can be given in unanalyzed feeling states. The second reason seems to be primarily one of a difference in attitude. Whitehead prefers to confine himself to the elaboration of his own position, leaving the repudiation of its alternatives to others. Insofar as he at all condescends to treat of presuppositions alien to those implicit in his own system, it is merely

to renounce them.[32] In short, explication of the process view itself constitutes sufficient refutation of those traditional views differing from it. With Bradley precisely the opposite attitude prevails. Oblique indication of dissent from the traditional via the development of a new synthesis is for him hardly sufficient. One's predecessors, he would maintain, however misguided their thinking, deserve at least the courtesy of refutation. Alien viewpoints are not disposed of simply by treating them as of no account. No view of Reality is so secure in its truth as to enable it to dispense with the task of justifying itself against views alternative to it.

Governed by this attitude, Bradley undertakes in Book I of *Appearance and Reality* to analyze the claim of rationalistically oriented metaphysics to have understood the nature of Reality. His method is to examine in turn all those conceptions making claim to represent ultimate reality—that is, will, substance, self, and so on—and to find the claim of each vitiated by inconsistency, and inconsistency which comes to light in the one factor exhibited in common by all; that is, relations. For, he concludes, we can no more understand relations that we can do without them.[33] "The arrangement of given facts into relations and qualities may be necessary in practice, but it is theoretically unintelligible. The reality, so characterized, is not true reality, but is appearance."[34]

Of course, no metaphysics or ontology with any pretensions to ad-

[32]*Ibid.*, p. viii.

[33]The point deserves much greater clarification. Unfortunately, to provide such would entail a major digression from our main theme. We can here but note that the significance of this Bradleian doctrine of relations for this main theme should become more apparent as the development of this theme progresses.

[34]*Appearance and Reality*, p. 21.

[35]*Ibid.*, pp. 166, 397. The mistake of interpreting Appearance as meaning the illusory rather than the finite (its true meaning for Bradley) has often been made. Whitehead himself appears to have been guilty of such a misinterpretation (see *Process and Reality*, p. 289 and *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, p. 88). It is interesting to speculate how much greater Whitehead's recognition of his debt to Bradley must have been had he clearly understood that Appearance connotes not illusion but finitude.

[36]*Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 63-64, 272.

[37]*Appearance and Reality*, p. 511.

[38]*Ibid.*

[39]R. D. Mack's *Appeal to Immediate Experience* constitutes one refreshing exception to this attitude.

[40]As presented in Book Two of *Appearance and Reality* and subsequently in the *Essays*.

[41]"If there is anything in philosophy of which I am fully assured, it is this, that to seek to discuss the nature of truth apart from a theory of ultimate reality ends and must end in futile self-deception" (*Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 149).

[42]*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 119, 123.

[43]*Ibid.*, p. 403.

equacy can safely ignore the level of the rational. Bradley would be the first to admit that the rational is, at least, an integral component of the real. But this is not, he would argue, to say that the rational exhausts the real, that we can merely by reflective thought attain to final epistemological and metaphysical truth. Such final truth, in the Bradleian view, can only be that truth which is the recognition of the Absolute qua Absolute. For Bradley, the Absolute alone *is* Reality. All else—that is to say, everything limited or contingent—is not Reality, but that Appearance which is its finite manifestation. However, it should always be kept in mind that in speaking thus of "Appearance" Bradley is not denying the reality of the external world. Appearance is not illusion;[35] nor is it to be regarded as an other to Reality in the sense that nonbeing is an other to Being. Appearance is never simply *mere* appearance.[36] Rather it is Reality as incompletely apprehended.

> [These] facts and views partial and one-sided, incomplete and so incoherent—things that offer themselves as characters of a Reality which they cannot express, and which present in them moves them to jar with and to pass beyond themselves—in a word *appearances* are [he insists] the stuff of which the Universe is made.[37]

"If we take them in their proper character we shall be prone neither to overestimate nor to slight them."[38]

Unfortunately, the injunction to take Appearance in its "proper character" has been, by Bradleian critic and disciple alike, usually ignored.[39] The implications for contemporary rationalism of Bradley's critique of relations have been such as to draw the attention of most commentators away from his positive doctrine of Reality[40] and to find in the negative philosophy of Book I of *Appearance and Reality* his basic contribution to metaphysics. That such a concentration on the negative is a mistake of the first order it seems hardly necessary to point out. The general tenor of the whole of Bradley's work is so clearly oriented toward the development of a positive doctrine of Reality[41] that it is difficult to imagine the critics being so misled. The analysis of relational experience (the realm of Appearance) is a necessary component within any philosophy of Reality.[42] It is a necessary stage in any defensible conception of suprarelational experience, since this latter must, by definition,[43] encompass all subordinate levels of

experience. But it is not, nor could it hardly be, a philosophy in itself."[44]

What is its role and significance? Bradley, summarizing his teaching, has this to say:

> Everything so far, which we have seen, has turned out to be appearance. It is that which, taken as it stands, proves inconsistent with itself, and for this reason cannot be true of the real. But to deny its existence or to divorce it from reality is out of the question. For it has a positive character which is indubitable fact, and, however much this fact may be pronounced appearance, it can have no place in which to live except reality. And reality, set on one side and apart from all appearance, would assuredly be nothing. Hence what is certain is that, in some way, these inseparables are joined. This is the positive result which has emerged from our discussion.[45]

In sum, everything finite is an appearance of the one reality and cannot be conceived either as illusion or as real in itself. This is the fundamental lesson to be gained from Bradley's analysis of appearance. Unfortunately, it is a lesson which has hitherto had virtually no acknowledgment either from Whitehead or his followers. Yet for

[44]This point seems not to have been clearly realized by Bradleian critic R. G. Ross. In his *Skepticism and Dogma* Ross interprets "feeling" as being merely a "mythical given" (pp. 105-6) and finds Bradley's philosophy to be, in sum, a complex manner of begging the ontological argument (p. 107). Such a conclusion would have force were Bradley no more than the intellectualist Ross apparently takes him to be. That Bradley is not merely an intellectualist is witnessed not only by his insistence on feeling as the one path to Reality (*Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 160), but also by his explicit repudiation of the intellectualist label itself (*ibid.*, p. 124)!

[45]*Appearance and Reality*, p. 114.

[46]Here again we have an illustration of the fallacy of judging content by label (see p. 2). Taken in the sense in which the labels "relativist" and "absolutist" are descriptively pertinent, the philosophies of Whitehead and Bradley prove to be (paradoxically?) not contrary but complementary. See below.

[47]"I therefore conclude that no given fact is sacrosanct. With every fact of perception or memory a modified interpretation is in principle possible, and no such fact therefore is given free from all possibility of error" (*Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 204). See also pp. 117, 324 ff., 343.

[48]Many Bradleians will here no doubt protest that Bradley's own philosophy constitutes an exception to this statement. Bradley himself remarks that "with regard to the main character of that Absolute our position is briefly this. We hold that our conclusion is certain, and that to doubt it logically is impossible. There is no other view, there is no other idea beyond the view here put forward. It is impossible rationally even to entertain the question of another possibility. Outside our main result there is nothing except the wholly unmeaning, or else something which on scrutiny is seen really not to fall outside" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 459). Strong words, and on the face of it they would seem to contravene much of what has been said above. Yet we should keep in mind that at this stage of the analysis we are still marking the implications of the doctrine of appearance. The implications, meaning, and compatibility of this "main result" vis-à-vis Whitehead still remain for explication.

[49]*Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 66-67, 132-33, 182, 188, 445-46.

process philosophy it is a lesson of immense significance as attention to its implications will reveal.

Whitehead is a relativist; and for him all cosmologies, his own included, are but hypotheses. Their justification is always pragmatic, and each in its turn will suffer supersession. Bradley is an absolutist, and for him all philosophies are but finite and imperfect attempts to describe that infinite perfection which is the Absolute. One a relativist, the other an absolutist, and yet their respective doctrines seem to come to the same thing.[46] For if everything finite is appearance, then everything, it would seem, must be hypothetical. For used in their metaphysical sense, "appearance" and "hypothesis" are each synonyms for the other. Thus the various philosophies of appearance discriminated by Bradley may with equal facility be viewed as alternative cosmological hypotheses. If no philosophy can claim final truth—since (in Bradley's view) even final truth would be a truth *about* reality, and not that Reality which it is about[47]—then once again all philosophies are hypothetical;[48] and the criterion for choice among them will be, as is acknowledged by both Bradley and Whitehead, pragmatic of necessity.[49]

So much is common ground. What is, however, not common is the respective justification each has to offer for his position. Whitehead's philosophy, as we noted above, is primarily descriptive, rarely polemical. He delineates but does not justify (at least in the sense of undertaking to refute his opponents). For Bradley, on the other hand, the analysis of the Book of Appearance stands as detailed justification for the view that all rationalization is essentially hypothetical. But if this is so, then the significance for process philosophy of Bradley's teaching concerning the universality of Appearance is plain to see. It is simply this: The critical justification of metaphysical relativism (the doctrine that philosophies are hypotheses) is to be found not in Whitehead, metaphysical relativism's great exponent, but in Bradley's Book of Appearance. To the degree that the thesis of this Book is valid, to that degree is the doctrine of hypothesis vindicated. Paradoxical though it may seem, the case for the open system has been best made by one whose own system is apparently the antithesis of openness!

Yet because appearance may be identified with hypothesis, it by no means follows that process (as defined by Bradley) is identifiable with reality (as defined by Whitehead). On the contrary, the disagreement between Bradley and Whitehead as regards their respective conceptions of process appears to be such as to reduce to triviality such affinities as we have heretofore noted.

Process, for Whitehead, is the very essence of reality. "Process," he remarks, "is the becoming of experience."[50] And as we have found it to be for Bradley, so also is it for Whitehead that what is not experience is nothing. In short, for Whitehead process is ultimate. For Bradley, on the other hand, process is ultimate only in the strictly limited sense in which appearance itself may be said to be ultimate.[51] Process, for Bradley, is not the essence of reality, but is rather that which appears within reality. Reality *contains* process,[52] but process is not reality. Process, change, progress—all these are, for Bradley, of no meaning save as appearances within a Whole which is itself none of them.[53] "For the improvement or decay of the universe seems nonsense, unmeaning or blasphemous. While, on the other hand, faith in the progress or persistence of those who inhabit our planet has nothing to do with metaphysics."[54]

Must we then take this to imply that Bradley's final viewpoint is that of Parmenidean monism? There are passages which would seem to support such a conclusion. "This one Reality," he notes, "enters into, but is itself incapable of evolution and progress[55]. . . We must remember that the universe is incapable of increase[56] . . . Progress and decay are alike incompatible with perfection . . . For nothing perfect, nothing genuinely real can move. The Absolute has no seasons."[57]

Taken in isolation, such statements would appear to justify the conviction that in Bradley's view Parmenides has finally conquered process. Taken in the context of his whole work, however, a somewhat different picture emerges. A monist Bradley surely is; but *monism* is a word of many senses, and even the most cursory attention to Bradley's teaching should suffice to convince that whatever may be the sense in which

[50] *Process and Reality*, p. 252.

[51] That is to say, in the sense that "the Reality is itself nothing at all apart from appearances" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 488).

[52] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 550; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 344.

[53] *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 442, 444, 445; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 337, 344, 411.

[54] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 344.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 442.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 445.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 442.

it is applicable, Parmenidean is not it.

For consider: If *monism* be taken as Parmenidean, then the whole of Bradley's teaching with regard to Feeling and Appearance must be repudiated as either pointless or contradictory. If Reality is changeless perfection, then it is meaningless to say, as Bradley has done, that it is approachable in Feeling, even if the function of this latter be no more than to provide a basis for analogy. If the essence of the Absolute is immutability, then it is difficult to see how Appearance can be anything but illusion. Yet, as we have seen, Bradley is most explicit in his contention that Appearance is never simply *mere* appearance.

We must remember that monism as such is not incompatible with the claims of Feeling and Appearance. Monism in itself does not entail the identification of Oneness with immutability. To deny that the Heracleitan viewpoint is ultimate is not to assert the ultimacy of the Parmenidean. For both views may stand as poles within a Reality identifiable with neither. To say that change is not ultimate is not to infer that it is mere illusion, any more than to deny ultimacy to the changeless is to acquiesce to the finality of process. Both poles, the abiding and the flux, must be interpreted as aspects of Reality and not Reality itself if we are to avoid the inconsistency and contradiction involved in setting up either pole as the expression of Reality.

In advancing such an interpretation I am, of course, aware that I may be pressing Bradley to a conclusion to which he would not assent. To say, on the one hand, that Bradley is not a Parmenidean and on the other to contend that, if consistent, he *ought not be* a Parmenidean, is to say two entirely different things. In arguing above that the doctrines of Feeling and Appearance imply the denial of Parmenidean monism, we have perhaps been contending more for the latter of these two statements (that is, that consistency requires the rejection of Parmenidean monism) than for the former. That the former is itself true, that Bradley's monism cannot possibly be Parmenidean, but that it is, on the contrary, a monism of an entirely different sort—compatible with, rather than alien to, that notion of unity envisaged by process philosophy—becomes clear when we turn, as we must now do, to the consideration of the meaning and implications of that suprarelational Experience which is the Absolute in and for itself.

III

Unity is a word having many synonyms, and thus it is that in Bradley's philosophy Reality takes various names. It is the Universe, conceived as one complete system.[58] It is the Whole, regarded as that unity binding all finite centers into One identity.[59] Because it alone is truly unity-in-diversity, it is spoken of as the Individual,[60] perfect and sufficient unto itself. Because in it all will, thought, and feeling are transmuted and absorbed, it is described as Experience.[61] For everything, says Bradley, "is experience, and also experience is one."[62] But most of the time Reality is named the Absolute, which is, by Bradley, defined as that "one system [whose] contents are nothing but sentient

[58] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 480; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 435.

[59] *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 403-4.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 489; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 246, 315.

[62] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 405; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 246, 343.

[63] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 129.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 130. "Then as to the oneness of the universe I argued in this way. Here is the world before us and in us, a world full of content and diversity. To try to explain this away would clearly be foolish, but, as we take the world up, it contradicts itself. In that character, then, we must assume that our world is not true or real; and yet, because it is, it must somehow with all its diversity be real. But . . . it cannot be plural, for that is self-contradictory, and every division and distinction pre-supposes and rests on a unity. Hence we are forced to take the whole mass of facts as all being one in such a way as *also* and *without abridgement* to be free from discrepancy" (*Collected Essays*, II, 683).

[65] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 140; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 246, 332, 412.

[66] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 243, 409.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

[70] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 550. My italics.

[71] Bernard Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1912), p. 362 n.

[72] See especially *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 240, 241, 245; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 242-44, 246.

[73] R. D. Mack, in his *The Appeal to Immediate Experience*, appears guilty of a fundamental error when he interprets Bradley's search for Reality as an attempt to recover an undifferentiated whole of feeling (p. 14). Whatever Bradley's goal, it surely is not an "attempt to get back to immediate experience as a place where thought can rest with certainty in its own validity" (p. 15). To argue, as Mack does, that "for Bradley, the search for immediate experience is the search for Reality itself, for Reality as immediately felt" (p. 15) is to ignore completely Bradley's oft-repeated thesis that the function of feeling vis-à-vis Reality is to provide not a *literal* but an *analogical* description of Reality. (See *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 92, 140, 213, 215-16, 223). Professor Mack might have avoided such a fundamental misinterpretation had he noted Bradley's reply to a criticism by E. H. Strange. Says Bradley: "Mr. Strange apparently takes me to identify feeling with reality. Everything, I understand him to say, arises out of feeling and returns into it. This, of course, is to me a fundamental mistake for which I am in no way responsible" (*Collected Essays*, II, 696).

[74] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 140.

experience,"[63] that which "holds all possible content in an individual experience where no contradiction can remain."[64] Yet such a definition provides us but with half a picture, for if the Absolute is the all-inclusive,[65] it is also that which is actually present and working within each finite center.[66] "We have," remarks Bradley, ". . . the Absolute Reality appearing in and to finite centres and uniting them in one experience."[67] It matters little that this "immanence of the Absolute in finite centres, and of finite centres in the Absolute, [must be] set down as inexplicable."[68] The important point is that in a very literal sense the Absolute is conceived by Bradley to be at once Whole and in every part, at once immanent and all-inclusive. "The Universe is," he contends, "substantially one with each of us, and actually, as a Whole, feels and wills and knows itself within us."[69] "For me," he concludes,

> every kind of process between the Many is a state of the Whole in and through which the Many subsist. The process of the Many, and the total being of the Many themselves, are mere aspects of *the one Reality which moves and knows itself* within them, and apart from which all things and their changes and every knower and every known is all absolutely nothing.[70]

We have only to compare such a view with Whitehead's conception of the function of the consequent nature of God in order to see how far removed from any taint of Parmenideanism it really is. Indeed, so far removed from Parmenidean monism is it that no less an idealist than Bosanquet has taken Bradley to task for stressing the immanental character of the Absolute to such extent as to—for Bosanquet—lean dangerously close to panpsychism.[71] Should any further evidence as to the non-Parmenidean character of Bradley's monism be required, a collation of those passages suggestive of Bradley's panpsychistic leanings should suffice.[72]

With the elucidation of the immanental character of the Bradleian Absolute, the description of Reality as the "perfect individual" and as "a single sentient Experience" takes on new and significant meaning. For only if Reality can be thus described does a knowledge of the Absolute become possible. This is not to say that, in feeling, we come *literally to know* the Absolute,[73] since "fully to realize the existence of the Absolute is, according to Bradley, for finite beings impossible."[74] "But," he adds, "the whole question turns on the sense in which we

are to understand 'knowing.'"[75] For if by "knowing" we understand no more than having a somewhat incomplete and abstract idea of the main features of Reality, then, he thinks, we may say we have a knowledge of the Absolute.[76]

However, it must be kept in mind that for Bradley this knowledge is never more than analogical. Because "feeling supplies us with a low and imperfect example of an immediate whole,"[77] because feeling "points to a superior whole above relations,"[78] we are able, by analogy, to comprehend in bare outline a suprarelational whole "superior to and embracing all incomplete forms of life."[79] Yet what, in detail, this Whole comprises—this we cannot know.[80]

Such a view seems to express somewhat less than that Whiteheadian conception of the consequent nature of God which is its counterpart. To grasp a "bare outline" is surely less than to comprehend that "weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts"[81] which is Whitehead's expression of God's function qua consequent. Then too, Whitehead's presentation is always literal in intent. At least its limitation to the analogical is never made clear. Yet it may be questioned whether literality of expression is at all an asset. The abrupt transition from technical to almost poetic modes of expressing deity which has distressed so many Whiteheadians is happily avoided by the Bradleian device of restricting expression to the analogical. Add to this the fact that on Bradley's view the connection between finite and infinite via feeling seems somewhat more clear than on Whitehead's view, and one begins to suspect that the doctrine of Bradley may, despite its more limited character, at this point constitute an improvement on that of Whitehead.

The superior flexibility of analogical description as compared with literal description perhaps shows to best advantage in connection with

[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 215.
[78] *Collected Essays*, II, 687.
[79] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 213.
[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 453, 583.
[81] *Process and Reality*, p. 524.
[82] For diverse expressions of this same idea see *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 213, 246, 338, 380, 404, 438, 453, 469; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 75, 157, 269.
[83] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 469.
[84] *Process and Reality*, p. 532.
[85] We might here remark that the presence and importance of the concept of transmutation in Bradley's philosophy poses an insoluble problem for those who would still conceive the Absolute in any Parmenidean sense.
[86] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 284 n.; also chap. 26.
[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 284, 284 n., 394.
[88] The same distinction is pertinent also

the key notion of transmutation. As noted earlier (in Part I), it is their common adherence to this concept which, in the last analysis, really justifies the coupling of Bradley and Whitehead in one philosophical tradition. In essence, the idea of transmutation (which is, incidentally, virtually identical in both philosophies) is that in the Absolute (the consequent nature of God) everything finite is at once overpowered, dissolved, and absorbed in such a way as to transform conflict into cosmic harmony. The diversity which is the universe becomes, via transmutation, a unity in which all inconsistency and incompleteness are resolved into a higher and complete concord.[82] As Bradley puts it:

> We have an all-pervasive transfusion with a re-blending of all material. And we can hardly say that the Absolute consists of finite things, when the things, as such, are there transmuted and have lost their individual natures.[83]

Whitehead gives voice to the same idea in a somewhat more concise form when he remarks that "what is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world."[84]

The significance of such a notion becomes apparent when one reflects that without it Whitehead's "consequent nature of God" has no meaning or function, and much the same might be said of Bradley's Absolute as concerns its character of all-inclusiveness.[85] Then, too, in the idea of transmutation alone is to be found a solution to a problem that has puzzled many Bradleians; namely, the question of the status of relations within the Absolute. Bradley clearly states in more than one place that the Absolute is nonrelational,[86] and such statements may and have been taken as substantiating the interpretation of Bradley as a Parmenidean. However, considered in the light of the idea of transmutation, an entirely different picture emerges. If we remember that for Bradley relation is, by definition, a notion applicable to the finite alone,[87] then we may argue that the nonrelational contains the relational much as the finite is absorbed within the infinite. "Nonrelational," as applied to the Absolute, refers, then, not to that which is *exclusive* of relations, but rather to that which as *inclusive* of relations swallows them up in a transmuted Whole, in which whole their finite character as relations no longer remains.[88]

Should it be inquired how precisely this is accomplished, Bradley would reply by pointing to feelings as offering at the finite level an analogy in terms of which such transmutation is intelligible if not explicable. As relational awareness is by us perceived as transmuted in pure feeling, so also, in the perception of that Individual Experience which is the Absolute, the cosmic pattern of relations is transmuted and intuited as one. In Bradley's words, "There [in the Absolute] somehow, we do not know how, what we think is perceived. Everything there is merged and re-absorbed in an experience intuitive, at once and in itself, of both ideas and facts."[89] Whitehead's solution for the same problem is, of course, to invoke the category of transmutation (Categoreal Obligation VI).[90] This sounds much more technical and efficient. Actually it is somewhat less than satisfying, since (*a*) taken literally, it implies knowledge of an organic function of which it is difficult even to conceive and (*b*) it leaves unexplained the relation of finite to infinite. The Bradleian answer, whatever its defects, seems at least to avoid these two pitfalls. The restriction to analogical de-

---

to the Bradleian usage of "perfection," since a correct understanding of the meaning of this latter as applicable to the Absolute explicitly presupposes the distinction between "exclusive" and "inclusive." The presupposition is here doubly important, for unless it is explicitly recognized, Bradley would appear to be giving a traditional Scholastic view new dress in predicating "perfection" of the Absolute rather than (as in St. Thomas) of God. Thus it is always necessary to remember that for Bradley "perfection" signifies the Whole as *inclusive* of all transmuted diversities (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 216). "For perfection or individuality," he notes, "is a system, harmonious and thus inclusive of everything" (*ibid.*, p. 366). Such a conception is really the very antithesis of the Scholastic notion of perfection, since, as against the Scholastic, Bradley would obviously deny that exclusion of imperfection from perfection which is the hallmark of the Scholastic conception of God.

[89] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 246; see also pp. 442, 443, 445; *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 337, 344, 411.

[90] *Process and Reality*, pp. 40, 384 ff.

[91] At least he *appears* to have such a denial in mind when he notes that "the Real in the end is self-subsistent, and contained wholly in itself; and its being is therefore not relative, nor does it admit a division of content from existence. In short, relativity and self-transcendence, or, as we may call it, ideality, cannot as such be the character of ultimate Reality" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 309). But if "relativity" and "self-transcendence" be identified merely with ideality, rather than, as on Whitehead's view, with Reality itself, while it of course follows that such characters are not, for Bradley, to be identified with ultimate Reality, this does not imply that the contraries of such characters may be so identified. The denial of a Heracleitan character to ultimate Reality justifies the ascription of a Parmenidean character no more than does the denial of the ultimacy of "relativity" and "self-transcendence" justify the ascription to Reality of characters opposite to them. For, and this is the vital point, neither relativity, self-transcendence, nor their contraries may be applied *literally* to Reality, since both are admittedly characters of ideality, which is to say—Appearances.

[92] *Process and Reality*, p. 533.

scription forestalls the necessity of explaining the "how" of a cosmic organic function; and in feeling we have, however tenuous, at least an analogical bridge between finite and infinite.

Yet whatever the final consensus as to the respective merits of these two interpretations of "transmutation" may be, one fact is clear, and that is that no philosophy for which "transmutation" is a basic element in the ordering of things can with consistency hold to a view of the universe as a static system. Inclusiveness is utterly inconsonant with immutability. Whether we say with Bradley that Reality contains process or whether, with Whitehead, we view process as the essence of Reality, we are in any case, as adherents to a doctrine of transmutation, committed to a system creative in some sense. I am acutely aware that there are in Bradley many passages which seem explicitly to deny this. I am cognizant of the fact that Bradley himself may have thought he was denying such.[91] And yet, how is one to reconcile the doctrines of feeling and transmutation with the belief in a static completed universe? If the Absolute is Experience, transmuting the felt universe into the richness of the Whole, then we must, if we would be consistent, interpret Bradley as offering implicit assent to Whitehead's conviction that

> throughout the perishing occasions in the life of each temporal Creature, the inward source of distaste or of refreshment, the judge arising out of the very nature of things, redeemer or godddess of mischief, is the transformation of Itself, everlasting in the being of God. In this way, the insistent craving is justified—the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for evermore.[92]

God is everlasting, and so is the Absolute. The Absolute is perfect, and so is God. But that perfection excludes perfectibility and that everlastingness is static, this no Bradleian need admit.

IV

From the beginning of this paper we have been guided by a two-fold aim: We have endeavored to establish the common bond uniting the philosophies of Bradley and Whitehead; we have sought to find in the work of the former a basic contribution to the viewpoint of the

latter. The linkage between the two has, I think, been fairly established. In closing, it is fitting that we briefly recapitulate the nature of the Bradleian contribution. It is, I suggest, fourfold.

1. The Bradleian tripartite division of experience provides a clearer and more concise account of the metaphysical status and function of Feeling than does that account which is offered in Part III of *Process and Reality*. Bradley's definition and employment of "feeling" evinces a character at once less ambiguous and more concordant with received human experience than does that of Whitehead.

2. The critical justification of metaphysical relativism implicit in Bradley's doctrine of Appearance not only fills a large gap in the Whiteheadian system, but serves also to point up the fact (by no means clearly explicated by Whitehead) that the process view itself is but one of several alternative hypotheses and as such is itself relevant only within the realm of Appearance.

3. The Bradleian conception of "transmutation" not only supplements that of Whitehead, but insofar as it envisages "transmutation" analogically rather than literally, and in so doing evades many of the difficulties inherent in the more literalistic Whiteheadian conception, it provides a preferable expression to its alternative.

4. In arguing that our knowledge of Reality is confined to an analogical vision of general structure, Bradley suggests a means whereby the metaphysical extremes of Parmenidean monism and Heracleitan pluralism may both be avoided and the problem of the Many and the One resolved in a fashion not possible, given the more literalistic Whiteheadian view. For the literalism of this latter too frequently eventuates in a tendency to mistake the Heracleitan extreme for ultimate Reality.

With all this we have left unsaid many things that must have been said were our account to be complete. We have left unconsidered the key problems of Time, Relations, and the nature of Abstraction. We have offered little defense of the position as a whole. For such omissions we can but plead the limitations of space and note that such defense as is possible already exists in the works of Bradley and Whitehead in far better form than anything we might here add.

Chronicle

At the Annual Meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, held at Harvard University, the following officers were elected for the current year: president, Charles Hartshorne, University of Chicago; treasurer, Mrs. Charles A. Fritz, Jr., University of Connecticut; secretary, John E. Smith, Yale University. John Wild was elected councilor for a period of four years.

The Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association was held in Milwaukee, April 20 and 21, 1954. The general subject of the meeting was the existence and nature of God. The following were the major papers: "Ordinary Knowledge and the Philosophical Demonstrations of God's Existence," by Peter W. Nash, S.J.; "Invalid Proofs of God's Existence," by Vernon J. Bourke; "The Prime Mover in Philosophy of Nature and in Metaphysics," by Vincent E. Smith; and "Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God," by Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. Though the topics were of great interest, there was unfortunately very little time for discussion, and some major issues were raised only briefly. At the annual dinner, the association address was given by Richard McKeon, on "Contemporary French Philosophy"; and the presidential address, by James Collins, on "God as a Function in Modern Systems of Philosophy." The papers will be printed in the annual *Proceedings* of the association and will be reviewed later.

The newly elected president of the association is Charles J. O'Neil; the vice-president, Vincent E. Smith. Next year's meeting will be held in Philadelphia, April 13 and 14.

The Western Division of the American Philosophical Association held its fifty-second annual meeting at the University of Illinois, May 6, 7, and 8, 1954. The section devoted to theory of knowledge presented three papers: "The Simply and the Literally Given in Experience," by Virgil C. Aldrich; "Knowing about Semipalatinsk," by James K. Feibleman; and "Is It Possible That I Am Now Dreaming?" by John O. Nelson. The section of practical ethics presented these papers: "Public Ethics," by Howard O. Eaton; "Experiment in Teaching Ethics," by Leo R. Ward; and "Guilt by Association," by John R. Kirk. The section on Kant presented "Kant's First Moral Principle," by Marcus Singer, and "The Analytic and Synthetic as

Categories of Inquiry," by Robert S. Hartman. The section on logic presented "Philosophical Principles and Technical Problems in Mathematical Logic," by Robert Sternfeld, and "Determinables, Determinates and Ostensive Definition," by Leo Simons. The section on the history of philosophy presented "The Uses of Socrates," by Albert W. Levi; "Is Aquinas an Aristotelian?" by Anthony Nemetz; and "Locke's Abstract Ideas," by John S. Linnell. The section on the theory of value presented "Beyond Relativism," by Arthur W. Munk; "Psychology and the Valuing Consciousness," by Forrest Williams; and "Value as a Scientific Concept," by Cornelius Golightly. There were three symposia: on the nature of scientific laws, by Manley Thompson, William H. Hay, and Roderick Chisholm; on the significance of conscience, by Iredell Jenkins, John Hospers, and Philip Blair Rice; and on language and ontology, by O. K. Bouwsma, Henry Veatch, and Everett W. Hall. The presidential address, by Paul Henle, was "The Problem of Meaning."

The Guild of Catholic Lawyers will present its second annual conference on natural law on December 4, 1954, and the topic will be "The Natural Law and the Family." Dr. Heinrich Rommen will speak on "The Natural Law, Man, and Society"; Dr. Brendan F. Brown, on "The Natural Law, the Marriage Bond, and Divorce"; Dr. James V. Mullaney, on "The Natural Law, the Family and Education"; and Dr. Friedrich Baerwald, on "The Natural Law and the Family as an Economic Unit." The meetings will be held in the auditorium of the Bar Association at 42 West 44 Street, New York.

The International Society for General Semantics held a second national conference in co-operation with University College of Washington University, June 10, 11, and 12, in St. Louis. The principal address was by Anatol Rapoport, president of the society, on "General Semantics and the New Behavioral Sciences." At the dinner meeting, the principal address was by S. I. Hayakawa, "Popular Songs *vs.* the Facts of Life." Other papers were by C. W. Dalley, "Conscious Use of Models in Studying Human Behavior"; John J. Kessler, "Semantics from the Greek Skeptics to Korzybski"; Howard Boone Jacobson, "Extensional Methods in Training for Journalism"; Edmund S. Glenn, "Semantic Difficulties in International Communication"; Julius Paul, "Language and the Law"; Leo Bohanon, "How Planning for Human Welfare Tends to Become an End in Itself"; Alfred Fleishman, "General Semantics and Human Relations"; Erwin R. Reifler, "Mechanical Translation"; Robert Plank, "Historical Illustrations of Concept Formation"; Henry N. Peters, "A Behavioral Theory of Value"; F. P. Kilpatrick, "Perception Theory and General Semantics"; Harry L. Weinberg, "The Psychiatric Technique of Abraham Low"; W. H. Pemberton, "Self-Corrective Therapy: A Semantic Approach to Counseling"; Wendell Johnson, "Some Contributions of Stuttering Research to Personality Theory and Psychotherapy"; J. S. Bois,

"Semantic Psychoanalysis: The Theories of Gaston Bachelard"; and Catherine Minteer, "A Counseling Course in the Chicago Public Schools."

The Aquinas Academy of Fairfield University presented a philosophical disputation on March 9, 1954. Two sets of theses from rational psychology were defended by two seniors; four objectors, also seniors, were appointed for each set of theses.

During the Celebration of the Fourth Centennial of Sao Paulo, an international congress of philosophy was held, August 9 to 16, 1954, under the sponsorship of the Faculties of Philosophy and Law of the University of Sao Paulo and of the Pontifical Catholic University of Sao Paulo. The papers were to be distributed in five sections: religion and ethics, art and aesthetics, juridicial and social philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy in the Americas.

BOOK REVIEWS

HENRY G. WOLZ, *Queens College*

New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes. **By Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. Pp. xii + 369. $5.00.**

A half-century's progress in Cartesian scholarship is illustrated in the striking contrast between Professor Smith's new book on Descartes and his *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy* published in 1902. In the past, even competent investigators, misled by a surface simplicity, were quick to point out weaknesses and inconsistencies in Descartes's writings; now with a more profound understanding has come a willingness to re-examine issues which were thought to be settled once and for all.

The famous "Cartesian circle" is a case in point. So general was the belief in the circularity of Descartes's argument that Professor Smith, in his earlier work, referred to it simply in a footnote: "The *petitio principii* lies in his using principles which he holds to be truths evident to the natural light of reason, to prove God's existence, and then guaranteeing the validity of reason by the veracity of God" (p. 54, n. 1). In the *New Studies* Professor Smith maintains that Descartes never questioned the truth of what is clearly and distinctly presented in immediate experience, but that he merely doubted

whether such intuitively perceived truths could be relied upon to hold in the future. It is, therefore, the eternal aspect of the ideas and not the ideas themselves which, according to Descartes, require to be certified by a good and immutable God; and since Descartes claims that the proof for the existence of such a God can be made to rest exclusively on immediately experienced truths, the circularity of the argument is avoided (*New Studies,* pp. 273 ff.).

While the charge of circularity used to be leveled against Descartes's metaphysics, his scientific method was said to be afflicted with a dichotomy. For on the one hand Descartes claimed to be able to proceed deductively from the *simple natures;* on the other hand he insisted on experimentation, especially in his anatomical inquiries. In the *New Studies* the dichotomy is resolved. Professor Smith no longer maintains, as he did in what he now calls his "prentice-work" (p. v), that "Descartes speaks as if the mind could from the conceptions of extension, figure, and motion, directly develop all the particularity and variety of the real" (*Studies,* p. 41). The *simple natures* he now sees as general guides (*New Studies,* p. 67). They may tell us, for example, that we must look for a mechanistic type of explanation, but only observation and experimentation will reveal the specific mechanical causes at work in a given situation: "Accordingly, while the *simples* may suffice for the purpose of delimiting and defining with precision and finality the range of *possible* alternatives, yet in order to discover what is *actually* in being we have to fall back upon the sensuously experienced . . ." (*ibid.,* p. 93).

The rationalism of Descartes thus appears to be far less extreme than it was formerly thought to be. Furthermore, Professor Smith presents evidence which shows that Descartes was aware of two alternative methods of inquiry (*ibid.,* pp. 125-26). The ideal method is based on the belief that the observable phenomena are subject to a certain order from which, if it were known, they could be deduced. But as Descartes became increasingly aware of the complexity of nature, he had to reconcile himself to the fact that, in specific fields of inquiry, the real causes often elude us and that we must then resort to the more laborious method; that is, "we have to fall back on a hypothetical type of procedure, arguing in an *a priori* manner, and conjecturally, from the sensuously experienced appearances to one or other of their conceivably possible alternative causes" (*ibid.,* p. 96). *Certain* knowledge does not, of course, result from this indirect method, and, reflecting a pragmatic turn of mind, Descartes is quoted as saying:

> For the [practical] purposes of life, it is . . . as useful to know the causes thus imagined [i.e., hypothetically postulated] as it would be to know the true causes. . . . And I shall believe that I have done enough, if the causes I have expounded are such that all the effects to which they

can give rise are found to be similar to those which we [in ordinary sense experience] see in the world, and that I have no need to inquire whether it is by them or by others that they are produced (*Princ.* IV, par. 204; *New Studies,* pp. 97-8).

Professor Smith's new approach to Descartes clearly shows that the *simple natures* are far from self-sufficient and that it is not enough "attentively to contemplate them, as a magician might gaze into a crystal sphere, and [see them] unfold from the bosom of their transparency the whole series of properties and modifications of which they are capable" (*Studies,* p. 41). Sense experience, for Professor Smith, now plays a much more active part in Descartes's method. In fact, Descartes is now said to acknowledge a two-fold function of the senses: They first supply the data through the analysis of which the *simples* are discovered; and secondly they provide the phenomena which arouse our curiosity, such as the phases of the moon, the flux and reflux of the tides, without which no need for explanation would be felt and no inquiry could get under way.

Professor Smith is at his best when he brings to light Descartes's empirical tendencies, which were so persistently neglected in the past. However, when he deals with the philosopher's thought as a whole, he fails to perceive as much cohesion as one might reasonably expect. His exposition at times leaves him with disparate elements which could have been connected without difficulty if he had proceeded a bit farther in the same direction. For instance, although he is fully aware that Descartes searched for certainty intuitively perceived, he does not always use this fact to full advantage as a principle of explanation. When he states the reason for Descartes's rejection of the syllogistic method, he rightly refers to Descartes's demand for direct experience of the truth: "In using the syllogism the mind is taught not itself to *see* truth but to *believe* it on the authority of the syllogistic rules" (*New Studies,* p. 68). Furthermore, "particular truths, Descartes is prepared to maintain, are known by the same process by which we apprehend the corresponding universals, namely, by intuition; and, as possessing the same intrinsic underived validity, do not require to be derived from them" (*ibid.,* p. 69). However, there is another and perhaps more profound reason for Descartes's opposition to the syllogism, a reason which Professor Smith does not mention. The conclusion of a valid syllogism is *true* only if the premises are true. Now, one of the premises must be a universal; and in order to establish it as true syllogistically, it must in turn be derived from a still broader principle, and so on. The Scholastics, therefore, had to choose between the postulation of an absolute reality and an infinite regress which would destroy the very possibility of an explanation. Of course, they decided in favor of an absolute principle of explanation. But then, no particular thing can be completely known unless it is known in relation to all

things; and since the absolute principle escapes human comprehension, no certainty can be obtained in any realm or inquiry dealing with individual things, such as the natural sciences. Since Descartes's acknowledged objective is to construct a science of certain truths, he could not possibly employ a logic, such as the syllogistic logic, which would make his objective not only factually but theoretically unattainable. As a result, in order to secure a firm foundation for his own logic of intuition, Descartes had to make significant alterations in Thomistic theology. He had to make the eternal verities dependent upon the will of God, who implants them into the mind of man. These truths thus not only become accessible to intuition but are knowable in their entirety. In this manner Descartes established the possibility of obtaining certainty even in restricted fields of investigation.

In his discussion of Descartes's opposition to the syllogism, Professor Smith makes good use of Descartes's demand for intuition but neglects a consideration of his quest for *certainty;* in connection with the proof for the existence of God in the *Meditations,* he does not take sufficient account of the fact that the goal of Descartes's inquiry is an *intuitive* perception of certainty. If the purpose of the *Meditations* is to lead the reader to the vision of a truth, then the more fruitful approach would seem to be psychological or pedagogical rather than logical. Such an approach might show, not that Descartes simply allowed "inherited Scholastic assumptions to take charge of his argument" (*ibid.,* p. 298), as Professor Smith seems to think, but that he merely *started out* with the terms familiar to the Doctors of the Sacred Faculty of the Sorbonne, to whom the *Meditations* were dedicated, and gradually led them over to the new meaning which the terms had acquired in his own philosophy. The traditional idea of causality, for instance, is reduced to that of necessary connection and at the end of the last argument the reader is made to see the doubting, thinking, existing, imperfect self as inseparably linked to a perfect being which is the source not only of the awareness of the self as a finite being but of its very existence. It would then still be true to say that Descartes's "ontological" argument is dependent on the preceding arguments, a view which Professor Smith seems to share with Hamelin and Gilson (*ibid.,* p. 304); but this dependence, instead of being logical, would be only a psychological dependence.

Descarte's theology is intimately related to the rest of his thought, and misunderstandings in this area easily lead to discrepancies elsewhere. However, since most modern readers are unwilling to carry an explanatory process to a point where Descartes' theology would begin to function, they will not be troubled by Professor Smith's shortcomings in this respect, while the book as a whole is likely to rid them of many a misconception of Descartes's philosophy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ADAMS, E. M. *Logic Problems: A Student's Manual.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. Pp. 144. Paper, $1.60.

———. *The Fundamentals of General Logic.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. Pp. 384. $4.00.

ADAMS, HENRY CARTER. *Relation of the State to Industrial Action, and Economics and Jurisprudence.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 190. $3.00.

Aesthetics and Language. Ed. with an introd. by William Elton. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. vi + 186. $4.75.

This is a collection of articles on aesthetics by members of the school of philosophical analysis. The authors are O. K. Bouwsma, W. B. Gallie, Stuart Hampshire, Arnold Isenberg, Helen Knight, Beryl Lake, Margaret MacDonald, J. A. Passmore, Gilbert Ryle, and Paul Ziff. The first two articles are general; then topics of feeling, expression theory, and intuitionist theories are taken up; the remaining essays touch on artistic criticism, the nature of critical judgment, appreciation, and the nature of the object of art.

As is their habit, the philosophers of this school attack confusion, and in this case they undoubtedly have plenty of scope for their ingenuity. But their habit of reading other authors as literally as they intend to be taken becomes a little boring after ten pages. What they have to offer apart from meticulous criticism is indiscernibly small.

ALIGHIERI, DANTE. *The Divine Comedy.* Tr. by H. R. Huse. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1954. Pp. 510. Paper, 95¢

———. *The Inferno.* Tr. by John Ciardi. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; August 20, 1954. 50¢

———. *On Monarchy and Three Political Letters.* Tr. with an introd. by Donald Nicholl. New York: Noonday Press; Nov., 1954. $2.75.

ALLPORT, GORDON WILLARD. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954. Pp. 555. $5.50.

ARBER, AGNES ROBERTSON. *The Mind and the Eye.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 156. $3.00.

ARNHEIM, RUDOLF. *Art and Visual Perception, A Psychology of the Creative Eye.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1954. Pp. 424. $10.00.

Arnold, Magda B.; Gasson, John A., s.j., and Others. *The Human Person.* New York: Ronald Press Co., 1954. Pp. x + 593. $5.75.

This book, subtitled "An Approach to an Integral Theory of Personality," consists of a group of essays by ten Catholic psychologists. It is an attempt to formulate a scientific theory of human personality in terms which will, on the one hand, take account of all the areas of relevant psychological data and, on the other, will be in harmony with the Christian concept of the human person. Each essay is annotated, and there are indices of names and subjects.

The book is divided into five parts: the science of psychology, personality structure, personality integration, psychotherapy and self-integration, and self-integration through religion.

Auerbach, Erich. *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature.* Tr. by Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 563. $7.50.

Austin, John. *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence.* New York: Noonday Press; Oct., 1954. $3.00.

Averroes. *Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem.* Ed. by Harry Blumberg. With Hebrew text. Cambridge: Mediaeval Acad. of America, 1954. $5.00.

Avey, Albert E. *Handbook in the History of Philosophy.* "College Outline Series." New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954. Pp. xvi + 320. Paper, $1.50.

This survey attempts too much. It includes not only the major thinkers, but also most of the minor figures. Not only subtle nuances but even basic considerations are suppressed in the treatment of positions of any complexity. Modern thought is treated at somewhat greater length. There is an appendix defining various philosophical schools and giving the names of their chief adherents. There is a list of reference books for further reading in English, and a detailed index.

The book can scarcely be recommended even for the nonspecialist or the casual reader.

Ayer, A. J. *Philosophical Essays.* New York: St. Martin's Press; June, 1954. $4.50.

Bachrach, Peter. *Problems in Freedom.* Harrisburg: Stackpole Co., 1954. Pp. 480. $5.00.

Baker, John Randal. *Abraham Trembley of Geneva, Scientist and Philosopher, 1710-1784.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. Pp. 278. $7.50.

Barnhart, T. A.; Donnelly, William A.; and Smith, Lewis C., Jr. *Viewpoints. Readings for Analysis.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xi + 456. $3.95.

Recent programs of "general education" are again putting stress on thought and expression. This textbook, intended as the basis for a college course in composition or rhetoric, is also intended to stimulate thought in the major areas of a general education program. The authors have chosen excellent pieces (articles or sections of books) to illustrate these areas. Critically used, this book can be very valuable.

The book has suggestions for papers, projects, and discussions. There are suggestions for further work along the lines of each major section.

Barrell, Joseph. *A Philosophical Study of the Human Mind.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xii + 575. $6.00.

Though this book is called "a philosophical study," it can be so called only in the large sense of the term "philosophical"—in the sense in which people commonly speak of "the philosophy of selling," or the "philosophy of mass production." In a more sophisticated theory of knowledge the present book would be accurately described as theoretical psychology. The author intends to give a general theoretical classification of psychological types. This he does by means of the polar concepts of "introvert-extrovert"

and "thinking-feeling types." By placing these functions in different "positions" in the structure of personality, the author ends up with eight main types of personality. The fruitfulness of this set of conceptual constructs does not seem to be very great.

BAUMGARTEN, ALEXANDER GOTTLIEB. *Reflections on Poetry: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus.* Tr. with original text, preface, introd., and notes by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1954. Pp. viii + 90. $3.50.

BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. *Inquiry into Inquiries.* Boston: Beacon Press; July, 1954. $6.00.

BENTLEY, JOHN EDWARD. *Philosophy.* Rev. ed. Patterson: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1954. Pp. 171. Paper, $1.50.

BERENSON, BERNARD. *Aesthetics and History.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; Oct., 1954. 85¢

BERGMANN, GUSTAV. *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. Pp. 352. $4.75.

BERGSON, HENRI LOUIS. *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.* Tr. from the French by R. Ashley Audra and others. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Pp. 320. Paper, 85¢

BLACK, MAX. *Problems of Analysis.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press; May, 1954. $5.00.

BLACKHAM, HAROLD JOHN. *The Human Tradition.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. Pp. 259. $3.00.

BLAIR, GLENN MYERS, and OTHERS. *Educational Psychology.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. 618. $4.75.

BLANSHARD, BRAND. *On Philosophical Style.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; July, 1954. $1.00.

BLAU, JOSEPH LEON (ed.). *Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. 411. $3.00; paper, $1.75.

BOWLE, JOHN. *Politics and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 512. $4.50.

BRIDGMAN, P. W. *Nature of Physical Theory.* New York: Dover Pubns.; Sept., 1954. $2.50; paper, $1.25.

BROUDY, HARRY S. *Building a Philosophy of Education.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. 495. $5.00.

BRUMBAUGH, ROBERT SHERRICK. *Plato's Mathematical Imagination.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 320. $8.00.

BRUNO DE JESUS MARIA (ed.). *Love and Violence.* New York: Sheed and Ward; Sept., 1954. $4.00.

BRYSON, LYMAN. *Drive toward Reason: In the Service of a Free People.* New York: Harper & Bros.; July, 1954. $2.50.

BRYSON, LYMAN, and OTHERS (eds.). *Symbols and Values: An Initial Study.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. 845. $6.00.

BURTT, E. A. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science.* Rev. ed. New York: Doubleday & Co.; Oct., 1954. 85¢

CALHOUN, ROBERT L.; MILLER, PERRY; NIEBUHR, REINHOLD; and PUSEY, NATHAN. *Religion and Freedom of Thought.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; August, 1954. Paper, $1.00.

CANFIELD, DONALD TREAT, and BOWMAN, JAMES HAROLD. *Business, Legal, and Ethical Phases of Engineering.* 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954. Pp. 376. $6.00.

CARTER, EVERETT. *Howells and the Age of Realism.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.; Sept., 1954. $5.00.

CASPARI. *Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; August, 1954. $5.50.

Cassirer, Ernst. *The Platonic Renaissance in England.* Tr. by James P. Pettegrove. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1953. Pp. viii + 207. $3.50.

This is a translation of *Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge,* originally published in 1932, which has been read and approved by the author. It has an advantage over the German work in that the numerous quotations from the Cambridge Platonists appear in their original form.

———. *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.* Tr. and ed. by Peter Gay. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 136. $2.75.

Castell, Alburey. *An Elementary Ethics.* New York, Prentice-Hall.

Chamberlain, Neil W., and Schilling, Jane Metzger. *Social Responsibility and Strikes.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. 276. $3.50.

Chamberlin, E. H. *Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation.* New York: St. Martin's Press; June, 1954. $7.50.

Chambliss, Rollin. *Social Thought, from Hammurabi to Comte.* New York: Dryden Press, 1954. Pp. 477. $5.00.

Childs, Marquis W., and Cater, Douglass. *Ethics in a Business Society.* New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1954. Paper, 35¢

Chodorov, Frank. *Source of Rights.* Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Foundation for Economic Education, 1954. Pp. 11. Paper, apply.

Citizenship for an Atomic Age. Washington: Govt. Printing Office; September, 1953. Pp. 16. 15¢

Clancy, Robert. *A Seed Was Sown.* New York: Henry George School of Social Science, 1954. Pp. 124. Paper, $1.00.

Cockerill, Eleanor E., and Others. *A Conceptual Framework for Social Casework.* 2d ed. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1953. Pp. 26. Paper, $1.50.

Cole, G. D. H. *Marxism and Anarchism.* "History of Socialist Thought," Vol. II. New York: St. Martin's Press; June, 1954. $6.00.

Collins, James. *A History of Modern European Philosophy.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1954. Pp. x + 854. $9.75.

This textbook covers the period of European thought from Bacon, Galileo, and Newton to Bergson and Nietzsche. Unusually thorough, scholarly, and readable for a textbook, it still retains a textbook's good qualities of clarity, emphasis on important points, and careful organization. The book is not merely a recital of facts and opinions, but also includes a critical, realistic appraisal of the points raised. Nevertheless, criticism and presentation are kept clearly distinct.

Each chapter has a fully annotated bibliography, and additional suggestions for further reading are given in many footnotes throughout the chapters. There is a detailed index.

The book will not only be a popular textbook, but will also be a standard reference book and consequently should be found in every college library.

Commager, Henry Steele. *Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 164. $2.50.

Conant, James B. *Modern Science and Modern Man.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Paper, 65¢

Confucius. *The Philosophy of Confucius.* Mt. Vernon, New York: Peter Pauper Press, 1953. Pp. 222. $4.50.

Conze, E. *Buddhist Texts through the Ages.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. $7.50.

Cornforth, Maurice Campbell. *Historical Materialism.* New York: International Publs., 1954. Pp. 206. $2.50; paper, $1.50.

Costello, Harry Todd. *A Philosophy of the Real and the Possible.* "Woodbridge Lectures," No. 4. New York.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 153. $2.75.

This book presents what the author considers the leading ideas of his own

philosophy. The author is a naturalist of sorts; he is a realist and an empiricist about existence and causality, but he takes sharp exception to positivistic empiricism and its contemporary version, analytic philosophy. In addition to the penetrating criticism which is often humorous, he strikes positively by his defense of possibility and the ability of the mind to know possibility as well as fact, language as well as verbal symbols, meanings as well as propositions. In addition, he offers interesting and valuable comments on systems (especially logical and mathematical ones), on perception, and on values.

The book contains as an appendix the author's previously published "The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge" (*Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. by Yervant H. Krikorian [Columbia Univ. Press, 1944]).

COUDENHOVE-KALERGI. *Idea Conquers the World.* New York: Roy Publs.; May, 1954. $5.00.

CRANE, R. S. *The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry.* Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1953. Pp. xxi + 214. $5.50.

CROCKER, LESTER G. *The Embattled Philosopher, A Life of Diderot.* East Lansing: Michigan State College Press; Oct., 1954. $5.00.

CRONBACH, LEE JOSEPH. *Educational Psychology.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954. Pp. 655. $7.50.

CROSSER, PAUL K. *Nihilism of John Dewey.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1954. $3.75.

DANIELS, FARRINGTON, and SMITH, THOMAS MARSHALL (eds.). *The Challenge of Our Times.* Minneapolis: Burgess Pub. Co., 1953. Pp. 364. $3.50.

DANTZIC, TOBIAS. *Henri Poincaré, Critic of Crisis.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1954. Pp. 160. $3.00.

———. *Number, the Language of Science.* 4th ed., rev. New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. 349. $5.00.

DAVIS, JOHN DENIS. *The Moral Obligations of Catholic Civil Judges.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1954. Pp. 246. Paper, $2.50.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER HENRY. *Medieval Essays.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1954. Pp. 278. $3.50.

DAY, DONALD. *Evolution of Love.* New York: Dial Press; Sept., 1954. $6.00.

DE BURGH, WILLIAM GEORGE. *The Legacy of the Ancient World.* 2 vols. Rev. ed. Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1954. Pp. 636. Paper, 65¢

DE CONDORCET, ANTOINE NICOLAS. *Sketch for an Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Spirit.* New York: Noonday Press; Spring, 1955.

DEFERRARI, ROY J. (ed.). *The Social Sciences in Catholic College Programs.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1954. Pp. vi + 180. Paper, $2.75.

This book contains thirteen papers read at the Workshop on the Social Sciences in Catholic College Programs, held at the Catholic University in June, 1953. They run the gamut from the "challenge of the social sciences" to suggestions for a social science program in preparation of nurses, social workers, and teachers. In good workshop manner, they are more valuable for problems posed than for solutions offered.

DE FOREST, IZETTE. *Leaven of Love: A Development of the Psychoanalytic Theory and Technique of Sandor Ferenczi.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. $3.50.

DE LUBAC, HENRI. *Aspects of Buddhism.* Tr. from the French by George Lamb. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1954. Pp. 192. $3.00.

DEL VECCHIO, GIORGIO, *Philosophy of Law.* Tr. by Thomas Owen Martin. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. xxiv + 474. $6.50.

Del Vecchio, professor of legal philosophy at the University of Rome, is one of the outstanding Continental legal philosophers. The author's philosophy of law is to some extent neo-Kantian and idealistic. Nevertheless,

there is much of value even in his systematic analysis, and many historical points are brilliantly conceived and well taken.

Dr. Brendan F. Brown has contributed an introduction (pp. xi-xx); there are a bibliography and an index of names.

DESAN, WILFRID. *The Tragic Finale.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 234. $4.25.

DE MONTCHEUIL, YVES. *Guide for Social Action.* Chicago: Fides, 1954. Pp. 93. Paper, $1.50.

DESCARTES, RENÉ. *Geometry.* Tr. by D. E. Smith and M. L. Latham with complete French text in facsimile. New York: Dover Pubns.; August, 1954. $2.95; paper, $1.50.

———. *Philosophical Works of Descartes.* 2 vols. Tr. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross. New York: Dover Pubns.; August, 1954. $3.95 each; paper, $1.95 each.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Essays in Experimental Logic.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. 444. $3.50; paper, $1.75.

This book was first published in 1916. It has since become a manual for the instrumentalists. On the one hand, the interest in the practical workings of the mind, the relation between logic, experience, and experiment and the social and human import of reasoning did need stressing. But the misunderstanding of the nature of pure science was a help neither to scientists nor to philosophers and educators. The idealistic and a priori tendencies, though modified by pragmatism, remained throughout Dewey's thought. Historically, however, the book has been important, and anyone who wishes to understand contemporary instrumentalism must know something about Dewey's work in this field.

DEWITT, NORMAN WENTWORTH. *Epicurus and His Philosophy.* Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1954. Pp. 388. $6.00.

DOOLAN, AEGIDIUS. *Order and Law.* Foreword by Most Rev. C. Lucey. Westminster: Newman Press, 1954. Pp. 217. $3.50.

DUFFY, BERNARD. *The Chicago Renaissance.* East Lansing: Michigan State College Press; Oct., 1954. $5.00.

EDMAN, IRWIN. *John Dewey.* "Makers of American Tradition Series." Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill; Sept., 1954. $3.00.

ENGLISH, HORACE B. *The Historical Roots of Learning Theory.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Pp. 32. Paper, 65¢

ESTES, WILLIAM KAYE, and OTHERS. *Modern Learning Theory.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Co., 1954. Pp. 394. $5.00.

Evaluation of Psychosurgery, Proceedings of the Third Research Conference on Psychosurgery, New York, N. Y., October 19 and 20, 1951. Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1954. Pp. 173. Paper, $1.00.

EVANS, JOSEPH W., and WARD, LEO R. (eds.). *The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Oct., 1954. $5.00.

EVERETT, MILLARD S. *Ideals of Life. An Introduction to Ethics and the Humanities, with Readings.* New York: Wiley & Sons, 1954. Pp. xiv + 736. $5.00.

This book is intended to be a self-sufficient course in ethics or to serve also as an introduction to philosophy. It illustrates very well what can be done with an ethics not based on a metaphysics and a philosophy of man. With the appearance of a full discussion and of a nondogmatic attitude, the book is loaded with highly dogmatic assumptions—Freudian psychology, planned economy for efficiency, materialism, and so on. The book also illustrates an antiquated "humanistic naturalism," whose naturalism is almost entirely antisupernaturalism (witness the author's extensive and labored attack on Catholic ethics) and whose humanism consists in softening and

easing the inherited mores of the society into which they are born (see, for example, pp. 260-61).

Fearon, Arthur D. *Concerning Knowledge.* Fresno, California: Academy Library Guild, 1954. Pp. 300. $5.00.

Festugière, André-Jean. *Personal Religion among the Greeks.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1954. Pp. viii + 186. $3.75.

Fireman, Peter. *Perceptualistic Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. $2.75.

Fisher, Margaret. *Leadership and Intelligence.* New York: Bur. of Pubns., Teachers College, 1954. Pp. 188. $3.75.

Freud, Sigmund. *The Origins of Psychoanalysis.* Ed. by Marie Bonaparte and others. New York: Basic Books, 1954. Pp. 497. $6.75.

Friedrich, Carl J. (ed.). *Totalitarianism.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; August, 1954. Pp. 450. $6.50.

Friedrich, C. J., and McCloskey, Robert G. (eds.). *From the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution; the Roots of American Constitutionalism.* "The American Heritage Series," No. 6. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. lxviii + 71. Paper, 75¢

This booklet reprints the documents basic for an understanding of the beginnings of the American constitutional system, including the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, plans submitted in the Constitutional Convention, and the Constitution with its amendments. The first half of the booklet is an incisive essay by the editors on the background of political thought, on the adoption of the documents, and on the role of the documents in subsequent history.

Gannon, Timothy J. *Psychology.* Boston: Ginn & Co., 1954. Pp. 494. $4.75.

General Education Bibliography. Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1954. Pp. 22. Paper, 15¢

Gillin, John Lewis (ed.). *For a Science of Social Man.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. 296. $4.00.

God, Man and the Universe. A Christian Answer to Modern Materialism. Ed. by Jacques de Bivort de La Saudée. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1954. Pp. xvi + 421. $7.50.

First published in Great Britain, this book is a translation of *Essai sur Dieu, l'homme et l'universe* (Paris: Casterman, 1950), made from the third French edition. There is an introduction by the editor. The essays and their authors are: "The Existence of God and Contemporary Materialism," Albert Dondeyne; "The World: Its Origin and Structure," Antonio Romaná; "The Origin of Life," Felix Ruschkamp; "The Origin of Man and Recent Discoveries," G. Vanderbroek; "The Origin of Man in the Book of Genesis," E. C. Messenger; "Is There a Soul?" Joseph Ternus, S.J.; "The Origin of Religion," Henri de Lubac, S.J.; "The Problem of Christ," Henri Fehner; "Economic and Social Conditions at the Time of the Establishment of Christianity," Pierre Defrennes; "Early Christianity in its Historical Setting," Joseph Huby, S.J.; "The Christian Church· Catholic and Roman," P. A. Liégé, O.P.; "The Origins of the Protestant Reformation," Joseph Duhr, S.J.; "Religion and Progress," Henri du Passage, S.J.; "The Church in the Age of Capitalism," Douglas T. Woodruff; "Dialectical Materialism," Gustave André Wetter, S.J.; "The Problem of Evil," Yves M. J. Congar, O.P.

Many of these men are renowned authorities in their fields; some of the historical and social articles are excellent. The articles which touch on philosophical points seem sometimes to be a little superficial; more often, perhaps, they seem to apologize for raising difficult questions.

Graef, Hilda. *Edith Stein.* Westminster: Newman Press; August, 1954. $3.50.

Gray, Christopher. *Cubist Aesthetic Theories.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 190. $4.50.

Guérard, Albert. *Bottle in the Sea.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 159. $3.50.

Hadas, Moses. *Ancilla to Classical Reading.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. xiii + 397. $4.75.

Hall, Calvin S. *A Primer of Freudian Psychology.* Cleveland: World Publishing Company; October 18, 1954. $2.50.

Hallowell. *Moral Foundation of American Democracy.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; July, 1954. $3.50.

Hamilton, Madison and Jay On the Constitution. Selections from the Federalist Papers. Ed. by Ralph H. Gabriel. "The American Heritage Series," No. 7. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. xviii + 231. $2.25; paper, 90¢

As the editor points out, the Federalist papers were written in haste and in controversy. For the contemporary students of political theory and philosophy and of our Constitution, many advantages accrue from a tighter logical organization and the omission of repetitions and irrelevancies. The editor has organized the selections around the following points: a new national philosophy; nature and powers of the new government; the taxing power; the legislative, judicial, and the executive branches; and general considerations. The Constitution itself is printed as an appendix. There is a brief historical introduction and a short selected bibliography.

This is an excellently printed edition, in a fine series.

Harding, Arthur L. (ed.). *Origins of the Natural Law Tradition.* Dallas: Southern Methodist Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 104. $3.00.

Harkness, Georgia. *The Sources of Western Morality.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Oct., 1954. Pp. 256. $3.50.

Harris, Errol Eustace. *Nature, Mind and Modern Science.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. 471. $5.50.

Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 186. $5.00.

Hayakawa, S. I. *Language, Meaning and Maturity.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Sept., 1954. $3.00.

[Heraclitus of Ephesus.] *The Cosmic Fragments.* Ed. by G. S. Kirk. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 438. $9.50.

Hindus, Milton. *The Proustian Vision.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 293. $4.00.

Hohlenberg, Johannes. *Soren Kierkegaard.* Tr. from the Danish by T. H. Croxall. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. Pp. 331. $5.00.

Horrigan, Sister Anita. *Moral Standards and Social Organization.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 41. Paper, apply.

Houde, Roland, and Fischer, Jerome J. *Handbook of Logic.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown & Co., 1954. Pp. xviii + 156. $2.65. *Workbook of Logic.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown & Co., 1954. Pp. iii + 138. $1.75.

The authors of this text want to make logic intelligible and attractive to young students who have no previous acquaintance with either logic or philosophy. The material of the book is traditional—the first three parts deal respectively with the three acts of the mind—and at the same time cognizance is taken of modern views and problems in part four. The presentation is simple, direct, and should be easy to teach. Each chapter has a well-chosen list of supplementary readings; and the authors insist that these readings are put down not as ornaments or for sporadic use, but are intended to be used regularly and in detail. This is an excellent feature of the book.

The workbook has sets of problems and questions connected with the various chapters and also has forms for reporting on the assigned supplementary reading. Many teachers think that a great number of exercises are necessary that the student may acquire skill in the use of logic; only a few are given by the authors.

It might be questioned whether there is sufficient material in the text and workbook to keep an average college class working; the use of the supplementary materials would remedy this defect. The student, however, might complain about the rather high cost of the book.

HUBBLE, EDWIN P. *Nature of Science, and Other Lectures.* San Marino: Huntington Lib., 1954. $2.00.

HUGHES, ERNEST. *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times.* Rev. ed. "Everyman's Library." New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; August, 1954. $1.65.

Index Translationum. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 511. Paper, $7.50.

Institute for Philosophical Research, Biennial Report, 1952-54. Ed. by Mortimer J. Adler. San Francisco: Institute for Philosophical Research, 1954. Pp. 68.

When the Institute for Philosophical Research was established in 1952, a certain amount of interest was aroused in its program. The preliminary announcements were necessarily somewhat vague, and many doubted its feasibility. The present report, summarizing some of the efforts that have been made, is both more definite and more optimistic than might be expected. The group of research fellows has been working on the particular topic of human freedom. Out of this work has come the material for a projected publication and—more important if true—the confidence that a method has been discovered which will serve to lay the ground for effective philosophical discussion in all the major areas of philosophy. Dr. Adler rightly points out the importance of real discussion and controversy for the life of philosophy and the impossibility of beginning any discussion at all between many of the divergent groups. If the work of the Institute may lay the ground for fruitful discussion, it will be of very great value. But past disappointments tend to make one skeptical until the first publications show concrete and public evidence of success.

Interrelations of Culture. (Collection of intercultural UNESCO studies). New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 387. Paper, $2.00.

JACKSON, BARBARA WARD. *The Mott Foundation Lectures: Are Today's Basic Problems Religious? Moral Order in an Uncertain World.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1953. Pp. 56. $3.00; paper, $1.25.

JAMESON, THOMAS HUGH. *Francis Bacon.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. Pp. 72. $2.50.

JARRETT, JAMES L., and MCMURRIN, STERLING M. (eds.). *Contemporary Philosophy.* New York: Henry Holt & Co.; March, 1954. Pp. 541. $5.00.

JERSILD, ARTHUR T. *Child Psychology.* 4th ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xii + 676. $6.00.

In itself this work is not directly philosophical. But it provides much material which can be of great assistance to one engaged in the study of the philosophy of human nature. Moreover, the book deserves special commendation because, in a field where a priori theorists (Freudians and objectivists both) habitually present far-fetched interpretations under the guise of facts, the author of this text proceeds habitually with admirable scientific caution. His interpretations are neither obtruded nor presented in any false guise. The book has also many other good textbook qualities.

JOHNSON, RAYNOR CAREY. *The Imprisoned Splendour.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. 424. $5.00.

JOHNSTONE, HENRY W., JR. *Elementary Deductive Logic.* New York: Crowell Co., 1954. Pp. 249. $1.95.

JONES, HOWARD MUMFORD, and OTHERS (eds.). *Modern Minds.* 2d ed. Boston: Heath & Co., 1954. Pp. 668. $4.25.

JOUVENEL, BERTRAND DE. *Power.* Rev. ed. Tr. from the French by J. F. Huntington. New York: British Book Centre, 1953. Pp. 319. $5.50.

Juvenile Delinquency. Interim report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, pursuant to S. Res. 89. Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1954. Pp. 73. 25¢

KAMIAT, ARNOLD HERMAN. *The Ethics of Civilization.* Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1954. Pp. 86. $2.00.

KATZ, DAVID. *Animals and Men.* Tr. from the German by Hannah Steinberg and Arthur Summerfield. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 191. Paper, 50¢

KELSEN, HANS. *Communist Theory of Law.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger; July, 1954. $5.00.

KESSLER, JOHN J. *General Semantics and Medieval Scholasticism.* Saint Louis: author, 1953. Pp. 32. Paper.

The author gives a bibliography on medieval thought which might lead to the impression that he is aware of the depth and complexity of medieval philosophy. But being a semanticist, he can see good only in the nominalists and can make sense only of the controversy over the status of the universals. And only another semanticist could be satisfied that the book is worth buying or looking at.

———. *General Semantics from Francis Bacon to Alfred Korzybski.* Saint Louis: author, 1954. No p.

This is the third of a series of phamphlets tracing the history of general semantics. The author is persuaded that he has found beginnings of the theory in ancient times and in the Middle Ages. In the present pamphlet he shows that Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, James, Dewey, Whitehead, Santayana, and Russell can be interpreted as embryonic semanticists by a semanticist. However, the culmination of this movement, and, in fact, its first realization, occurs in Korzybski. The presentation of semantics itself is brief, as it may well be. There is a limitless field of application of the theory, but the theory itself has a fascinating simplicity: words are neurological reactions of a peculiar kind of animal that can observe himself talking.

KIERKEGAARD, SOREN. *Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death.* Tr. by Walter Lowrie. New York: Doubleday & Co.; Oct., 1954. 85¢

KILZER, E., and Ross, E. J. *Western Social Thought.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; March, 1954. Pp. x + 516. $6.50.

This book is intended both for general background information or for use as a textbook in the history of social thought. Thinking about society was first done by philosophers and theologians, so that we find sections on Plato (15 pages), St. Augustine (11 pages), Hegel (4 pages). Most of the contemporary writing on society is done by sociologists, and so the later chapters of the book deal briefly with a great number of social scientists. The survey is clear but brief. There are twelve pages of bibliography and indices of names and subjects.

KIMPEL, BEN. *The Symbols of Religious Faith.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. x + 198. $3.75.

This is an introductory book in the philosophy of religion. The author begins with a definition of religion. According to him, religion is all that man does in reference to an ultimate and transcendent reality upon which he is dependent. The author therefore maintains that a realistic metaphysics is in some way presupposed for religion. He also maintains that a symbol can function as a religious symbol only when it directs its user beyond itself to the reality which is symbolized. On the other hand, there are a number of deficiences. The author holds that a belief in one true religion makes an intellectual approach to other religions impossible. His interpretation of many points in the history of Christianity is not well grounded. For example, thinking that *hypostasis* means the same as *ousia*, he contends that the "solution" offered in the Nicene creed is purely verbal, a matter of how to deal with symbols rather than a matter of realities.

KOHN, HANS (ed.). *German History: Some New German Views.* Boston: Beacon Press; May, 1954. $4.00.

KREYCHE, ROBERT J. *Logic.* New York: Dryden Press; August, 1954.

Learning Theory, Personality Theory, and Clinical Research. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1954. Pp. 173. $3.50.

LEBLANC, HUGUES. *Introduction to Deductive Logic.* New York: Wiley & Sons; Sept., 1954. $4.75.

LEUBA, CLARENCE J. *The Natural Man.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Pp. 80. Paper, 95¢

LIPSON, LESLIE. *The Great Issues of Politics.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xvi + 431. $5.25.

This "introduction to political science" is noteworthy, first, because of its method. Explicitly, the author makes use of both philosophical reflection and evaluation and of the direct observational methods of history and social science. Secondly, the book aims more at understanding than at a plethora of information. Thirdly, because the content of the book is organized around a small number of major issues, a reader can grasp and remember much more of the book. Perhaps inevitably, there are individual statements (both historical and evaluative) to which exception must be taken.

There is a bibliographical note and an index.

LIVINGSTONE, SIR RICHARD WINN. *On Education.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 240. $3.00.

LOCKHART, WILLIAM B., and MCCLURE, ROBERT C. *Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution.* Minneapolis: Law Review Foundation, Univ. of Minnesota, 1954. Pp. 99. Paper, $1.00.

MACH, ERNEST. *The Principles of Physical Optics.* Tr. by John S. Anderson and A. F. A. Young. New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. x + 324. $3.50; paper, $1.75.

The first English translation of this work was published in 1926, and it has exerted a great influence on the philosophy of science. Mach believed in the validity of scientific thought, though he seems to have been skeptical about the ability of the mind to transcend experience. He thought that science consisted of theoretical explanations which were verified by facts. His conception of fact and his theory of verification appear rather naive today, and yet they are at the basis of many philosophies of science. As a study in the philosophy of science, the book has special interest because of its author's competence in physical theory.

MACKINNON. *On the Notion of a Philosophy of History.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 24. Paper, 30¢

MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW. *Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays.* Introd. by Robert Redfield. New York: Doubleday & Co.; spring, 1954. Paper, 85¢

Man's Right to Knowledge. New York: Herbert Muschel, Box 800, Grand Central; 1954. Pp. 102. Paper, $1.00.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *Approaches to God.* "World Perspectives Series." New York: Harper & Bros.; Sept., 1954. $2.75.

———. *The Degrees of Knowledge.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. A new translation is in preparation.

MAYER, CHARLES L. *In Quest of a New Ethics.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. Pp. 334. $4.00.

MCCORMICK, MARY JOSEPHINE. *Diagnostic Casework in the Thomistic Pattern.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 253. $3.50.

MCGILL, V. J. *Emotions and Reasons.* Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1954. Pp. 137. $3.25.

MCKEON, RICHARD PETER. *Thought, Action and Passion.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 313. $5.00.

McNair, Sir Arnold Duncan. *The Development of International Justice.* New York: Oceana Publs., 1954. Pp. 34. $2.50.

Melzer, John Henry. *Practical Aspects of the Teaching of Philosophy.* Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press; Sept., 1954. $2.50.

Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century.* 2d ed. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. xi + 528. $6.50.

Miller, Perry Gilbert Eddy (ed.). *American Thought, Civil War to World War I.* New York: Rinehart & Co., 1954. Pp. 407. Paper, 95¢

Modern Education and Human Values. "Pitcairn-Crabbe Foundation Lecture Series," Vol. V. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1954. Pp. 86. $3.00.

This volume of the Pitcairn-Crabbe Foundation Lectures contains lectures by Mildred McAfee Horton, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Hu Shih, and James Phinney Baxter, III. The first lecture, by Mrs. Horton, has the title "Moral and Religious Assumptions in America's Educational Heritage" and sets these assumptions forth in a brief but comprehensive way. The second, by Dr. Fosdick, is called "The Most Critical Problem in our American Universities"; the problem is identified as the universities' failure to teach anything about religion, philosophy, and moral values; the author makes a strong plea for the right of students to learn something about them in the public schools. The third lecture, by Dr. Shih, "An Oriental Looks at the Modern Western Civilization," expresses his evaluation of the "spiritual" and "material" values of the West. The fourth lecture, "The Human Values of American History," by Dr. Baxter, touches somewhat lightly on the lessons to be learned from early American history.

Moore, Virginia. *The Unicorn. William Butler Yeats' Search for Reality.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. 538. $6.50.

Mounier, Emmanuel. *Be Not Afraid.* New York: Harper & Bros.; July, 1954. $3.50.

Mourant, John A. (ed.). *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Crowell Co., 1954. Pp. 511. $2.95.

Muckle, J. T., C.S.B. (tr.). *The Story of Abelard's Adversities.* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1954. Pp. 70.

This is an excellent translation of Abelard's *Historia Calamitatum.* It has extensive and wisely-chosen explanatory notes and a brief introductory preface by Etienne Gilson.

Murray, A. R. M. *An Introduction to Political Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. 247. $4.75.

Myrdal, Gunnar. *The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory.* Tr. from the German by Paul Streeten. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 265. $5.00.

Nagel, Ernest. *Sovereign Reason and Other Studies in the Philosophy of Science.* Glencoe: Free Press; August, 1954. $4.50.

Neumann, Erich. *The Origins and History of Consciousness.* Tr. by R. F. C. Hull. Foreword by C. G. Jung. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. Pp. 517. $5.00.

Nolan, Paul. *Saint Thomas and the Unconscious Mind.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 30. Paper, apply.

Norwood, Gilbert. *Essays on Euripidean Drama.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1954. $5.00.

Nowell-Smith, Patrick. *Ethics.* Baltimore: Penguin Books; June, 1954. 85¢

Onians, Richard Broxton. *The Origins of European Thought.* 2d ed. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 601. $9.50.

Oppenheimer, J. Robert. *Science and the Common Understanding.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954. Pp. 120. $2.75.

Oursler, Fulton. *Why I Know There Is A God.* Garden City, New York: Permabooks, 1954. Pp. 160. Paper, 35¢

[Paine, Thomas.] *Inspiration and Wisdom from the Writings of Thomas Paine.* Ed. by Joseph Lewis. New York: Freethought Press Assn., 1954. Pp. 313. flex. lea., $5.00.

Patton, Kenneth L. *Man's Hidden Search. An Inquiry into Naturalistic Mysticism.* Boston: Meeting House Press, 1954. Pp. 123. $2.50.

This is a rather eloquent, rhetorical presentation by a Universalist minister of "naturalistic religion," culminating in a "naturalistic mysticism." This kind of religion seems to be composed of friendship, self-knowledge, athomeness with the world, and a delight in living and with the arts. The mysticism in question would seem to be a sinking into a vivid but sheerly sensory immediacy. The philosophical view back of this is a materialism stressing the dynamism, the interaction, and the interchange of material energy-particles.

Parkinson, G. H. R. *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 197. $3.70.

Pattie, Frank A. *Learning Theory, Personality Theory, and Clinical Research.* New York: Wiley & Sons, 1954.

Pearson, Ralph M. *The Modern Renaissance in American Art.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. 325. $6.50.

Perry, Ralph Barton. *Realms of Value.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 509. $7.50.

Piaget, Jean. *Construction of Reality in the Child.* New York: Basic Books; August, 1954. $6.00.

Pieper, Josef. *Fortitude and Temperance.* Tr. from the German by Daniel F. Coogan. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. Pp. 128. $2.75.

Plamenatz, John. *German Marxism and Russian Communism.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. $5.50.

Plato. *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Symposium.* Revised Jowett translation by Moses Hadas. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954. Pp. 155. Paper, 80¢

———. *The Last Days of Socrates.* Tr. by Ronald Searle. Baltimore: Penguin Books. 50¢

———. *The Last Days of Socrates: The Apology, Crito, Phaedo.* Tr. by Hugh Tredennick. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 167. Paper, 50¢

Polya. *Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning.* 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954. $6.00; $5.00.

Pound, Roscoe. *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.* Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 209. $3.50.

Price, H. H. *Some Aspects of the Conflict between Science and Religion.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 58. Paper, 75¢

Pulos, C. E. *The Deep Truth.* Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 124. $2.75.

Quilty, Roger Paul. *The Influence of Hughes Felicité de Lamennais' Epistemology on His Theory of Democracy.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1954. Pp. 24. Paper, 50¢

Raju, P. T. *Idealistic Thought of India.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 454. $6.50.

Rapoport, Anatol. *Operational Philosophy.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. 269. $3.75.

Raven, Charles Earle. *Experience and Interpretation.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 233. $4.00.

Reaver, J. Russell. *Emerson as Myth-Maker.* Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1954. $2.00.

Reulet, Anibal Sánches. *Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy.* Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press; July, 1954. $5.00.

Riesman, David. *Individualism Reconsidered, and Other Essays.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1954. Pp. 529. $6.00.

Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and Their Faculties. Princeton: Princeton Univ., Dept. of Public Relations; 1953. Paper, apply.

ROBINSON, RICHARD. *Plato's Earlier Dialectic.* 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. x + 286. $5.00.

ROGERS, CARL R., and DYMOND, ROSALIND F. (eds.). *Psychotherapy and Personality Change.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Sept., 1954. $6.00.

ROOS, H. *Kierkegaard and Catholicism.* Westminster: Newman Press; August, 1954. $2.75.

ROPER, ELMO. *American Attitudes on World Organization.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. Paper, 35¢

ROSENBERG, MAX. *Introduction to Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; August, 1954. $6.00.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. (ed.). *Treasury of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1954. Pp. 1200. $15.00.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Analysis of Matter.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. $3.95; paper, $1.85.

———. *Mysticism and Logic.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954. $2.75.

RUSSELL, WILLIAM F. *How to Judge a School.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. ix + 143. $2.50.

This book is subtitled "A Handbook for Puzzled Parents and Tired Taxpayers." The author seeks to explain and justify the best in American educational practice. By and large his proposals are sound. Often, however, he sets up bogey-men (various types of un-American education), which he criticizes very easily. Such a procedure is indeed rhetorically effective, but it betrays, I believe, an inadequate understanding on the author's part.

RYAN, MONSIGNOR JOHN KENNETH. *Basic Principles and Problems of Philosophy.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1954. Pp. 221. $2.50.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Three Philosophical Poets.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Paper, 65¢

SCHANCK, RICHARD L. *The Permanent Revolution in Science.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. 128. $3.00.

SCHRÖDINGER, ERWIN. *Nature and the Greeks.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 97. $2.00.

SCOTT, GEOFFREY. *Architecture of Humanism.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; July, 1954. 85¢

SHELDON, WILMON HENRY. *God and Polarity: A Synthesis of Philosophies.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 712. $8.00.

This work should rank as one of the best major efforts at synthesis ever attempted by an American philosopher. A lifetime of reading, thought and experience have gone into the volume. In a series of brilliant chapters, the author discusses the criterion of reality, rival types of philosophy, idealism, materialism, Scholasticism, process, and irrationalism (existentialism and similar modern movements). In a final chapter, the author sums up his results.

In the author's evaluation of philosophies, there is a strong emphasis on the empirical and even pragmatic aspects. The principle of polarity is not used rigidly or in any a priori manner; it is a suggestive rather than a systematic principle. The author's own genius for synthesis leads him to look with a great deal of favor on Thomism.

SHERRINGTON, SIR CHARLES. *Man on His Nature.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Paper, 85¢

SMITH, VINCENT. *St. Thomas and the Object of Geometry.* "1953 Aquinas Lecture." Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press; Fall, 1954. $2.00.

SOLOMON, JOSEPH C. *A Synthesis of Human Behavior.* New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954. Pp. 265. $5.50.

SONNEMANN, ULRICH. *Existence and Therapy.* New York: Grune & Stratton, 1954. Pp. 392. $8.00.

STALLKNECHT, N. P., and BRUMBAUGH, R. S. *The Compass of Philosophy.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Pp. 288.

STERRING, L. SUSAN. *Logic in Practice.* 4th ed. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954. Pp. xi + 90. $1.50.

This is an expensive little introduction by one of the better British writers. The text has been corrected by C. W. K. Mundle. The book might be offered to one who knows nothing of logic and might want to know a little. It is not suitable for classroom use, though a lecturer, looking for material for a single lecture on logic, might find some very useful things here.

STEVENS, DAVID HARRISON. *The Changing Humanities.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. 272. $4.00.

STIERNOTTE, ALFRED P. *God and Space-Time.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; August, 1954. $5.00.

Studies in Intellectual History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953. Pp. 233. $3.75.

SUCKLING, NORMAN. *Paul Valery and the Civilized Mind.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 285. $4.00.

SUMMERS, ROBERT EDWARD. *Freedom and Loyality in Our Colleges.* New York: H. W. Wilson, 1954. Pp. 214. $1.75.

SWABEY, MARIE COLLINS. *The Judgment of History.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. x + 257. $3.75.

This is a discussion of the validity of the "judgment of history." The author argues for evaluation of the past in a wide perspective and in relation to some comprehensive and objective framework and condemns a strictly naturalistic and relativistic view of history.

TAYLOR, A. E. *Socrates.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Paper, 65¢

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *Truth.* Vol. III, qq. 21-29. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Sept., 1954. $7.50.

THOMAS, HENRY, and THOMAS, DANA LEE. *Living Adventures in Philosophy.* Garden City: Hanover House, 1954. Pp. 320. $2.95.

TILLICH, PAUL JOHANNES. *Love, Power, and Justice.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 135. $2.50.

TITUS, HAROLD H. *Ethics for Today.* 2d ed. New York: American Book Co., 1954. Pp. 576. $4.75.

UNAMUNO, MIGUEL DE. *Tragic Sense of Life.* Tr. by J. E. Crawford Flitch. New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. xxxv + 332. $3.95; paper, $1.90.

This translation was first published in 1921 and has long been out of print. The publishers have done a great service in making it available again, and in an excellent form at a very reasonable price. For Unamuno could be reckoned with the existentialists, except that he has preserved a vigor of spirit, a sincerity, a love of truth, and a depth of feeling that are far removed from the superficial dramatics that often mar the movement in its contemporary forms.

UNTERSTEINER, MARIO. *The Sophists.* Tr. by Kathleen Freeman. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xvi + 368. $6.00.

This work was first published in 1948; the English translation was published in Great Britain in 1953. The author says that he intends to expound the philosophy of the Sophists from their sources. He maintains that the Sophists were not skeptics at all; their tendency was rather to show the irrationalism both in nature and in law. The evidence of the fragments shows quite clearly that their main interest was in ethics and political philosophy. In the field of political theory, the Sophists can perhaps be called the first "realists" (in the German sense of *Realpolitik*).

There is a selective bibliography of nine pages, which is of special value to an English student because it includes so many German and Italian sources. There is a detailed index of persons and deities; the index of subjects is divided into English and Greek terms.

VEBLEN, THORSTEIN. *High Learning in America.* "American Culture and Economics Series," No. 3. New York: Academic Press; Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1954. $4.00.

VIVAS, ELISEO. *Creation and Discovery.* New York: Noonday Press; Oct., 1954. $5.00.

VON FRITZ, KURT. *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity. A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Thought.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Nov., 1954. Pp. 500. $7.50.

VREEDE, FRANS. *Short Introduction to the Essentials of Living Hindu Philosophy.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 71. Paper, $1.00.

[WEBER, MAX.] *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society.* Ed. with an introd. by Max Rheinstein. Tr. from the German by Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 435. $6.00.

WELLS, HARRY KOHLSAAT. *Pragmatism, Philosophy of Imperialism.* New York: International Publs., 1954. Pp. 221. $2.75; paper, $1.50.

WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP. *Burning Fountain.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Sept., 1954. $6.00.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, as Recorded by Lucien Price.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1954. Pp. 396. $5.00.

WILLEY, BASIL. *The Seventeenth Century Background.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Paper, 85¢

WILLIAMS, CECIL. *The Foundation of Intelligence.* New York: Comet Press, 1953. Pp. 126. $2.50.

WIMSATT, W. K., JR. *Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry.* Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1954. $4.00.

WISE, JENNINGS C. *Philosophical History.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1954. $4.75.

WOOD, ALEXANDER, and OLDHAM, FRANK. *Thomas Young, Natural Philosopher, 1773-1829.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 375. $6.00.

WYSCHOGROD, MICHAEL. *Kierkegaard and Heidegger.* New York: Humanities Press, 1954. Pp. 168. $3.00.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Aesthetics and Language. Ed. with an introd. by William Elton. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. vi + 186. $4.75.

ANDREWS, GLADYS. *Creative Rhythmic Movement for Children.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. viii + 198. $4.75.

ARNOLD, MAGDA B.; GASSON, JOHN A., S.J., and OTHERS. *The Human Person.* New York: Ronald Press Co., 1954. Pp. x + 593. $5.75.

ASSOCIAZIONE FILOSOFICA LIGURE. *Relazioni e Discussioni (1951-1952).* Milan: Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1953. Pp. 169.

ASVELD, PAUL. *La pensée religieuse de jeune Hegel. Liberté et aliénation.* Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer & Cie., 1953. Pp. ix + 244. $2.70.

AVEY, ALBERT E. *Handbook in the History of Philosophy.* "College Outline Series." New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954. Pp. xvi + 320. Paper, $1.50.

AYER, A. J. *Philosophical Essays.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. Pp. xi + 289. $4.50.

BARNHART, T. A.; DONNELLY, WILLIAM A.; and SMITH, LEWIS C., JR. *Viewpoints. Readings for Analysis.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xi + 456. $3.95.

BARRELL, JOSEPH. *A Philosophical Study of the Human Mind.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xii + 575. $6.00.

BAUMS, ROBERT. *Die Rätsel im Weltgeschehen.* Bonn: J. F. Carthaus, 1949. Pp. 69. Paper, $1.00.

BLAKE, CLINTON H., JR. *An Elementary Introduction to Religion and Christianity.* Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1954. Pp. 63. $1.75.

BRAGG, WILLIAM, SIR. *Concerning the Nature of Things.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. xi + 232. $2.75; paper, $1.25.

BRAUN, FRANÇOIS-MARIE, and OTHERS. *Morale chrétienne et requetes contemporaines.* Paris: Casterman, 1954. Pp. 291. 90 fr.

BRODY, LEON, and STACH, HERBERT J. (eds.). *Highway Safety and Driver Education.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xvi + 464. $4.50.

CAPELLE, WILHELM. *Geschichte der Philosophie.* Band II. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1953. Pp. 144. DM 2.40.

CARTER, RUSSELL GORDON. *Mr. Whatley Enjoys Himself.* Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1954. Pp. 156. $2.50.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Platonic Renaissance in England.* Tr. by James P. Pettegrove. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1953. Pp. viii + 207. $3.50.

COLLINS, JAMES. *A History of Modern European Philosophy.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1954. Pp. x + 854. $9.75.

COSTELLO, HARRY TODD. *A Philosophy of the Real and the Possible.* "Woodbridge Lectures," No. 4. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 153. $2.75.

CUVELIER, FERNAND. *Dieu n'habite pas au 74.* Malines: Editions du C.E.L.F., 1953. Pp. 160.

DE BUCK, J. M. *Éducateurs a la dérive.* Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953. Pp. 193.

DEFERRARI, ROY J. (ed.). *The Social Sciences in Catholic College Programs.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1954. Pp. vi + 180. Paper.

DEL VECCHIO, GIORGIO. *Philosophy of Law.* Tr. by Thomas Owen Martin. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. xxiv + 474. $6.50.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Essays in Experimental Logic.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. 444. $3.50; paper, $1.75.

Dictionary of European History. Ed. by William S. Roeder. Introd. by Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. viii + 316. $6.00.

ELSBREE, WILLARD S., and REUTTER, E. EDMUND, JR. *Staff Personnel in the Public Schools.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. x + 438. $4.65.

EVERETT, MILLARD S. *Ideals of Life. An Introduction to Ethics and the Humanities, with Readings.* New York: Wiley & Sons, 1954. Pp. xiv + 736. $5.00.

FLETCHER, F. T. H. *Pascal and the Mystical Tradition.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. vii + 156. $4.75.

FORSYTHE, CHARLES E. *Administration of High School Athletics.* 3d ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xvi + 462. $5.00.

FRIEDRICH, C. J., and MCCLOSKEY, ROBERT G. (eds.). *From the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution; the Roots of American Constitutionalism.* "The American Heritage Series," No. 6. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. lxviii + 71. Paper, 75¢

God, Man and the Universe. A Christian Answer to Modern Materialism. Ed. by Jacques de Bivort de La Saudée. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1954. Pp. xvi + 421. $7.50.

GRABOWSKI, STANISLAUS J. *The All-Present God, A Study in St. Augustine.* St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954. Pp. xi + 327. $4.50.

GRANDMAISON, JEAN LE COUR. *Le monde n'est pas un "combinat" géant.* Tournai, Belgium: Desclée & Cie., 1954. Pp. 85.

GUITTON, JEAN. *Dialogues avec monsieur Pouget; Sur la pluralité des mondes, le Christ des Évangiles et l'avenir de notre espèce.* Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1954. Pp. 259.

HALLDEN, SOREN. *Emotive Propositions.* Stockholm: Almquist & Widsells Boktryckeri, 1954. Pp. 232.

Hamilton, Madison and Jay on the Constitution. Selections from the Federalist Papers. Ed. by Ralph H. Gabriel. "The American Heritage Series," No. 7. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. xviii + 231. $2.25; paper, 90¢

Handbook of Private Schools: An Annual Descriptive Survey of Independent Education. 35th ed. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1954. Pp. 1228. $8.00.

HOUDE, ROLAND, and FISCHER, JEROME J. *Handbook of Logic.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown & Co., 1954. Pp. xviii + 156. $2.65.

———. *Workbook of Logic.* Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown & Co., 1954. Pp. iii + 138. $1.75.

Institute for Philosophical Research, Biennial Report 1952-54. Ed. by Mortimer J. Adler. San Francisco: Institute for Philosophical Research, 1954. Pp. 68.

In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board. Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1954. Pp. 993. Paper, $2.75.

JAEGER, WERNER. *Paideia, Die Formung des griechischen Menschen.* Band I. 3d ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1954. Pp. vii + 513. DM 14.80.

JERSILD, ARTHUR T. *Child Psychology.* 4th ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xii + 676. $6.00.

JOLIVET, RÉGIS. *De Rosmini a Lachelier. Essai de philosophie comparée.* Paris: E. Vitte, 1953. Pp. 255.

———. and MAXENCE, J. P. *Manuel de Philosophie: I, Psychologie.* Lyons: E. Vitte, 1953. Pp. 480. 900 fr.

KESSLER, JOHN J. *General Semantics and Medieval Scholasticism.* Saint Louis: author, 1953. Pp. 32. Paper.

———. *General Semantics from Francis Bacon to Alfred Korzybski.* Saint Louis: author, 1954.

———. *The Three Hills of Semantika.* St. Louis: author, 1953. Pp. iv + 24.

KILZER, E., and Ross, E. J. *Western Social Thought.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; March, 1954. Pp. x + 516. $6.50.

KIMPEL, BEN. *The Symbols of Religious Faith.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. x + 198. $3.75.

LABOURDETTE, M. M. *Foi catholique et problèmes modernes.* Tournai, Belgium: Desclée & Cie., 1953. Pp. 168.

LEGGETT, GLENN; MEAD, C. DAVID; and CHARVAT, WILLIAM. *Prentice-Hall Handbook for Writers.* 2d ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xx + 544. $2.95.

LIPSON, LESLIE. *The Great Issues of Politics.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xvi + 431. $5.25.

MACH, ERNST. *The Principles of Physical Optics.* Tr. by John S. Anderson and A. F. A. Young. New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. x + 324. $3.50; paper, $1.75.

MARC, ANDRE, S.J. *Dialectique de l'agir.* "Collection problèmes et doctrines," Vol. IV. Paris: E. Vitte. Pp. 558. 2.400 fr.

Marriage. Chicago: Fides, 1954. Pp. 31. 25¢

Mary, God's Masterpiece. New York: Perpetual Help Press, 1954. Pp. 65. $2.00.

Mass, The. Chicago: Fides, 1954. Pp. 31. 25¢

MAYER, P. EMMANUEL, O.F.M. *Die objektivitat der Werterkenntnis bei Nicolai Hartmann.* Meisenheim am Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1952. Pp. 176. DM 12.80; paper, DM 10.50.

MCCAHILL, TOM. *The Modern Sports Car.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. x + 228. $3.95.

Modern Education and Human Values. "Pitcairn-Crabbe Foundation Lecture Series," Vol. V. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1954. Pp. 86. $3.00.

MUCKLE, J. T. (tr.) *The Story of Abelard's Adversities.* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1954. Pp. 70.

The New Testament. Tr. from the Greek by James A. Kleist, S.J., and Joseph L. Lilly, C.M. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1954. Pp. xii + 690. $5.00.

NOWELL-SMITH, P. H. *Ethics.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 324. Paper, 85¢

Our Faith in Pharmacy. Covington: Druggists' Guild of St. James, 1953. Pp. 30. Paper, 25¢

PATKA, FEDERICO. *O Estruturalismo de Eduard Spranger.* São Paulo: author, 1953. Pp. 98.

PATTON, KENNETH L. *Man's Hidden Search. An Inquiry into Naturalistic Mysticism.* Boston: Meeting House Press, 1954. Pp. 123. $2.50.

Perspectives in Philosophy. Essays by Members of the Department of Philosophy of the Ohio State University. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1954. Pp. iv + 148.

PIEPER, JOSEF. *La Fin des temps. Méditation sur la philosophie de l'histoire.* Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953. Pp. 201. $1.00.

———. *The End of Time. A Meditation on the Philosophy of History.* Tr. by Michael Bullock. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. Pp. 157. $2.75.

QUIGLEY, MARTIN. *The Motion Picture Production Code. Its Character and Purposes.* New York: Motion Picture Assn. of America, 1954.

ROSSI, GIOVANNI FELICE, C.M. *Il quarto pioniere della commissione Leonina. P. Clemente Suermondt O.P.* Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1954. Pp. 35.

RUSSELL, WILLIAM F. *How to Judge a School.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. ix + 143. $2.50.

The Sargent Guide to Summer Camps. 9th ed. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1954. Pp. 128. Paper, $1.10.

SCHEEBEN, MATTHIAS JOSEPH. *Nature and Grace.* Tr. by Cyril Vollert, S.J. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954. Pp. xxiv + 361. $4.95.

SCHLEICHER, CHARLES P. *Introduction to International Relations.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xvi + 941. $6.75.

SCHRÖDINGER, E. *Science et humanisme, la physique de notre temps.* Tr. from the English by J. Ladrière. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954. Pp. 123.

Science et liberté, rapports et débats du congrès de Hambourg, 1953. Paris: Preuves, 1954. Pp. 126. 120 fr.

SHELDON, WILMON HENRY. *God and Polarity: A Synthesis of Philosophies.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 712. $8.00.

SMITH, HENRY P. *Psychology in Teaching.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xiii + 466. $4.95.

SMITH, LILIAN BENNETT, and BARRETT, JEAN. *The House Is Still.* Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1954. Pp. 74. $2.00.

STEBBING, L. SUSAN. *Logic in Practice.* 4th ed. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954. Pp. xi + 90. $1.50.

STEVEN, PAUL. *Elements de morale sociale.* Preface by His Excellency, Monseigneur Paul Richaud, Archbishop of Bordeaux. Tournai, Belgium: Desclée & Cie., 1954. Pp. viii + 612.

STRASSER, STEPHAN. *Le problème de l'âme. Études sur l'objet respectif de la psychologie métaphysique et de la psychologie empirique.* Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Desclée de Bouwer & Cie., 1953. Pp. xiv + 257. $3.60.

SWABEY, MARIE COLLINS. *The Judgment of History.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. x + 257. $3.75.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *Opuscula Philosophica.* Introd. and notes by Raymund M. Spiazzi, O.P. Torino: Marietti Editori, 1954. Pp. xxxi + 379.

———. *Opuscula Theologica.* Vol. I, *De Re Dogmatica et Morali.* Introd. and notes by Raymund A. Verardo, O.P., Vol. II, *De Re Spirituali.* Introd. and notes by Raymund M. Spiazzi, O.P., to which has been added *De Trinitate*

and *De Hebdomadibus* with an introd. and notes by M. Calcaterra, O.P. Torino: Marietti Editori, 1954. Pp. xviii + 531; xi + 441.

TURNER, PEARL IVA. *Living the More Abundant Life.* Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1954. Pp. 72. $2.00.

UNAMUNO, MIGUEL DE. *Tragic Sense of Life.* Tr. by J. E. Crawford Flitch. New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. xxxv + 332. $3.95; paper, $1.90.

UNTERSTEINER, MARIO. *The Sophists.* Tr. by Kathleen Freeman. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xvi + 368. $6.00.

VANCOURT, RAYMOND. *La phénoménologie et la foi.* Tournai: Desclée & Cie., 1953. Pp. 127.

VLAVIANOS, BASIL J., and GROSS, FELIKS. *Struggle for Tomorrow, Modern Political Ideologies of the Jewish People.* New York: Arts, Inc., 1954. Pp. 303. $6.50.

WAHL, JEAN. *Les philosophies de l'existence.* Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954. Pp. 176. 250 fr.

WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP. *The Way of Philosophy.* New York: Odyssey Press, 1954. Pp. xv + 617. $4.50.

Where to Buy Supplies for Educational Institutions. 14th ed. Boston: Porter Sargent Publs., 1954. Pp. 160.

WIMSATT, W. K. JR. *The Verbal Icon, Studies in the Meaning of Poetry.* Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1954. Pp. xviii + 299. $4.00.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus.* "Archivum Philosophicum Aloisianum," Series III, Vol. 1. Original text, translation with critical introd. and notes by G. C. M. Colombo, S.J. Milan: Fratelli Boca Editori, 1954. Pp. 331. Paper, 3,000 lire.

NOVEMBER 1,
FEAST OF ALL SAINTS

INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY

Edited by A. M. HENRY, O.P.

The Theology Library, six volumes, is an effort to fill the gap between the simplified textbook and the seminary manuals. Inspired by the great synthesis of Saint Thomas, a team of over forty theologians have conceived and presented a work destined to be a teacher for the faithful of our times, a real initiation to theology.

INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY begins the series with a systematic presentation of all the elements which must be consulted in theological research: Tradition, Holy Scripture, the Liturgy, Canon Law, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, the Creeds, Tradition in the Oriental Churches, the Ecumenical Councils, and Christian Art and Gregorian Chant. They are the elements from which a synthesis of Christian truth can be constructed.

Volume One now ready $5.95

THE CHURCH: A DIVINE MYSTERY

ROGER HASSEVELDT

In answer to those who today question, "Why the Church?", Father Hasseveldt looks at the Church from within, as a believer who seeks to discover the splendors and challenges of his faith. He is concerned with the connection between Christ and the Church, and the need for going through the Church in order to live by and in Christ. For the classroom or the individual who wishes to make further inquiries into the mystery of the Church, the study projects at the end of each chapter will be especially useful.

Just released $4.50

Order from your bookdealer

FIDES PUBLISHERS Chicago 10, Illinois

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY

A Jesuit Institution

Founded 1818

"Democracy is built upon the bedrock of Christian education . . ."

CONSTITUENT SCHOOLS

Labor College
School of Law
Graduate School
School of Nursing
School of Divinity
School of Medicine
School of Dentistry
School of Social Service
Institute of Technology
Institute of Social Science
College of Arts and Sciences
School of Commerce and Finance
College of Philosophy and Letters
Parks College of Aeronautical Technology

CORPORATE COLLEGES

Webster College
Maryville College
Fontbonne College
St. Mary's Junior College
Notre Dame Junior College

Saint Louis University owns and operates

Radio Station WEW

Saint Louis 3 Missouri